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Distribution network pricing plays an important role in maximising the economic ben­
eﬁts of providing the network services to both the utilities and other market partici­
pants. It is essential in providing economic signals to serve two key purposes: 
•	 to incentivise efﬁcient utilisations of existing distribution facilities; 
•	 to guide the siting of future generation and demand. 
Many pricing methodologies have been developed since the late 80’s. In the UK, the 
distribution reinforcement model (DRM) has been the foundation for the distribution 
tariff setting since its introduction. However, DRM is deemed inefﬁcient in providing 
locational economic signals, especially when the contribution of distributed generation 
(DG) is getting more signiﬁcant. Hence, two other economic pricing methodologies, 
long-run incremental cost (LRIC) pricing and forward cost pricing (FCP) methodolo­
gies, were developed to resolve the drawbacks of DRM. The LRIC pricing model is 
the most advanced pricing model to date that is capable of reﬂecting both the ’dis­
tance’ and the degree of utilisation of the network assets. On the other hand, the FCP 
approach provides limited economic signals as it groups nodes to a network group, 
where the nodes have the same charges. 
This work focused on improving the basic LRIC pricing methodology to provide ef­
ﬁcient economic signals to the network users. This basic LRIC pricing methodology, 
however, has some major issues that are preventing its practical deployment. The is­
sues addressed in this work includes: 
•	 determining the network assets’ maximum capacity margin to withstand credible 
contingencies 
•	 determining the network assets’ reinforcement time horizon due to their evalu­
ated circuit loading growth rates 





The LRIC pricing methodology is then assessed by comparing its pricing signals with 
those of the FCP methodology. In addition, the long-term impact or beneﬁts of the 
three pricing methodologies implemented or going to be implemented in the UK are 
assessed by measuring their efﬁciency through a 20-year study that involves customer 
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HE introduction brieﬂy describes the background, themotivation, 
T the objectives, the challenges and the contribution of this thesis. It also provides an overview of the thesis layout. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 UK Electricity Distribution Network Economics 
As a result of the deregulation of the electricity power industry around the world, 
electricity markets were formed and developed. This eventually moved the electric­
ity power industry from a monopoly structure to a competitive environment. In the 
UK, privatisation was introduced in the electricity supply industry in 1990 as a way of 
increasing efﬁciency and reducing costs. Many studies and assessments have been car­
ried out about the privatisation since then [1, 2, 3]. In different deregulation processes 
the institution and market designs were often very different but many underlying con­
cepts were the same, for instance, separating the contestable functions (generation and 
supply) from the natural monopoly functions (transmission and distribution). This is 
achieved by introducing competition to generation and supply, and applying regula­
tion on the latter to ensure open, non-discriminatory access to the grid for all market 
participants. 
Some major industrial users and large plants connect directly to the grid. However, 
electricity for most industrial users and commerce premises, and all domestic users 
are supplied through the 14 lower voltage distribution networks in th UK, which are 
connected to the grid itself. Smaller plants, or distributed generation (DG), can also 
connect directly to the distribution network. Figure 1.1 shows the electricity networks 
and their customers [4]. 
These distribution networks are owned by distribution network operators (DNOs). 
The DNOs are responsible for the provision of the distribution services and are reg­
ulated by the Ofﬁce of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem). They have the duty to 
connect any customers requiring electricity within their area and maintain an efﬁcient, 
co-ordinated and economical supply to them thereafter. 
In order to recover their costs, the 2000 Act gives network companies the authority to 
raise revenue by levying use of system charges (delivery of energy) and connection 
charges on generators and suppliers. The distribution use of system (DUoS) charges 
are paid by generators and suppliers for network reinforcement, maintenance and re­
newal, whilst the connection charges are paid by generators and customers wishing to 
connect for the costs of infrastructure required for new connections. For all DNOs, the 
vast majority of the businesses income is from the charges for use of the distribution 
system, where the revenue from the charges for connection might represent as low as 





Figure 1.1. Electricity networks and their customers [4] 
1.2	 Distribution Network Planning for New Customers in 
Deregulated Environment 
The electricity supply industry is undergoing rapid changes since the late 1980s, such 
as the deregulation of the industry, technological advances (especially in the perfor­
mance of small-scale generating plant), tighter ﬁnancial/lending constraints and in­
creased environmental concerns [4]. The key drivers of these changes are to increase 
plant-operating efﬁciency and reduce the electricity costs for the customers. Besides 
these ﬁnancial drivers, these changes are further driven by social and governmental 
pressure to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Electricity generation is the largest 
producer of greenhouse gases, around 30% of the UK CO2 emissions. Hence, to help 
meet the UK government targets of 15% renewable energy by 2020 and 80% by 2050, 
an interim target was set to increase the UK electricity generated from renewables to 
more than 30% by 2020 [6]. 
The DGs, especially wind generation and combined heat and power (CHP), are hence 





Figure 1.2. Illustrative mix of technologies in lead scenario, 2020 (TWh)[6] 
•	 They have shorter construction times, lower capital costs and quicker payback 
periods; 
•	 The DGs are connected nearer to demand, thus reducing network charges; 
•	 Some particular DGs – renewable electricity and combined heat and power (CHP) 
are encouraged to reduce CO2 emissions. 
Therefore, the conﬁguration, operation and regulation of current electricity networks 
need to be further modiﬁed to accommodate these DGs. Thus, this create signiﬁcant 
technical, commercial and regulatory challenges, especially the techno-commercial chal­
lenge in planning of the electricity networks in this new environment, with the goal of 
enhancing reliability and efﬁciency of the power supply to the customers. 
1.3 Motivation 
Network investment is very expensive and the lead time for investing an infrastructure 
is long, for instance, it can take 7 to 10 years to install overhead lines. Furthermore, 
the incentives for DGs (i.e. reducing connection charges) and DNOs introduced by 
Ofgem might lead to investment in infrastructure only for speciﬁc DGs and it will not 
fund “deeper reinforcement” [7]. Therefore, forward (medium to long term) network 
planning is critical to the delivery of affordable and reliable electricity. 
However, it is very difﬁcult for the network operators to plan their network in the long 
term. This is because the network operators are not in control of the siting, sizing or 
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the types of future generation or demand. Planning according to a series of scenarios 
might eventually turn out to be very different from the network requirements in the 
reality. One of the efﬁcient ways is to guide the future new generation and demand 
to locations requiring the least reinforcements or expansion. This can be done through 
ﬁnancial incentives in the form of network charges to the customers for their use of 
network. 
The Electricity Council developed a distribution pricing methodology in 1984 called 
the distribution reinforcement model (DRM). The model assesses long run incremental 
capacity costs by estimating the capacity cost of accommodating an assumed increment 
of 500MW in the network maximum demand met at each voltage level. The DRM, 
however, is a postage-stamp allocation method and produces prices lack of locational 
differences. This contradicts with the aims to promote competition and guide the siting 
of new customers to facilitate efﬁcient power distribution. Hence, the effectiveness 
of the network charging methodology in providing adequate economic signals has 
become a great concern. 
1.4 Objective 
The objective of this work is to develop a novel network pricing methodology that 
considers and quantiﬁes the long-term network reinforcement costs in accordance to 
the usage of demand and contribution of generation. This work attempts to develop a 
long-term network pricing methodology that have the following features: 
1. Provide forward-looking, economic guidance on efﬁcient siting of the future gen­
eration and demand 
2. Incentivise efﬁcient utilisations of existing network facilities and future develop­
ment 
3. Reﬂect key cost drivers in the pricing model 
4. Be simple to implement and applicable to different networks 
This pricing methodology will need to adequately address the challenges of the future 
huge penetration of renewable generation into the network and, besides guiding the 
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network existing and new customers, give essential economic incentives and indicator 
to the network operators themselves of the area requiring reinforcement or expansion. 
This work is done based on the basic long-run incremental cost (LRIC) pricing method­
ology, developed by University of Bath in conjunction with Western Power Distribu­
tion (WPD) and Ofgem. The basic LRIC pricing methodology is the most advanced 
network pricing methodology that is capable of reﬂecting both the ’distance’ and the 
degree of utilisation of the network assets. However, this model needs to be further 
enhanced as its prices are purely economical and there are still some key issues pre­
venting its practical deployment. These issues will be discussed in more details in 
Section 1.5. 
1.5 The Challenge 
The basic LRIC pricing methodology translates the changes in the assets investment 
horizons due to nodal load/generation increment into long-run investment cost. This 
investment horizon is the time taken for the loading level of a circuit to reach its capac­
ity. 
Various challenges are faced in implementing LRIC pricing methodology to practical 
systems, such as evaluating the maximum capacity margin of the network assets be­
fore reinforcement is needed, evaluating the time taken to reach this assets’ capacity 
margin according to the nodal demand growth forecast, evaluating the ﬁnal tariff and 
assessing the efﬁciency of the pricing model. 
1.5.1 Assets Maximum Capacity Margin Evaluation 
In order to reﬂect the long-term reinforcement costs, the margin, for each asset, when 
reinforcement is needed in the future need to be evaluated. Generally, in the basic LRIC 
pricing methodology, it is deemed to reinforce an asset when it reaches 50% of its rated 
capacity. This is not cost-reﬂective as no proper contingency analysis is carried out 
and the assumption is no way close to reality. Hence it is critical that a full contingency 
analysis is performed at the results is translated to the maximum allowed loading level 
for each asset. 
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1.5.2 Reinforcement Time Horizon Evaluation 
The basic LRIC pricing methodology assumes that the loading levels of all the net­
work assets grow at a constant rate of 1%, in order to evaluate the time horizon to 
reinforcement requirements. This assumption is approximately right if all the demand 
and generation in the distribution network are growing at 1% each year. However, de­
mand connected at different nodes has high chances to be different due to the location 
and types of demand. Moreover, it is not rational to assume that generation has the 
same features as demand, i.e. growing gradually. Instead, generation normally grows 
as a big lump sum unless the generation in question is microgeneration. Therefore, 
appropriate evaluation method has to be developed to get a better estimation of the 
reinforcement time horizon for each asset in the network. 
1.5.3 Final Tariﬀ Evaluation 
Often, the revenue recovered from the network prices does not meet the targeted al­
lowed revenue of the network operators. Hence, some scaling methods need to be 
used to evaluate the ﬁnal tariff for the distribution use of system charges. The scaling 
method applied to the pricing model needs to: 
• Preserve the economical signals provided by the network charges 
• Be simple to implement 
1.5.4 Eﬃciency Assessment 
Qualitative and quantitative assessments to measure the economic efﬁciency of the 
proposed network pricing methodology need to be performed and compared with 
other pricing methodologies. This is to verify that the pricing methodology proposed 
meets the objectives set out for the work. The resulting prices and the pricing signals 
are investigated in the qualitative assessment and the interaction between the price, 
the network planning and resulting customers behaviours are modelled in the quanti­
tative assessments. 
1.6 Contribution 




Chapter 1	 Introduction 
•	 To bring a deeper understanding of the principle and the economic signals of the 
network pricing methodologies currently used in the UK; 
•	 To develop a new pricing methodology that better reﬂects the extend of use for 
the existing network and its future development; 
•	 To demonstrate the potential users’ behaviours towards the projected consequent 
network prices, for different pricing methodologies, in a study period of 20 years. 
In so doing, this study attempts to: 
•	 Evaluate a security factor in the pricing methodology that complies to the full N­
1 contingency analysis. It is used to reﬂect the maximum allowed loading level 
of each asset in the network; 
•	 Evaluate a more accurate circuit loading level growth rate due to the nodal load 
growth rate, where existing generation is deemed to have zero growth; 
•	 Demonstrate the principle of three different scaling or revenue reconciliation 
methods and their appropriateness of use in different conditions; 
•	 Compare the network pricing methodologies used in the UK on their principle, 
pricing signals and long-term impacts/beneﬁts to the network development. 
1.7 Thesis Layout 
This thesis is arrange as follows: 
Chapter 2 describes the pricing principles of the network pricing methodologies used 
in the UK, namely the investment cost-related pricing (ICRP) methodology imple­
mented by the transmission network in the UK, the distribution reinforcement model 
(DRM) used by the distribution network companies, and the long-run incremental cost 
(LRIC) pricing and forward cost pricing (FCP) methodologies demanded by Ofgem to 
be implemented by the distribution companies from April 2011 in replacement of the 
DRM. The reasons of establishing network charging for security, deriving circuit load­
ing growth rates and calculating the ﬁnal network tariffs are also discussed. 
Chapter 3 presents the enhanced LRIC pricing methodology that ensures network se­
curity through the evaluation of the security factor in the pricing model. This factor 
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is translated from a full N-1 contingency analysis and an evaluation method using the 
line outage distribution factor. 
Chapter 4 deals with the translation of the nodal existing demand and generation 
growth to the circuit loading level growth of each circuits. In addition, different types 
of circuit loading growth patterns, i.e. positive, negative and zero circuit loading 
growth are modelled and analysed. 
Chapter 5 discusses three different revenue reconciliation methods commonly used, 
namely ﬁxed adder, ﬁxed multiplier and Ramsey method, to demonstrate their suit­
ability in various conditions, such as revenue under-recovery, revenue over-recovery 
and situations where customers are elastic to the prices. 
Chapter 6 compares two of the distribution network pricing methodologies – LRIC and 
FCP, on their pricing signals and their potential users’ behaviours. Sensitivity analysis 
is also carried out to investigate the factors that affect the resulting network prices. 
Chapter 7 assesses the three pricingmethodologies (ICRP, LRIC and FCP) in the longer­
term, i.e. a study period of 20 years, in terms of their resulting customers responses and 
network investments due to the 20-year consequent network prices. The efﬁciency of 
these methodologies are measured by comparing the total investments in the network 
throughout the 20-year study period 







in England and Wales 
HIS chapter summarises the network pricing methodologies de-
T veloped and used in England andWales, namely distribution rein­forcement model (DRM), investment cost-related pricing (ICRP), 
long-run incremental cost (LRIC) pricing and forward cost pricing (FCP). 
Page 10

Chapter 2 Network Pricing Methodology Implemented in England and Wales 
2.1 Introduction 
The concept of distinguishing providing a network service from providing energy was 
introduced in the Energy Act 1983. Identifying the costs of the network service, and 
establishing separate charges for use of the distribution system have been essential 
since then. 
Distribution use of system (DUoS) pricing is playing an increasingly crucial role nowa­
days in conjunction with the signiﬁcance of distributed generation (DG). DUoS pricing 
is important in determining whether providing network services is economically ben­
eﬁcial to both the utilities and other market participants, creating a win-win situation. 
An efﬁcient network pricing methodology will lead to more effective network usage, 
which will next facilitate a more reliable and secure network, and this will reduce the 
costs of delivering electricity to the network customers. 
The pricing of the network services is a technical issue but it is not totally an engi­
neering problem. The engineering part mainly analyses the feasibility and the cost of 
providing the network services, but this only contributes to one of the many considera­
tions in the process of the distribution network pricing. Market and political consider­
ations could also play major roles in determining the network prices [8]. In the UK, the 
government hopes to increase the contribution of renewable electricity and combined 
heat and power (CHP) to the UK energy supplies under the pressure to reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions. In addition to reducing CO2 emissions, these DG and renewable 
energy sources (RES) are also vital in improving the security of energy supplies when 
dependency on imported fossil fuel is decreased [9]. This has caused a signiﬁcant in­
crease in the number of new DG connected or connecting to the distribution network, 
which is located near the network demand. 
Hence, the network pricing model has to be able to reﬂect forward-looking costs and 
have adequate distinction in the cost of siting at different locations, to facilitate efﬁcient 
operation and expansion of the distribution network. 
Studies have been extensively carried out over the years to solve the problems identi­
ﬁed within the DUoS pricing model currently used – distribution reinforcement model 
(DRM). The main drawback is that the DRM is a postage-stamp cost allocation method 
leading to inadequate locational signals. Long-run pricing schemes are increasingly 
favoured, as they include the reinforcement and expansion cost in addition to the oper­
ating cost. Long-run cost pricing methodologies are recognised as more economically 
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efﬁcient since they are forward looking and provide locational signals. However, their 
implementation is often complicated as they involve the allocation of the reinforcement 
costs among the network users [5][8]–[17]. ICRP, LRIC and FCP methodologies, im­
plemented or going to be implemented in the UK, are classiﬁed in the long-run pricing 
schemes. 
Among these pricing methodologies, the LRIC model is the ﬁrst pricing methodology 
that establish the link between nodal customer growth and the changes in investment 
costs, where the utilisations of the network assets are taken into consideration. It is also 
the most advanced pricing model available to date in the UK. Therefore, as mentioned 
in Chapter 1, this basic LRIC pricing methodology is used as the foundation of the 
development of an improved pricing methodology for distribution network. 
This chapter explains the principles of the four methodologies implemented for the 
transmission and distribution network in England and Wales – DRM, ICRP, LRIC and 
FCP methodologies. The mathematical models of these methodologies are also dis­
cussed, using some simple examples in some cases. As LRIC pricing methodology is 
the main focus in this thesis, some major issues affecting the LRIC prices, which are 
yet to be improved for practical implementation, are discussed. 
2.2 Principles of Network Pricing Methodologies 
In the 1984, the Electricity Council developed a methodology for the formulation of 
tariffs for use of the distribution system. This approach is known as the distribution 
reinforcement model (DRM). Since its introduction the DRM has provided the founda­
tion for the distribution tariff for all the DNOs in England and Wales [5]. However, 
it is acknowledged that DRM is not able to provide locational and cost-reﬂective sig­
nals, and hence unable to provide an environment to promote competition between 
generation and suppliers. 
On the other hand, for the transmission pricing in England and Wales, NGC consid­
ered several methodologies in year 1992 [18], and had a preference on the method­
ology called the investment cost-related pricing (ICRP). ICRP provides a more sta­
ble message to the users, in addition to being locational, transparent and simple. In 
year 2004, NGC implemented the DC load ﬂow investment cost-related pricing (DCLF 
ICRP) which has made some further improvements from the original ICRP (will be fur­
ther discussed in Section 2.2.2). ICRP was then the most pragmatic long-run pricing 
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model developed and implemented for network pricing, considering the distance that 
power has to travel to supply demand. 
In year 2007, Western Power Distribution (WPD) implemented long-run incremental 
cost (LRIC) pricing, developed in conjunction with University of Bath. The LRIC ap­
proach considers the utilisation of the existing facilities, in addition to the other fea­
tures like distance and investment horizon. LRIC is also locational, cost-reﬂective and 
transparent. Other DNOs, namely EDF and CE Electric, are also actively developing 
the methodology to apply on the EHV networks. 
In March 2009, Ofgem has decided that it would be appropriate for the DNOs to im­
plement their choice of one of two common charging methodologies – a common LRIC 
model or a common forward cost pricing (FCP) approach developed by the G3 group 
(Scottish and Southern (SSE), Central Networks (CN) and Scottish Power (SP)). DNOs 
are required to implement a revised methodology for the EHV charges by April 2011 
[19]. The FCP approach treats demand and generation differently, considering the dif­
ferent behaviours of these users. FCP, though relatively weaker, provides locational 
signals and is transparent. FCP is said to be able to overcome the potential excessive 
charges of the LRIC approach. 
2.2.1 Distribution Reinforcement Model 
Since its introduction, DRM has been the foundation for the distribution tariff setting 
for all DNOs in England and Wales. The model has been modiﬁed over the years by 
the DNOs to accommodate changes in policy and to ensure the accuracy and relevance 
of the representation. 
Generally, the DRM is an independent network designed as an extension to the existing 
network. The model is designed to be capable of supplying electricity to an additional 
500MW of demand at each voltage levels represented in the model [5]. As it is a 
theoretical 500MW extension of the distribution system, DRM is also known as the 
’500MW model’. 
The Yardstick Tariﬀ 
The DRM aims to simulate a scaled down network instead of the actual network. ’Since 
the model calculates marginal costs, the 500MW ﬁgure has no particular signiﬁcance 
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other than to be large enough to have signiﬁcant impact at all voltage levels in the 
model network, but small enough to dilute the beneﬁt of using a scale model [5].’ 
The DRM takes into account the cost of providing a distribution network but not the 
physical electrical capability of technical performance of the network. The electrical 
capability is obtained using simple, static, load information and equipment ratings in 
this model. 
The DRM calculates a complete set of annuitised rates for user group. The outcomes 
are often referred to as ’yardstick’ tariff outputs with yardsticks produced for differ­
ent voltage level of demand connections, that is low voltage (LV), high voltage (HV), 
extra-high voltage (EHV), and 132kV. From the sum of individual items of equipment 
(lines, cables, transformers and switchgears) needed, the DRM calculates the costs of 
providing the network at each voltage levels. 
The simultaneous maximum demand (SMD) at each voltage level is obtained for the 
DRM calculation. In order to scale the distribution system for modelling, a scaling fac­
tor between the 500 MW and SMD is determined. Next, the 500 MW model is obtained 
by multiplying the original system components’ lengths or quantities. 
500 
Scaling Factor = (2.1) 
SMD 
500MW Model = System Asset× Scaling Factor (2.2) 
Hence, the total asset reinforcement cost to meet 500 MW demand is equivalent to the 
product of 500 MW model and unit cost of the corresponding asset. With a known 
diversity factor (ratio of aggregate maximum demand to the coincident maximum de­
mand), the yardstick, or capital charge is: 
∑(500MW Model × Unit Cost)
Yardstick = (2.3) 
Diversity Factor 
The model is expressed in terms of capital costs but could equally well be expressed in 
terms of costs annuitised over expected useful lives at an appropriate cost of capital, 
i.e: 
∑(500MW Model × Unit Cost)
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After that, the cumulated cost is generated for each voltage level, taking losses into 
account. 
Cumulated Cost = ∑(Yardstick× (1+ Loss%)) (2.5) 
The table in Figure 2.1 at the following page shows a simple example of the DRM 
model. In this example the SMD is assumed to be 250,000MW. 
Operational and maintenance costs and other miscellaneous costs of each customer 
classes are then added into the tariffs. And ﬁnally, the prices may be scaled to match 
the price control target revenue . 
DRM is a simple postage stamp cost allocation approach. The DRM, however, has 
three major drawbacks: 
• Unable to reﬂect appropriate forward looking costs 
• Lack of distinction in the cost of siting at different locations 
• Has little recognition of the cost of reactive power ﬂows 
although DRM provides forward-looking cost by evaluating the cost to accommodate 
an additional 500MW of demand, the costing is based on historical data, i.e. using past 
costs to project future cost. Hence, the DRM prices cannot reﬂect the true forward-
looking investment costs. Therefore, there is a need in developing a new pricing 
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2.2.2 Investment Cost-Related Pricing Methodology 
A new use of system charging methodology, the DC load ﬂow investment cost-related 
pricing (DCLF ICRP), was implemented by National Grid in 2004. This transport 
model, as mentioned in [21], enables the differentiation of the basic nodal costs and 
also allows sensitivity analysis concerning alternative developments of generation and 
demand to be undertaken. 
The basis of the charging to recover revenue is the ICRPmethodology. In ICRP, electric 
power is assumed to ﬂow along the shortest path, while in DCLF ICRP the power 
ﬂow is obtained based on the DC power ﬂow equations. In other words, the circuit 
reactance is taken into account in the DCLF ICRP transport model [22]. 
It has been assumed that a circuit’s impedance is equals to its reactance for DCLF ICRP 
transport model. An example is used to demonstrate this model. Firstly, considering 
the system in Figure 2.2 the total generation is scaled uniformly to match the total 
demand, giving the scaled generation as shown in Figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.2. DCLF ICRP transport model (1) [21] 
With node A as the reference node and the circuit expansion factor for the 400kV cable 
and the 275kV overhead line are 10 and 2 respectively, the DCLF transport algorithm 
evaluates the base case power ﬂow as illustrated in Figure 2.4. 
The total cost for the base case is the sum of the multiplication of the power ﬂow and 
length of the line. 
TotalCost = (450× 10) + (50× 6) + (550× 26) = 19, 100MWkm 
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Figure 2.3. DCLF ICRP transport model (2) [21]

Figure 2.4. DCLF ICRP transport model (3) [21] 
A 1MW of generation is next injected at a node each time with a corresponding 1MW 
offtake (demand) at the reference node, in this case node A. the total MWkm cost is 
recalculated and the difference in cost from the base case is the marginal km cost. 
The marginal km at node C, for instance, is as follow: 
Totalcost = (449.25× 10) + (50.25× 6) + (549.75× 26) = 19, 087.5MWkm 
clearly the overall cost has reduced by 12.5, therefore the marginal km cost for node C 
is -12.5. Hence, ICRP can be derived using Equation 2.6. 
ICRPN = ∑(Unit Costℓ × ΔPℓ × Lℓ) (2.6) 
Where the unit cost is in £/MWkm, ΔPℓ is the change in power ﬂow and Lℓ is the 
length of the circuit. 
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Figure 2.5. DCLF ICRP transport model (4) [21] 
Whilst the DCLF ICRP transport model provides locational signals, the prices given are 
highly volatile. The ﬂow of the circuits may reverse as generation increases (generation 
dominated). This is known as the ’ﬂip-ﬂop’ effect. 
Distribution ICRP 
Distribution ICRP (DICRP)methodology byUniversity of Bath is derived for the Ofgem 
study about the beneﬁts that might arise from charging models based on economic 
principles in autumn 2005 [10]. This pricing methodology differs from the transmis­
sion pricing methodology by having some additional features to meet the distribu­
tion properties. For DICRP, transformations are also modeled as circuits between two 
nodes. Unlike transmission ICRP where its prices are expressed relative to a ’slack 
node’, in the distribution approach each grid supply point is effectively the ’slack node’ 
[23]. Reactive power ﬂow is also considered. 
The DICRP is derived by injecting a 1MW of load or generation at each node (Figure 
2.6) and the power ﬂow at each circuit caused by that injection is compared with the 
original power ﬂow before the injection. The ICRP price is then derived from Equation 
2.6. 
Similar to the transmission ICRP, the distribution ICRP is volatile to the reverse ﬂow 
at the circuits due to generation increase. The ’ﬂip-ﬂop’ effect is the major drawback 
of the ICRP approach as distributed generation is expected to site close to load which 
will eventually cause reverse power ﬂow at some part of the network. Hence, the ICRP 
approach is not suitable to be used at distribution level. 
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Figure 2.6. DICRP and LRIC derivation method 
2.2.3 Long-Run Incremental Cost Pricing Methodology 
Paper [11] proposed the ﬁrst long-run charging methodology that links the nodal gen­
eration/demand increment to changes in circuits and transformers’ investment hori­
zon, which is in turn translated into long run investment cost. The investment horizon 
is dictated by the present loading level, the load growth rate and circuits’ or transform­
ers’ spare capacity. 
Figure 2.7. LRIC: increment of load or generation

In other words, the LRIC model reﬂects the asset costs of meeting an increment of 
generation or demand (Figure 2.6), which for lines and cables will be a function of dis­
tance and also the degree of utilisation. For a given load growth rate, rℓ, of a network 
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component, such as a circuit, the time horizon, nℓ, will be the time taken for the load to 
grow from current loading level of the circuit, Dℓ, to its full loading level, Cℓ, as shown 
in Equation 2.7. It is assumed that when the circuit utilisation reaches its capacity, re­
inforcement will be needed and an asset duplication is assumed to be the investment. 
By rearranging equation 2.7, the time to reinforce can be obtained – Equation 2.8. 
Cℓ = Dℓ(1+ rℓ)
nℓ (2.7) 
log Cℓ − log Dℓ nℓ = (2.8) log(1+ rℓ) 
If there is an injection from node N, causing power ﬂow change along a circuit to 
rise by ΔPℓ, then this will advance or delay the future reinforcement, leading to new 
time horizon- nℓ,new to reinforce. This future investment can be discounted back to its 
present value, which will be a function of the time horizon to the investment. Know­
ing the discount rate, d, the present value of the investment can be evaluated (Equa­
tion 2.9). A load or generation injection will affect the time to reinforce and hence the 
present value of the investment costs. The circuit’s long-run incremental cost is there­
fore the change of its present values PVℓ with and without the increment of load, and 
is then determined using Equation 2.10. 
Asset CostℓPVℓ = (2.9) (1+ d)nℓ 
ΔPVℓ = PVℓ,new − PVℓ 
1 1 




Where d is the discount rate, Asset Costℓ is the asset investment cost and nℓ is the time 
horizon to reinforcement decision. The change in present value is next multiplied by 
an annuity factor (derived according to the asset economical lifetime – 40 years) to 
annuitised the investment costs. 
If there is a total of m circuits supporting the power injection from node N, then the 
long-run incremental cost for node N will be the summation of the changes of present 
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value from all supporting circuits over its nodal injection ΔPiN , as represented by 
equation 2.11. 
∑ΔPV 
LRICN = × Annuity Factor (2.11) 
ΔPiN 
As mentioned in paper [11], the LRIC pricing methodology recognises not only the 
’distance’ power must travel to meet demand but also the degree of circuits’ utilisa­
tion. The LRIC pricing methodology overcomes the drawbacks of the DRM. However, 
LRIC prices are fairly sensitive to the rate of growth of demand. Its publication is also 
relatively difﬁcult considering the model’s complexity and the amount of data needed. 
Although the LRIC pricing model has its merits in providing economical signals to the 
network customers, there are some key issues preventing the pricing model from its 
practical deployment. These issues have to be addressed and tackled. Three of the ma­
jor issues dealt with in this work are the security factor (effective maximum capacity of 
assets), the circuit loading growth rate (effective speed reaching the capacity of assets) 
and the revenue reconciliation method (to produce the ﬁnal LRIC tariff). These issues 
will be further discussed in Section 2.3. 
2.2.4 Forward Cost Pricing Methodology 
Forward cost pricing (FCP) approach was developed by G3 which is formed by Scot­
tish and Southern (SSE), Central Networks (CN) and Scottish Power (SP). The FCP 
approach is extensively discussed and analysed since its introduction [24]–[27]. This 
approach treats demand and generation differently, hence FCP can be divided into FCP 
demand approach, FCP generation approach and generation beneﬁts. Instead of nodal 
pricing, the FCP approach allocates charges for identiﬁed network groups. The FCP 
demand is based on the LRIC approach and the main difference is that the annuity 
factor used in FCP demand is based on the cost recovery period (ten years), not the 
asset lifetime. As for FCP generation, instead of considering the marginal change or 
cost, the total generation changes or total reinforcement cost is considered. 
Firstly, the network is split into network groups. A network group is normally sup­
plied by a grid supply point (GSP) or a bulk supply point (BSP) and is not electrically 
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FCP Demand Approach 
Figure 2.8. FCP demand approach 
For FCP demand, reinforcement projects are identiﬁed within a 10 year horizon. This is 
achieved by incrementing the loads, according to the forecast network group growth, 
each subsequent year until the tenth year. The reinforcement costs are then forecast. 
The FCP demand approach is derived based on the LRIC pricing model. The key 
difference is that the annuity factor used is based on the cost recovery period, not the 
asset lifetime. 
If the growth rate, rℓ, is small, Equation 2.7 can be expressed as: 
Dℓ = Cℓe 
−rℓnℓ (2.12) 
Where the rℓ for FCP case, is worked out backwards by knowing the Dℓ the current 
loading level of circuit ℓ, Cℓ the capacity of the circuit and nℓ the time to reinforce 
(identiﬁed from the 10-year study). Rearranging Equation 2.12 gives Equation 2.13, 
used to calculate rℓ. The drawback of this method is that if the loading level of a circuit 
is growing steadily at 1%, in order to have reinforcement projects identiﬁed within 10 
years, the effective utilisation of the circuit has to be at least 90%. 




Equation 2.14 shows the derivation of FCP demand charges. 





Where d is the discount rate, and rℓ is the load growth rate given by 
log(Cℓ/Dℓ) where nℓnℓ 
is the number of years into the future (up to 10 years) when reinforcement is required. 
Detailed derivation of FCP demand is shown in reference [24]. 
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FCP Generation Approach 
Figure 2.9. FCP generation approach 
Using the same network groups, reinforcement costs expected (due to generation in­
crements) within the next 10 years are forecast. For the generation case, different as­
sumptions are made. Firstly, a test-size generator for each voltage level is estimated, 
which is the 85th percentile of the existing generator sizes at that voltage level. Then 
the total new generation of the whole system is forecast (as a percentage of current 
demand), which is next subdivided into generation forecasts for each voltage level (ac­
cording to the assumption that each voltage level will retain its existing proportion of 
total embedded generation on the network). The summary of the processes is shown 
in Figure 2.10. 
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To forecast the total EHV generation over the next 10 years, the probability of the corre­
sponding test-size generator connecting to the network group is determined (Equation 
2.15). Assuming equal probability of connection in each of the 10 years, the amount of 
the generation connection/increments will form a linear function, i.e. rising from zero 
at time zero to the test-size at the end of ten years [24, 25]. 
New Generation[voltage level]
Probability[voltage level] = (2.15) 
Total TestSize Generator[voltage level] 
Figure 2.11. Generation versus years 
Figure 2.11 shows the generation versus years graph of a network group where the 
headroom is when the ﬁrst reinforcement project is identiﬁed in the network group and 
n is the year when this reinforcement project is needed. With the ﬁrst reinforcement 
project identiﬁed within the 10-year horizon, the FCP generation charge can be ob­
tained by using Equation 2.16. 
PV 
=FCPℓ,Generation Total Generation Volume10years 
Asset Cost× Probability× e−dn 
= (2.16) 
GTestSize 10(Ginitial + 2 ) 
Where PV is the total present value of the reinforcement project required, Ginitial is the 
initial or existing generation in the network group and GTestSize is the test-size genera­
tor. Total generation volume is the area underneath the graph in Figure 2.11. 
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Generation Beneﬁts 
Besides seeing a charge, generation is also given a credit, i.e. the generation beneﬁt, 
as generation reduces the reinforcement requirements due to the increase of demand. 
The generation beneﬁt, here, is the sum of all the demand costs for voltages and trans­
formation levels above the point of connection, multiplied by the P2/6 generation con­
tribution factor. And the ﬁnal generation capacity charge is as shown in Equation 2.17 
Generation Capacity Charge = FCPGeneration − Generation Bene f its (2.17) 
The FCP approach though part of it is derived based on the LRIC pricing model, the 
locational signals are much weaker as the nodal prices of the nodes in the same net­
work group is the same. Besides, the 10-year window used to identify reinforcement 
projects might cause a sudden leap or change in the prices when a new reinforcement 
project ’slide’ into (or out of) the 10-year window. The FCP generation approach, more­
over, is fairly sensitive to the assumptions of the size of test-size generator and the 
forecast new generation. Its publication is also relatively more difﬁcult than the LRIC 
approach considering the model’s complexity and the amount of data needed. In ad­
dition, this approach is not appropriate for lowly-utilised network as there might be 
no FCP charges for customers. 
2.3 Major Issues of LRIC Prices 
The LRIC pricing methodology is used as the basis of the work in this thesis. This 
is because, although the LRIC pricing model has its drawbacks, LRIC is to date the 
most advanced amongst the four pricing models discussed in Section 2.2 in terms of 
providing economical signals to the network customers. LRIC prices are more cost 
reﬂective than both DRM and ICRP prices, as it takes into account the distance and 
extend of use of the network facilities. Also, LRIC pricing methodology is less complex 
than the FCP approach and its price signals is not restricted to group signals like those 
of the FCP approach. 
In order to improve the basic LRIC model for its practical deployment, three of the 
major issues are dealt with in this thesis – the security factor (effective maximum ca­
pacity of assets), the circuit loading growth rate (effective speed reaching the capacity 
of assets) and the revenue reconciliation method (to produce the ﬁnal LRIC tariff). 
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2.3.1 Security Factor 
Many coal and nuclear plants will close in the next decade and electricity generation 
shortages are a potential threat to electricity supplies. Hence, providing adequate gen­
eration to meet demand becomes one of the key issues for the market forces in achiev­
ing adequate security [28][29]. 
The Joint Energy Security of Supply (JESS) group in the UK, set up in 2001 to examine 
energy security issues, acknowledges that competitive markets, mostly through price 
signals, help to provide information for consumers, suppliers and producers alike to 
see when supplies are relatively plentiful or tight [30]. 
The market is designed to encourage electricity prices to rise as the demand for addi­
tional capacity increases [29], thus encouraging new and timely generation develop­
ment. 
Adequate generation will require sufﬁcient network to transport energy from points of 
generation to points of consumption. With ever rising generation/demand and limited 
scope in infrastructure development, maintaining network security is more challeng­
ing than ever before for network owners/operators [31]. There are two measures that 
can be taken by network operators to assure availability of network capacity and to 
ensure the integrity of the network, i.e. withstand credible contingencies to maintain 
the integrity of the system. One is a technical measure to ensure adequate investment 
in transmission and distribution infrastructure (building new lines or, when feasible, 
upgrading existing ones) and efﬁcient operation of the system [28][32]. The other 
is a commercial measure to have an efﬁcient network pricing model that reﬂects the 
cost imposed on the network from new generation/demand at different locations. The 
objective is to provide forward-looking economic message to inﬂuence the siting and 
sizing of future generation/demand, and to lead to the least cost to the future network 
development. 
Papers [5] and [8] illustrate how the network design (planning) process will affect 
network investment costs. Network investment will increase available or usable ca­
pacity, especially from circuits that are operating at or near their maximum capacity, 
and hence increase reliability. Therefore, charging for network security is important in 
reﬂecting the assets maximum allowed capacity to withstand N-1 contingency. 
In terms of security, the ICRP charging model used by National Grid of the UK does 
not factor the network security requirement into the chargingmodel, instead it relies on 
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post-processing through a full-contingency analysis to give an average security factor 
of 1.86 for all network assets [21]. Reference [11] demonstrated a simplistic approach 
to network security, which is based on the assumption that reinforcement is needed 
when a branch reaches its 50% utilisation. The importance of network security is also 
acknowledged in some other works [33]–[35], but none of them translated network 
security into pricing methodology. 
2.3.2 Circuit Loading Growth 
Generally, the distribution planning objective is to determine an orderly and econom­
ical expansion of equipments and facilities to meet the utility’s future electric demand 
(future load growth) with an acceptable level of reliability. This involves determining 
the sizes, locations, and timing of the future additions to distribution facilities [36]. 
Long-term load forecasting plays an important role in system planning because it takes 
several years and requires a great amount of investment to construct power generation 
and distribution facilities [37]. 
Growth of the existing demand is expected to affect numerous existing areas of the sys­
tem. Facilities in these areas are hence expected to be more heavily utilised and may 
need reinforcement in the nearer future. There are also areas where no electric load 
growth is expected and therefore no new facilities will be needed. In some cases, de­
mand may decrease over time due to various reasons, like the deliberate and planned 
actions that the utility or its customers may take to reduce energy consumption – de­
mand side management [36]. Many works have been done in long-term load forecast­
ing to estimate the load growth [38]-[44]. 
Two of the important cost drivers in network development are the present loading 
levels of network assets and how the loading levels might grow into the future, i.e. the 
growth rates of the circuit loading level. These cost drivers are directly dependent on 
the nodal demand/generation growth rates. To better reﬂect the long-term planning 
of the network, the long-term load growth forecasting is vital for distribution network 
pricing. 
The basic LRIC pricing methodology is the ﬁrst network pricing methodology that 
links the extent of use of the asset and its growth rate with network investment. LRIC 
assumes that a load will grow in an exponential way in accordance to its predicted 
growth rate. However, it also simply assumes that the loading level of all assets grow 
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at the same positive rate, i.e. same circuit loading growth rate at 1% throughout the 
network. This is not practical as long-term nodal load growth rate should varies due 
to various factors, such as weather, population, gross domestic production, index of 
industrial production, energy demand, facility investment etc [45, 46]. And circuit 
loading growth rates should instead be translated from these predicted nodal growths. 
For the FCP demand approach, the circuit loading growth rates are back-worked by 
simulating the time when reinforcement is needed. However, the process of identify­
ing the reinforcement projects through simulations is time consuming, and this is only 
feasible if the study is made within a short study period. Furthermore, in the FCP de­
mand approach, the reinforcements themselves are identiﬁed but not modelled in the 
simulation. 
2.3.3 Revenue Reconciliation 
Due to the high capital investment cost in the distribution networks, the marginal cost 
pricing may generate revenues (revenue recovered) that do not meet the annual tar­
geted or allowed revenue. Hence, revenue reconciliation is required to make up the 
revenue shortfall or surplus. Revenue reconciliation was researched, more intensively, 
in spot pricing previously [47, 48]. However, it is also a vital issue in long-term net­
work pricing as an inefﬁcient revenue reconciliation method will distort the pricing 
signals provided to the customers. 
There are mainly three different revenue reconciliation approaches investigated to date 
[47]. The ﬁrst approach modiﬁes the marginal prices directly. This approach includes 
ﬁxed “adder”, ﬁxed “multiplier”, “reliability sensitive adder”, and “elasticity sensitive 
adder (i.e. Ramsey method)”. These revenue reconciliation methods are investigated 
extensively in Reference [49]. Reference [47] believes that these methods of the ﬁrst 
approach are most pragmatic. However, it is argued that these methods distort the 
price signals and therefore reduce the attainable social welfare [50]. 
The second revenue reconciliation approach is by using revolving funds (recommended 
for ideal case). A revolving fund is a special account into which money is deposited for 
expenditure without regard to ﬁscal-year limitations. Money left in a revolving fund 
at the end of the year remains available for use the following year. The money does 
not revert back to the general treasury as would ordinary, unused ﬁscal-year appro­
priations [51]. This approach allows user to see the unreconciled marginal price but it 
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is not favoured as it is not compatible with the regulatory practice and needs a longer 
account settlement term [50]. 
The third approach reconcile by using a surcharge or refund, i.e. if the network oper­
ators recover more than the targeted amount by the end of the year a refund will be 
given back to the customers and vice versa. Similar to the second approach, it does not 
change the marginal price. However, network users may not be readily to accept the 
extra charges placed on them. 
The ﬁrst approach is more compatible with the regulatory practice. Currently the ﬁxed 
“adder” method is used in the network pricing for both transmission and distribution. 
Other revenue reconciliation methods of the ﬁrst approach will be further investigated 
in Chapter 5 to see if the ﬁxed “adder” method is the most efﬁcient method in various 
situations for the LRIC pricing model. 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
The DRM is deemed to restrict the competition in the generation and supply. This is 
because DRM is unable to reﬂect adequate forward looking costs and is lack of dis­
tinction in the cost of siting at different locations. Therefore, the distribution network 
pricing needs to move forward. 
The ICRP methodology used by the transmission network might not be suitable to be 
implemented on the distribution network. This is mainly because future generation, 
that is going to be connected nearer to demand, could easily trigger the ’ﬂip-ﬂop’ effect 
of the ICRP methodology, i.e. when distributed generation is exporting back to the 
distribution network. 
the LRIC and FCP methodologies are acknowledged to be able to adequately pro­
vide forward-looking and locational economical signals to the network customers. Al­
though the FCP demand shares similar principle as the LRIC model, these twomethod­
ologies treat generation very differently. 
The pricing signals and the long-term efﬁciency of LRIC and FCP methodologies will 
be further compared and analysed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. And the LRIC’s major 
issues preventing its practical deployment – security factor, circuit loading growth rate 
and the revenue reconciliation are further discussed and investigated in Chapter 3, 4 






HIS chapter enhances the LRIC pricing methodology by intro-
T ducing a security factor term that can reﬂect the maximum al­lowed loading level of the assets, ensuring network security. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Pricing for the use of the networks is essential in the way that it should be able to 
reﬂect the costs/beneﬁts imposed on a network when connecting a new generator or 
demand and to provide forward-looking message to inﬂuence the site and size of fu­
ture network customers. 
Studies have been extensively carried out over the years to achieve this pricing goal. 
Few methodologies that can directly link nodal generation/demand increment to net­
work long-run marginal/incremental costs. Even fewer consider network security in 
their pricing methodologies, considering it is one of the most important cost drivers. 
All networks are designed to be able to withstand credible contingencies, but this 
comes at a signiﬁcant cost to network development. 
This chapter describes a much enhanced LRIC pricing methodology that adds a num­
ber of practical planning considerations in the network pricing. The aim is to signif­
icantly improve the applicability of the LRIC pricing in practice. The enhanced LRIC 
pricing model considers the additional power ﬂow that circuits or transformers have 
to carry under a full N-1 contingency analysis when pricing the cost of circuits and 
transformers, this will be contrasted with that from reference [11] where all assets 
were assumed to carry an equal amount of additional contingency power ﬂow. The 
enhanced model also takes into account the effects from differing nodal load growth 
as seen by planning engineers, instead of a uniform growth rate across the entire net­
work as assumed in reference [11]. 
3.2 LRIC-Security 
For network pricing using LRIC, it is very important to recognise that a signiﬁcant 
proportion of the network spare capacity is reserved for network security. The spare 
capacity in the LRIC calculation should reﬂect the maximum allowed loading level 
(MALL) for a network asset subject to N-1 contingencies, rather than its rated capacity, 
where the MALL is the rated capacity divided by a security factor (S.F.), S
C 
.F. . 
The critical or maximum allowed loading point could either be triggered by a ther­
mal or bus voltage limit or a voltage stability limit (voltage collapse point) [31]. This 
proposed long-run incremental cost (LRIC) pricing places emphasis on assets thermal 
limits. Previously, security factor is obtained through a security factor table created 
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according to the judgment of network engineers. In the proposed methodology, a se­
curity factor for each and every circuit and transformer of the network is obtained by 
performing an N-1 contingency analysis, where the outage of the most critical circuit 
is considered. 
3.2.1 Security Factor Table 
Security factor is also the inverse of themaximum allowed or critical utilisation,Util%max, 
under N-1 contingent situation. Therefore, the MALL of an asset can also be repre­
sented as C × Util%max. The number of lines/path connected between two nodes, 
operating in parallel is termed the security index, S.I., in this case. 
Under the N-1 contingent situation, assuming that all paths connected between the 
two nodes are identical and losses are negligible, the security factor can be evaluated. 
Assuming there are 3 lines connecting two buses (Figure 3.1), when one line is out, 
the other 2 lines will have equal share of the ﬂow initially carried by the faulty line. 
Therefore, the ﬂow at the lines after the outage will be equivalent to Util% + Util2
%, 
where Util% is the initial utilisation of the line and Util2
% is the share of the contingency 
ﬂow. 
Figure 3.1. Line outage for 3 lines connecting 2 nodes 
The maximum allowed utilisation of the line is when the original plus the contingency 
ﬂow is equal to the rated capacity at the outage condition. Hence, the Util%max of the 
3 lines between 2 nodes case can be calculated as shown: 
Util%max Util%max + 2 = 1 
Util%max = 0.667 
Util%max Util%max + 3 = 1 
Util%max = 0.75 
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Figure 3.2. Line outage for 4 lines connecting 2 nodes 
The maximum allowed utilisation (inverse of security factor) for Figure 3.2 case is 
75%. When one line is out, one third of its ﬂow will be equally carried by other lines. 
Therefore a general security factor equation can be derived for n number of security 
indices as shown in Equation 3.1. 
S.I. 
S.F. = (3.1) 
S.I. − 1 
Security Index, S.I. Security Factor, S.F. Util%max (%) 
1 – 100.0 
2 2.00 50.0 
3 1.50 66.7 
4 1.33 75.0 
5 1.25 80.0 
6 1.20 83.3 
7 1.17 85.7 
8 1.14 87.5 
Table 3.1. Relationships between security index, security factor and maximum allowed utilisation 
The initial LRIC pricing methodology is implemented using the security factor table 
(Table 3.1), which is evaluated using Equation 3.1. Security factor decreases as se­
curity index increases. This is because as there are more lines supporting two buses, 
the system will be more reliable during outage conditions and hence the maximum 
allowed utilisation rises. However, this approach is not accurate as it is rare to have 
identical lines connecting two nodes. 
3.2.2 Security Factor with Uniform Nodal Load Growth Rate 
Figure 3.3 shows a 2-bus test system, where Line 1 has a 30MWﬂow and Line 2 20MW 
ﬂow when there is a 50MW load connected at busbar 2, assuming no losses. For this 
Page 34

Chapter 3 LRIC: Network Security

Figure 3.3. 2-Bus Test System 
simple case, Line 2 outage is the only and the most critical outage for Line 1 and vice 
versa. We can easily see that when one line is out, the other line will have to carry all 
the 50MW power ﬂow to maintain the security of supply. The security factor equation 
can also be expressed in terms of the power ﬂow on the circuit using Equation 3.2. 
Knowing the power ﬂow at Line 1 during its most critical outage (in this case 50MW), 
the security factor (S.F.) of Line 1 can be evaluated. 
PowerFlowOutage 
S.F. = (3.2) 
PowerFlowOriginal 
Security factor for Line 1 is hence 50MW divided by 30MW, i.e. 1.66. Likewise, se­
curity factor of Line 2 will be 2.5. Shown in Figure 3.4 is the simpliﬁed ﬂow chart 
for security factor calculation. In the calculation the critical outage causing the critical 
contingency ﬂow on each circuit needs to be identiﬁed. This is done by performing an 
N-1 contingency analysis. 
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Figure 3.4. Simpliﬁed Flow Chart for Security Factor Evaluation 
3.2.3 Security Factor with Diﬀerent Nodal Load Growth Rate 
Equation 3.2 assumes uniform loading growth rate along each circuit of the network. 
In reality, loads at different nodes may grow at different rates, leading to potentially 
very different growth rate for circuits’ loading levels. 
If Circuit A is the worst outage for Circuit B, the outage power ﬂow at Circuit B, SB,Out, 
is the sum of the additional contingency ﬂow and the original ﬂow at Circuit B, SB,In; 
where the additional ﬂow at Circuit B is the re-distribution of the original ﬂow of Cir­
cuit A when it is out. To account for different load growth rate, a line outage distribu­
tion factor (LODF) [52] that deﬁnes the size of this re-distribution is introduced into 
the equation, shown in Equation 3.3 and Equation 3.4. 
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SB,Out = LODF× SA,In + SB,In (3.3) 
SB,Out − SB,In 
LODF = (3.4) 
SA,In 
Knowing their respective circuit load growth rate, the relationship of the base power 
ﬂow across the critical line over the base power ﬂow of the examined line, m, can then 
be found through Equation 3.5; where rA and rB are the load growth rates of Circuit 
A and Circuit B respectively. rA and rB are computed by examining the power ﬂow 
change at each circuit as a result of the load increase by a given growth rate. 
rA × SA,In 
m = (3.5) 
rB × SB,In 
SB,Out = (LODF× m + 1)SB,In (3.6) 
Security factor as the ratio of a circuit’s worst outage loading level to its original load­
ing level for variable load growth rates can then be redeﬁned in Equation 3.7. The 
maximum allowed loading level for Circuit B can then be evaluated by dividing its 
rated capacity with the S.F. 
S.F. = LODF× m + 1 (3.7) 
3.2.4 LRIC Considering Network Security 
Long-run incremental cost (LRIC) pricing reﬂects how a nodal increment might ad­
vance or defer the time horizon of future investment. For a given load growth rate, 
the time horizon of future reinforcement is the time taken for the circuit’s loading level 
rise from the present level to the maximum allowed power ﬂow. To provide efﬁcient 
long-run signals for future investment and to account for the cost of maintaining the 
security of supply, it is necessary to ﬁnd the appropriate requirement of reinforcement 
for the network circuits. This can be done by adding a security factor in the basic LRIC 
pricing model. 
The rating of the circuit at the design stage is inﬂuenced by security factor, which is 
impacted by the critical outage condition seen by the circuit. With the security factor 
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term, it will make sure that sufﬁcient spare capacity is allocated to ensure network 
security under the N-1 contingent situation. 
For a given load growth rate r, the time horizon of future investment will be the time 
taken for the load to grow from current loading level, D to the maximum or require­
ment of reinforcement loading margin (under N-1 contingency), S
C 
.F. , instead of C, the 
full loading level (rated capacity). The time horizon, present value of the assets and 
ﬁnally the new LRIC cost are then obtained, with the S.F. term. Therefore, the LRIC 
Equation 2.7 from previous chapter is rewritten into Equation 3.8. 
Cℓ = Dℓ(1+ rℓ)
nℓ (3.8) 
S.F. 
3.3 Case Studies 
Two networks are used in the case studies, i.e. and the IEEE 14-bus test system and 
WPD Pembroke network. The IEEE 14-bus test system is chosen because it is inter­
nationally used and is more publishable. On the other hand, Pembroke network is 
part of the South Wales distribution network owned and operated by Western Power 
Distribution. The power ﬂow and basic LRIC pricing analyses was carried out on 
the Pembroke network and the whole South Wales network, and it is found that the 
results from the Pembroke network analyses closely represent the results of the equiv­
alent network from the South Wales analyses. Therefore, Pembroke network is used 
for case studies as it is a practical distribution network, which also allows reasonable 
computational time for complex analyses. 
3.3.1 IEEE 14-Bus Test System 
This section compares the proposed approach with the basic LRIC pricing on the IEEE 
14-bus test system. The system consists of 14 buses, 17 lines, 3 transformers, 2 gen­
erators, and 3 synchronous condensers. Buses 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are at 132kV voltage 
level and the other buses are at 33kV voltage level. The peak demand of the system is 
260MW [53]. The network diagram and the demand and generation data are shown 
in Appendix A.1. 
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By running an N-1 security assessment, the security factor of each lines and transform­
ers are obtained. LRIC charges with and without any security consideration are then 
compared. 
Security Factor and Maximum Allowed Loading Level 
Table 3.2 shows 18 valid outage conditions and their respective impacts to the degree 
of assets’ utilisation. Highlighted in grey are the original utilisations (%) of the lines 
and transformers, whilst the data highlighted in red are the highest utilisation of each 
asset due to outages. For example, line connecting Bus 1 to Bus 2 has its utilisation 
raised from 47.63% to 72.22% (the most critical) as a result of Outage L2 (outage of the 
line connecting Bus 1 to Bus 5). Besides that, Outage L2 is also the critical contingency 
for line from Bus 2 to Bus 5. Knowing the contingency ﬂow of the examined circuit 
and the original ﬂow of the faulty asset of its critical contingency, the LODF can be 
evaluated. 
Base Loading Maximum Allowed 
Line From To Level (MVA) Loading Level (MVA) S.F. 
1 BUS 1 BUS 2 329.84 218.44 1.51 
2 BUS 1 BUS 5 192.20 151.34 1.27 
3 BUS 2 BUS 3 192.29 143.50 1.34 
4 BUS 2 BUS 4 135.26 80.51 1.68 
5 BUS 2 BUS 5 135.22 72.31 1.87 
6 BUS 3 BUS 4 134.93 32.83 4.11 
7 BUS 4 BUS 5 179.63 110.88 1.62 
8 BUS 6 BUS 11 28.05 13.43 2.09 
9 BUS 6 BUS 12 27.98 11.06 2.53 
10 BUS 6 BUS 13 37.66 26.15 1.44 
11 BUS 7 BUS 8 114.26 114.26 1.00 
12 BUS 7 BUS 9 114.47 84.17 1.36 
13 BUS 9 BUS 10 27.95 12.10 2.31 
14 BUS 9 BUS 14 28.05 15.94 1.76 
15 BUS 10 BUS 11 27.96 9.05 3.09 
16 BUS 12 BUS 13 28.05 3.72 7.54 
17 BUS 13 BUS 14 28.05 10.50 2.67 




Ori Outage Outage Outage
ginal L2 L3 L6
47.63 72.22 45.52 49.14
38.71 49.62 36.07
37.62 44.61 .
41.09 60.97 69.39 64.94 .
30.55 51.85 11.40 30.56 .
17.77 73.42 6.47 17.62 17.86 .
34.97 35.96 33.40 28.27 .
29.43 42.67 11.12 55.69 40.19
29.09 31.61 . 37.08 31.88 30.43
50.52 . 57.85 59.63 54.66
15.80 15.79 15.79 15.79 15.79
25.26 17.35 27.92 27.42 .
23.40 25.64 11.86 42.09 .
35.47 19.90 62.14 . 29.21
15.13 . 28.07 5.84 43.28 26.18
6.43 10.39 14.16 9.24 7.66
























Line[From Utilisation (%) 
- Outage Outage 
To Bus] L4 L5 
43.23 43.23 
– 47.10 47.10 
– 46.30 46.30 50.39 45 62 
– 49.25 32.78 41 46 
57.05 49.25 – 24.39 30.28 30.57 31.01 31.82 30.80 31 01 
8.87 6.43 6.43 – 17.64 17.73 18.10 18.30 17.82 17.70 17.76 17.68 18 34 18.00 
15.78 57.19 55.02 55.02 28.06 – 36.53 35.16 33.91 28.63 34.14 35.78 35.01 36.01 32 25 
23.77 34.86 33.90 33.90 28.03 62.37 – 31.19 34.07 60.53 53.71 14.10 29.89 40.68 
28.37 29.86 29.69 29.69 28.90 33.17 73 73 29.72 33.23 26.98 30.39 22.64 24.64 
48.37 52.73 52.31 52.31 49.94 62 94 – 73.33 
15.77 15.77 15.79 15.79 15.80 15.80 – 15.80 15.80 15.80 15.80 
26.82 23.90 24.07 24.07 25.67 25.64 24.12 – 23.52 22 78 15.44 34.27 
28.81 18.87 20.05 20.05 24.61 52.60 21.85 19.02 16.40 – 38.38 22.97 14.39 30.73 18 12 
39.21 32.08 32.67 32.67 36.42 23.68 39.61 33.28 17.12 45.51 – 26 85 
9.55 20.46 19.60 19.60 13.75 48 40 14.10 16.87 19.89 45.63 38.60 – 15.58 26.22 
5.72 7.12 6.96 6.96 6.27 8.84 48.85 7.15 10.39 4.40 7.66 – 2.46 
17.55 24.69 24.13 24.13 20.23 33.13 7.45 57.50 
34.34 31.30 31.40 31.40 33.52 35.06 34.39 30.99 – 43.78 
28.31 25.26 25.39 25.39 27.28 28.69 24.45 52.14 – 
45.34 42.73 48.22 47.73 47.73 44.56 61.71 42.81 50.87 58.09 50.91 
Table 3.2. Circuits with their highest utilisation highlighted at their critical outage condition 
Bus– Outage Outage Outage Outage Outage Outage Outage Outage Outage Outage Outage Outage Outage 
L7 L8 L9 L10 L11 L12 L13 L14 L15 L16 L17 T1 T2 
1–2 53.68 47.71 47.68 47.83 47.44 47.37 47.62 47.66 47.66 47.63 47.69 47.33 47.50 
1–5 29.70 38.63 38.74 38.83 38.82 39.21 38.80 38.93 38.66 38.71 38.66 39.18 38.89 
2–3 37.74 37.65 37.77 37.80 37.32 37.57 37.56 37.68 37.62 37.70 37.33 37.49 
2–4 41.39 41.17 41.21 40.09 40.95 40.90 41.24 41.09 41.30 40.07 40.65 





6–13 69.54 52.11 62.67 44.47 54.30 54.71 37.66 
7–8 15.80 15.80 15.79 
7–9 26.62 25.33 26.96 
9–10 
9–14 29.33 36.33 57.08 
10–11 
12–13 22.71 
13–14 17.09 23.81 41.03 11.32 27.37 20.34 – 
4–7 33.25 30.72 19.44 32.07 34.04 33.02 34.39 
4–9 29.28 27.14 26.96 51.17 25.37 28.06 26.85 28.42 
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Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 show the results of the maximum allowed loading level 
(MALL) of the lines and transformers and their respective security factor for each asset. 
For a uniform growth rate, the security factor generated from the maximum allowed 
power ﬂow and the base ﬂow varies widely from 1.00 to 7.54. This will signiﬁcantly 
impact on the time horizon of future reinforcement, which will in turn impact on the 
long-run locational prices. This also implies that long-run cost evaluation without se­
curity consideration (i.e. considering S.F. equals to 1) is considerably under-evaluating 
the cost to the network from a nodal increment. 
In this case, Line 16 has the highest security factor – 7.54. The outage of Line 10 will 
result in the critical contingency ﬂow at Line 9 and Line 16. This is because additional 
power has to ﬂow through these two lines in order to meet demand at Bus 13. The con­
tingency ﬂow through Line 9 and Line 16 is nearly the same. However, their security 
factor is very different because their original power ﬂows are very different, 29.09% 
and 6.43% respectively. The original utilisation of Line 16 is very low as demand at 
Bus 13 is mainly supported by Line 10 under normal condition. The critical contin­
gency ﬂow at Line 16 is more than 6 times its original loading level as most of the 
original power ﬂow through Line 10 has to ﬂow through Line 16. Hence, the room for 
the contingency ﬂow needs to be huge resulting in a high security factor. 
Figure 3.5 depicts the maximum allowed loading level for each line, from the N-1 
contingency analysis, and its rated capacity. Figure 3.5 suggests that this maximum 
allowed loading level, under N-1 contingency, could be hugely different compared to 
the rated capacity. For instance, Line 6, i.e. the line connecting Bus 3 to Bus 4, has a 
MALL value of 32.83 MVA which is just about a quarter of its rated capacity. 
Base Loading Maximum Allowed 
Transformer From To Level (MVA) Loading Level (MVA) S.F. 
1 BUS 4 BUS 7 89.67 67.93 1.32 
2 BUS 4 BUS 9 60.06 30.80 1.95 
3 BUS 5 BUS 6 100.20 73.68 1.36 
Table 3.4. Maximum allowed loading levels and security factor for transformer 
According to Table 3.2, the worse outage that caused a large contingency ﬂow (75.1 
MVA) on Line 6 is Outage L3 (the Line connecting Bus 2 to Bus 3). Line 3 has an original 
ﬂow of 72.3 MVA, which is the highest power ﬂow at a line in the network supplying 
the highest demand in the network at Bus 3. And when Line 3 is out, Line 6 has to 
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Figure 3.5. Maximum allowed loading level with and without security consideration 
carry all the power ﬂow to supply the load at Bus 3. Figure 3.6 shows the initial power 
ﬂow directions in the network. Line 3 outage will have caused less impact on Lines 4, 
5 and 7 compared to Line 6 as there are two paths for power to ﬂow to Bus 4 whilst 
there is only one path from Bus 4 to Bus 3 to supply demand at Bus 3. This means that 
about 75% of Line 6’s capacity needs to be reserved to accommodate power ﬂow at L3 
should this line is out. 
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The lesser the MALL, the smaller will be the spare capacity. Hence the future reinforce­
ment will be closer, and this will give rise to the reinforcement cost of the asset. 
Long-Run Incremental Cost Pricing 
The signiﬁcant difference of the MALL and the rated capacity of Line 6 is immediately 
reﬂected in the LRIC price at Bus 3 (Figure 3.7), which is supported by Line 3 and Line 
6. The extremely high price at Bus 3 is resulted from the fact that Line 6 has the highest 
security factor, 4.11, in the 132kV network. Moreover, the 132kV asset costs are notably 
higher than that of the 33kV assets. 
Figure 3.7. LRIC charges (for real power, P) comparison with and without security factor (using 
LRIC) 
This is followed by the prices at Bus 13 and Bus 14, which are supported by the line 
with the highest security factor (Line 16) in the whole network. The LRIC price at Bus 
14 is greater than that of Bus 13 due to the way power is distributed at the 33kV voltage 
level. As shown by Figure 3.8, power ﬂows into Bus 13 through Line 10 and 16 and 
ﬂows out to Bus 14 through line 17. Therefore, a load withdrawal at Bus 14 causes a 
power ﬂow increase on all three supporting lines. As for Bus 13, a load withdrawal at 
that point has increased power ﬂow for line 10 and 16 but decreased power ﬂow for 
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Figure 3.8. Directions of the power ﬂow for the 33 kV part of the system. 
Figure 3.9 shows the reactive power prices against each node in the network. LRIC 
prices for reactive power is based on the MW+MVAr-Mile method presented in [55]. 
The ﬁgure shows the impact to the long-run network reinforcement cost or the LRIC Q 
price from a unit MVAr injection at each study node. 
Without security factor consideration all the prices for the reactive power (Fig. 3.9) 
are small negative values. This suggests that there is excessive reactive power in the 
system, which is not the case when the network is required to withstand all N-1 con­
tingencies. 
With security factor consideration, Bus 2 has a large negative price. This is due to 
the reactive power counter ﬂow created in Line 1, Line 3 and Line 5 as the result of 
a reactive power injection at Bus 2. The reactive power ﬂow directions is shown in 
Figure 3.6. 
The LRIC charge at Bus 3 has the largest negative value as a reactive power injection at 
Bus 3 has a huge impact to the network, causing counter ﬂows on Line 1, Line 4, Line 
6 and Line 7. 
The prices shown in Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.9 depict the price for load. As for gen­
eration, the prices are obtained by applying an increment of generation at each node. 
Hence, the generation prices are the negative of the load prices that reﬂects the oppo­
site effects in reinforcement horizon as a result of nodal generation increment. 
Generally, the results suggest that the prices for LRIC without security factor are sig­
niﬁcantly smaller but less cost-reﬂective compared to the prices with security factor. 
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Figure 3.9. LRIC charges (for reactive power, Q) comparison with and without security factor (using 
LRIC) 
When the network security is not being taken into account in the cost evaluation by 
the original LRIC pricing model, the circuit loading level is allowed to reach to its 
rated capacity. As for the new LRIC methodology, the pricing is able to separate the 
spare capacity for network security from the effective spare capacity, providing more 
cost-reﬂective long-run pricing in network charges. 
Revenue Recovery 
Table 3.5 summarises nodal generation/demand, nodal real and reactive power prices 
and the revenue recovery without considering security, while Table 3.6 gives the re­
sults considering security. With signiﬁcantly higher prices, the LRIC methodology 
with security factor can recover considerablymore revenue, rising from 10.4% to 91.4%. 
This would leave less room for revenue reconciliation, and hence, less distortion to the 
pure economic message. 
For the basic LRIC methodology, generation (at Bus 2) collects -18,434 per year while 
load across the network pays 917,652 per year after revenue recovery. As for LRIC with 
security consideration, generation earnings increase by around 5 folds to -90,238 per 
year and load payments increase to 8,003,684 per year. 
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Generation Load LRIC Charge Revenue Recovered 
Node P(MW) Q(MVAr) P(MW) Q(MVAr) P(/kW/yr) Q(/kW/yr) P(/yr) Q(/yr) Total(/yr) 
002 -40.0 -44.1 21.7 12.7 1.36 -0.21 -24943 6509 -18434 
003 0.0 -25.3 94.2 19.0 4.02 -0.29 378213 -1857 376356 
004 0.0 0.0 47.8 -3.9 3.90 -0.26 186229 -1002 185227 
005 0.0 0.0 7.6 1.6 3.35 -0.16 25422 -256 25166 
006 0.0 -13.8 11.2 7.5 3.65 -0.21 40914 -1304 39610 
007 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.90 -0.27 0 0 0 
008 0.0 -18.3 0.0 0.0 3.90 -0.26 0 -4711 -4711 
009 0.0 0.0 29.5 -2.4 3.87 -0.27 114106 -636 113470 
010 0.0 0.0 9.0 5.8 3.88 -0.25 34929 -1444 33485 
011 0.0 0.0 3.5 1.8 3.81 -0.22 13342 -391 12951 
012 0.0 0.0 6.1 1.6 3.88 -0.17 23674 -277 23397 
013 0.0 0.0 13.5 5.8 3.95 -0.16 53298 -911 52387 
014 0.0 0.0 14.9 5.0 4.11 -0.19 61284 -970 60314 
Total 899210 
Table 3.5. Revenue recovery table without security consideration

Generation Load LRIC Charge Revenue Recovered 
Node P(MW) Q(MVAr) P(MW) Q(MVAr) P(/kW/yr) Q(/kW/yr) P(/yr) Q(/yr) Total(/yr) 
002 -40.0 -44.1 21.7 12.7 7.90 -1.73 -144479 54241 -90238 
003 0.0 -25.3 94.2 19.0 68.62 -10.57 6464381 -67022 6397359 
004 0.0 0.0 47.8 -3.9 9.53 1.22 455438 4762 460200 
005 0.0 0.0 7.6 1.6 9.92 0.99 75362 1587 76949 
006 0.0 -13.8 11.2 7.5 9.03 1.09 101114 6868 107982 
007 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.62 1.44 0 0 0 
008 0.0 -18.3 0.0 0.0 10.64 1.36 0 24909 24909 
009 0.0 0.0 29.5 -2.4 11.04 1.65 325592 3962 329554 
010 0.0 0.0 9.0 5.8 11.34 1.92 102051 11148 113199 
011 0.0 0.0 3.5 1.8 10.49 1.64 36719 2959 39678 
012 0.0 0.0 6.1 1.6 9.39 1.32 57303 2104 59407 
013 0.0 0.0 13.5 5.8 12.03 2.06 162432 11954 174386 
014 0.0 0.0 14.9 5.0 13.88 2.67 206738 13325 220063 
Total 7913447 
Table 3.6. Revenue recovery table with security consideration 
3.3.2 Pembroke Network 
To demonstrate its practicality, the proposed approach is applied on a WPD distribu­
tion network – Pembroke area (See Appendix B) [56]. This network consists of 56 
lines, 54 transformers, and 3 generators. The lines consist of both overhead lines and 
underground cables; and the underground cables have much higher cost per km com­
pared to the overhead lines. As shown in Appendix B, Pembroke network can be 
divided into two areas, Zone 1 (rural area) and Zone 2 (urban area). 
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Security Factor and Maximum Allowed Loading Level 
Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11 demonstrates the maximum allowed loading level, with 
and without S.F. consideration, for some of the lines and transformers of Pembroke 
network. Appendix C shows the detailed MALL and S.F. values of these lines and 
transformers. 
Figure 3.10. Line maximum allowed loading level with and without security consideration

Figure 3.11. Transformer maximum allowed loading level with and without security consideration 
Line 24 to Line 31 and Transformer 26 to Transformer 31 are located at Zone 1, the rural 
area. From the results, it is illustrated that these assets, supporting the loads of Zone 
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1, has largest capacities and with security consideration, their MALLs have become 
signiﬁcantly smaller compared to those of Zone 2. 
Long-Run Incremental Cost Pricing 
The P and Q LRIC charges with and without security factor are shown in Figure 3.12 
and Figure 3.13. 
Figure 3.12. LRIC charge (for real power, P) comparison with and without security factor





Chapter 3 LRIC: Network Security 
As shown in Figure 3.12, the highest price for real powerwithdrawal(for LRIC-security) 
is at Bus 3009 where the main supporting line, line connecting Buses 2015 and 3012, 
is the longest line in the network, at 20.9km. Nevertheless, the length of the line is 
not the only factor affecting the price. For instance, load at Bus 3015 supported by 
another lengthy line (20.1km) is charged much less. This is because the main support­
ing branches of Bus 3015 have to support a relatively small proportion of contingency 
ﬂow, which consequently results in large spare capacity and small effective circuit util­









Transformers 3018 3015 2.00 8.97 4.03 
3018 3015 2.02 8.88 3.99 
Lines 2015 3018 1.23 13.97 9.43 










Transformers 3012 3009 2.00 5.70 5.29 
3012 3009 2.02 5.65 5.24 
Lines 2015 3012 2.63 8.25 7.56 
Table 3.8. Data of the main supporting branches of Bus 3009 
The next highest price is at Bus 3054, which is mainly due to the highly utilised (96%) 
single transformer that is supporting the load. In addition, the main supporting line 
connecting Buses 2005 and 3057 consist of a 4.7km underground cable. This cable is the 
longest amongst all the 33kV underground cables and has a signiﬁcant contribution to 
the line’s high asset cost. 
The prices from Bus 2025 to Bus 2048 are relatively small. These loads are located at 
Zone 2 and are supported by assets with larger capacities. Therefore, a small increment 
at a node would have cause little effect on their reinforcement time horizons, hence 
lower LRIC prices. 
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Revenue Recovery 
The revenue recovered from using the LRIC prices without security consideration is 
7.6%, while LRIC-security recovers 45.8% which again leaves less room for revenue 
reconciliation. 
LRIC-security not only takes into account the length and effective utilisation of the 
supporting branches, but also leads to a better revenue recovery that is closer to the 
target compared to the basic LRIC. 
3.3.3 Prices Seen by Network Customers 
The LRIC prices shown for both case studies in £/kW/yr are seen by customers con­
nected directly to the distribution network (extra-high voltage (EHV) level), such as 
distributed generation, large industrial customers, etc. For the end users, distribution 
use of system charges only contributes to less than 20% of the electricity bill (as shown 
in 3.14). 
Figure 3.14. An approximate proportion of current end users gas and electricity bills[57] 
For example, for the previous IEEE 14-bus test system analysis, with security consider­
ation the LRIC P price at Bus 3 is £68.62/kW/yr and Q price is -£10.57/kVAr/yr. In or­
der to meet the target revenue, these prices are scaled up by an adder of £2.49/kVA/yr. 
Network end users see a p/kwh charge and using Equation 3.9, a unit price for distri­
bution in £/kW/yr can be obtained. 
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Q S 
Unit PriceP = PriceP + × PriceQ + × adder (3.9) P P 
Here, P, Q and S are the real, reactive and apparent power of the end users. If the res­
idential customers at Bus 3 have a power factor of 0.95, Equation 3.9 can be rewritten 
as Equation 3.10 and a unit price of £74.72/kW/yr can be obtained. 
1 
Unit PriceP = PriceP + tan(arccos(p f )) × PriceQ + × adder (3.10) p f 
Assuming the load factor (the average power divided by the peak power over a period 
of time) of these residential customers is 0.57, an approximation of this unit price in 
p/kwh can be evaluated from Equation 3.11. The evaluated distribution cost here is 
1.49p/kwh. 
Unit PriceP × 100 Unit Pricekwh = (3.11) Load Factor× 8760 
Assuming the energy and supply cost is 4p/kwh and the transmission cost is 0.4p/kwh, 
the tariff these residential customers will see is 5.89p/kwh plus environmental cost and 
VAT. 
Industrial customers, on the other hand, may have a smaller power factor and a higher 
load factor. Assuming the industrial customers connected to the same bus, Bus 3, have 
a power factor of 0.85 and a load factor of 0.63, the unit prices in £/kW/yr and p/kwh 
will be £78.10/kW/yr and 1.42p/kwh respectively. Assuming the energy and sup­
ply cost is 3p/kwh and the transmission cost is 0.3p/kwh, the tariff these industrial 
customers will see is 4.72p/kwh. 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented a new approach to account for the cost of security in a long-run 
network pricing model. The proposed approach relates the nodal increment of gener­
ation/demand to the long-run incremental cost to a network, where the incremental 
cost reﬂects the network security in addition to distance travelled and the degree of 
circuits’ utilisation. For the ﬁrst time, network security can be reﬂected in a pricing 
model by adding a security term into the methodology, which is obtained by running 
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a full N-1contingency analysis. This security factor term reﬂects the additional power 
ﬂow a branch has to carry when its most critical contingency takes place. 
The security factor would reduce the unused capacity of a branch and thus brought 
forward the time horizon of the future reinforcement, and hence increases the incre­
mental cost. Further, it has signiﬁcantly increased the revenue recovery, leaving less 
room for distorting the pure economic message. In this case, the new methodology 
recovers 91.4% of the revenue, which is 81% more than the LRIC methodology with­
out security consideration for the IEEE 14-bus test system and recovers 38.2% more 
revenue for the Pembroke network. 
In conclusion, the new pricing methodology is simple, more cost-reﬂective, transpar­
ent and able to provide more efﬁcient locational signals for potential generation and 







ROWTH rates are vital in the derivation of LRIC charges. 
G This chapter establishes the link between nodal and circuit loading growth rates and analyses different types of circuit 
loading growth rates and their effect on the LRIC charges. 
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4.1 Introduction 
In order to achieve the target purposes of network pricing, the network pricingmethod­
ology used has to consider all possible events in the distribution network to be cost­
reﬂective. One of the issues requiring attention is the cases of different nodal load or 
generation growth. These nodal growth rates will then in turn affect the growth rate 
of the loading level at each circuit of the network. 
The circuit loading levels will either grow, decrease or stay the same. However, it is 
a challenging task to model the growth pattern of the circuit loading levels. And this 
is important as the reinforcement horizon of a circuit is directly affected by the circuit 
loading level growth prediction. 
This chapter proposes an improved LRIC pricing methodology with consideration of 
positive, negative and zero circuit loading growth rates (resulted from different nodal 
load growth rates throughout the whole network). The effect of different combination 
of positive and negative nodal load growth rates on the LRIC charges are also analysed 
on the IEEE 14-bus test system andWPD Pembroke network. This work is done on top 
of the security factor analysis discussed in the previous chapter. 
4.2 Circuit Loading Growth Rates Estimation 
For LRIC pricing, the long-term growth rate of the circuit is an essential factor in 
the calculation. This circuit loading growth rate, rℓ, is directly affected by the nodal 
load/generation growth rate at each nodes, which can be forecast by analysing their 
historical data. By simulating the load and generation growth, the circuit loading 
growth rate of each circuit can be estimated. 
4.2.1 Simulation Method 1 
A simple method to estimate circuit loading growth rate through simulation is by run­
ning two load ﬂow calculations with and without load increments of the size of their 
corresponding growth prediction. If the loading level of a circuit is growing at rate rℓ 
Equation 4.1 can be derived, where D0 is the original loading level of a circuit and Dn 
is the loading level of that circuit at year n. 
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Assuming all the demand and generation in the network increase in accordance to 
their forecast nodal growth rate, a new loading level of that circuit for the following 
year, D1 can be obtained. So if n equals to 1, Equation 4.1 can be written as Equation 
4.2. By the arranging Equation 4.2, the circuit loading growth rate, shown in Equation 
4.3,can be calculated using this simple simulation method (Method 1). 
D1 = D0(1+ rℓ) (4.2) 
D1 − D0 rℓ = (4.3) D0 
However, this circuit loading level estimation is not reasonable when there are more 
than one load affecting the circuit loading growth rate, like in the example of Figure 
4.1. As illustrated, loads D1 and D2 are supplied through line ℓ. Thus, the loading 
level growth pattern of line ℓ will be inﬂuenced by both D1’s and D2’s growth rate. 
Figure 4.1. 4-bus test system 
For instance, if Demand 1 and Demand 2 have nodal growth rates of 2% and 1% re­
spectively and assuming that there is no losses, the actual circuit loading level (Total 
Flow in Figure 4.2) will be the sum of Demand 1 and Demand 2. The estimated cir­
cuit loading level using Method 1 (Estimated Flow) matches the actual circuit loading 
level quite well for the earlier years; But the estimation at later years slightly diverge 
from the actual. This is because the rℓ estimation for the circuit examined is based on 
the initial ’combined’ growth rate of Demand 1 and Demand 2 and at later years, the 
actual ’combined’ growth rates would have changed. 
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Figure 4.2. Circuit loading growth rate derivation using Method 1 
Hence, the circuit loading growth rate estimated using Method 1 does not adequately 
reﬂect the circuit growth patterns of assets in a distribution network, which in reality 
will have loads with different nodal growth. 
4.2.2 Simulation Method 2 
Another simulation method (Method 2) that requires a third power ﬂow simulation 
can better reﬂect the actual circuit loading level. This method assumes that the power 
ﬂow of a circuit consists of a growing/decreasing element, DB, and a constant element, 
DA, as demonstrated in Equation 4.4. This assumption is made so that the ’combined’ 
circuit loading growth rate, in this case, rB can be adjusted so that the estimated loading 
level can conform better to the actual loading level. Hence, the loading level equation 
(shown in Equation 4.5) is different from Equation 4.1, where DB is growing at rate 
rB. 
D0 = DA + DB (4.4) 




Chapter 4 LRIC: Growth Rates 
There are three variables in Equation 4.5, therefore, three equations are needed to 
solve the problem. By knowing the loading level of the circuit for the ﬁrst three years 
(through simulations) and rearranging their equations (see Appendix D), rB, DB and 
DA can be evaluated in turn: 
D2 − D0 
rB = − 2 (4.6) 
D1 − D0 
DB = 
D1 − D0 
rB 
(4.7) 
DA = D0 − DB (4.8) 
Using simulation Method 2 the error at later years is reduced, hence the estimated 




































There are cases where some of the demands are either not expected to have any growth 
or ,in some rare cases, diminishing. 
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Scenario 1 has a third demand, Demand 3, that is expected to stay the same along 
years, i.e. with zero growth. SimulationMethod 1 and 2 are used to estimate the circuit 
loading growth rate of the circuit supporting these demands. Shown in Figure 4.4 are 
the results for Method 1 (Fig. 4.4(a)) and Method 2 (Fig. 4.4(b)). It is demonstrated 
that using Method 1 the estimated circuit loading level growth is far too inaccurate in 
this case, while Method 2’s result still matches the actual loading level growth quite 
well. 
As for Scenario 2, Demand 3 is decreasing at a rate of 1%. Although the estimated 
circuit loading level of Method 2 (shown in Figure 4.5(b)), in this case, is slightly er­
roneous from year 30, its estimation is still much better than that of Method 1 (Figure 
4.5(a)). 
From these scenarios, simulationMethod 2 is proven to better estimate the circuit load­
ing growth rates according to the nodal growth rates of the whole network. 
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4.3 Circuit Loading Growth Patterns 
Demand in the network is usually expected to grow, but there are also areas where 
no electric load growth or even negative load growth is expected. As for generation, 
power generation growth normally means new generation connection in a lump sum 
rather than the growth of the existing generation. Hence, nodal existing generation 
growth rates are assumed to be zero. 
These different load growth forecast throughout the whole network will lead to differ­
ent types of circuit loading growth patterns, namely positive, negative and zero circuit 
loading growth. These growth patterns are results of different circuit loading growth 
rates, rℓ, and they are treated differently in LRIC pricing to give adequate economical 
signals for network users to act upon. 
In addition to circuit loading growth patterns, the LRIC prices for demand and gener­
ation are also dependent on whether the circuit is demand- or generation-dominated. 
Demand will be charged if the supporting circuits are demand-dominated and will be 
rewarded otherwise. This also applies to generation where generation will be charged 
when the supporting circuits are generation-dominated. 
A circuit can be either demand- or generation-dominated seen by customers at differ­
ent locations. If a load withdrawal at a node results in a ﬂow increase at a circuit, then 
the circuit is considered as demand-dominated seen by this load. However, this same 
circuit can be generation-dominated if a load injection at another node causes power 
ﬂow decrease. 
Figure 4.6. 2-bus test system 
For instance, if the power is ﬂowing from Bus 2 to Bus 1 in Figure 4.6, a load incre­
ment at Bus 1 will cause the power ﬂow at the circuit to increase. Hence, for the pricing 
purpose, the circuit is demand-dominated seen by the customers – both load and gen­
eration at Bus 1. However, a load injection at Bus 2 will result in a counter ﬂow at 
the circuit. Therefore, the circuit is generation-dominated seen by both the load and 
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generation at Bus 1. Therefore, load at Bus 1 and generation at Bus 2 will be charged 
for using the line whilst load at Bus 2 and generation at Bus 1 will be rewarded. 
4.3.1 Positive Circuit Loading Growth Pattern 
A circuit with positive circuit loading growth means that the circuit loading level is 
increasing in the long term. These growth pattern is inﬂuence by the dynamic element 
DB and its growth rate rB. There are two possibilities where a circuit could have a 
positive circuit loading growth: 
• When DB is positive and rB is positive 





























Figure 4.7. Positive loading growth patterns 
The positive growth patterns of these two positive and negative rB cases are shown in 
Figure 4.7. From the graph, it is shown that the loading level of the positive rB case 
grows exponentially, while the loading level of the negative rB grows logarithmically. 
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For instance, in the Figure 4.6 example, if power ﬂows from Bus 2 to Bus 1 and load at 
Bus 1 has a positive nodal growth rate, the positive exponential circuit loading growth 
pattern can be obtained. On the other hand, if power ﬂows from Bus 1 to Bus 2 (i.e. the 
circuit is generation-dominated seen by customers at Bus 1) and the load at Bus 1 has 
a negative growth rate, the positive logarithmic circuit loading growth pattern can be 
achieved. 
For the negative rB case the loading level will never reach the maximum allowed load­
ing level and hence no reinforcement cost will be seen. Therefore, only the positive rB 
case will be considered for network pricing, and there will not be any investment cost 
for the negative rB case. 
4.3.2 Negative Circuit Loading Growth Pattern 
Negative circuit loading growth indicates that the loading level of the circuit is de­
creasing. Similarly, there are two possibilities where a circuit could have a negative 
circuit loading growth: 
• When DB is positive and rB is negative 
• When DB is negative and rB is positive 
The negative growth patterns of these two positive and negative rB cases are shown in 
Figure 4.8. From the graph, it is shown that the loading level of the negative rB case 
decreases exponentially. This also means that the loading level will decrease slower 
with time and will never reach zero. Hence, if a circuit loading level is diminishing 
and the rB is negative, the LRIC price is zero as no reinforcement is required. 
On the other hand, for the positive rB case, the size of the loading level decrement 
grows with time. Therefore, at some point the loading level of the circuit will become 
zero and the ﬂow on the circuit will ’ﬂip’ to another direction (loading level becomes 
negative). The DB ﬂow with the positive rℓ will continue grow until the loading level 
reaches the maximum allowed capacity. Reinforcement is then required. 
In the Figure 4.6 example, if power ﬂows from Bus 2 to Bus 1 and load at Bus 1 
has a negative growth rate, the exponential negative circuit loading growth pattern 
is reached. If power ﬂows from Bus 1 to Bus 2 (generation-dominated) and load at Bus 
1 has a positive growth rate, then the loading level of the line will diminish until it 
reaches zero and ’grow’ exponentially at the different direction (load-dominated). 
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Figure 4.8. Negative loading growth patterns 
4.3.3 Zero Circuit Loading Growth Pattern 
Zero circuit loading growth will occur when demand is not growing or not decreasing, 
i.e. rB is zero. The loading levels of the corresponding circuits remain the same. This 
might happen at some remote areas where the domestic customers merely change their 
usage of electricity. 
For zero circuit loading growth case, as there is no change in the loading level hence 
there is no need for investment. Therefore, there is no reinforcement cost for circuits 
with zero circuit loading growth. 
4.4 LRIC Pricing for Diﬀerent Circuit Loading Growth 
Rates 
As there are different circuit loading growth patterns, LRIC pricing will need to be 
customised for these different cases. 
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4.4.1 Positive Circuit Loading Growth 
For the LRIC pricing model, with a given circuit rℓ (or rB), the time horizon, nℓ, will 
be the time taken for the current loading level, Dℓ to grow to its maximum allowed 




. . Shown in Equation 4.10 is the modiﬁed equation after 
integrating Method 2 for both demand-dominated and generation-dominated cases. 





Cℓ − DA (4.10) S.F. 
Where the current loading level Dℓ is the sum of DA and DB. If there is a load injec­
tion from node N, causing power ﬂow change along a circuit to rise by ΔDℓ, then this 
will advance (load-dominated case) or delay (generation-dominated case) the future 
reinforcement, leading to new time horizon – nℓ,new to reinforce. The circuit’s long-run 
incremental cost, i.e. the change of its present values PVℓ with and without the in­
crement of load, is then determined. Here, the ΔDℓ is subdivided into ΔDA and ΔDB 
retaining DA and DB proportion. 
Figure 4.9 shows the LRIC price pattern for the positive circuit loading growth with 
positive rℓ case (exponential growth). The blue curve is the LRIC price when there is 
a load injection, while the pink curve is when there is a generation injection. The left 
side of the graph is the generation-dominated scenario, while the right the demand­
dominated scenario. 
It is shown that for demand-dominated situation, load is charged more when the sup­
porting circuit’s loading level is higher. This is because at higher loading level, a load 
injectionwill have a higher impact on the investment horizon. And load is discouraged 
to connect at the node while generation is incentivised. 
As for generation-dominated situation, a load withdrawal will defer the reinforcement 
decision. Therefore, the LRIC price for this load will be negative. 
Page 65

Chapter 4 LRIC: Growth Rates

Figure 4.9. LRIC price pattern for positive circuit loading growth with positive rℓ 
4.4.2 Negative Circuit Loading Growth 
For negative circuit loading growth, the time horizon from current loading level de­
creasing to negative maximum allowed capacity is calculated instead to obtain the 
time horizon for reinforcement decision. Equations 4.11 and 4.12 deﬁne how the cur­
rent loading level ”grows” to the maximum allowed loading level (negative), where 
DB is negative and rℓ is positive. Equation 4.12 indicates that DA acts as an additional 
buffer or unused capacity. 
− 




nℓ = −( 
Cℓ + DA) (4.12) S.F. 
Similarly, if there is a load injection from node N, causing power ﬂow change along 
a circuit to change by ΔDℓ, then this will bring forward (load-dominated case) or 
defer(generation-dominated case) the future reinforcement, leading to new time hori­
zon – nℓ,new to reinforce. The circuit’s long-run incremental cost, i.e. the change of its 
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present values PVℓ with and without the increment of load, is then determined. As 
before, the ΔDℓ is subdivided into ΔDA and ΔDB retaining DA and DB proportion. 
Figure 4.10. LRIC price pattern for negative circuit loading growth with positive rℓ 
Figure 4.10 shows the LRIC price pattern for the negative circuit loading growth with 
positive rℓ case. The blue curve is the LRIC price when there is a load injection, while 
the pink curve is when there is a generation injection. The left side of the graph is the 
generation-dominated scenario, while the right the demand-dominated scenario. 
Different from the positive circuit loading growth case, it is shown that for demand­
dominated situation, load is charged more when the supporting circuit is at lower 
utilisation. This is because at lower loading level, a load injection will have a higher 
impact on the investment horizon. Also, load is discouraged to connect at the node 
while generation is incentivised so that the utilisation of the circuit will be maintained 
at an effective level. 
It is important to assign a reasonable nodal growth rate as the LRIC price will be very 
different in the cases of positive and negative circuit loading growth patterns. For 
instance, for a lowly utilised circuit, a load may be charged highly if the circuit loading 
level has a negative growth (demand-dominated); but if the same circuit has a positive 
loading growth pattern instead, the same load will be charged at a low price. 
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4.5 Case Studies 
This section compares the proposed approach with the current practice in LRIC pricing 
where the circuit loading growth rate is assumed to be 1% throughout the network. To 
demonstrate the effect of circuit loading growth rates to the LRIC prices, a few scenar­
ios are demonstrated on the IEEE 14-bus test system and WPD Pembroke Network. 
4.5.1 IEEE 14-Bus Test System 
IEEE 14-bus test system consists of 14 buses, 17 lines, 3 transformers, 2 generators, 
and 3 synchronous condensers. Buses 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are at 132kV voltage level and 
the other buses are at 33kV voltage level. The network diagram and the demand and 
generation data are shown in Appendix A.1. 
Uniform Circuit Loading Growth Rate vs Uniform Nodal Load Growth Rate 
The ﬁrst comparison is between uniform circuit loading growth rate (Scenario 1) and 
uniform nodal load growth rate (Scenario 2). Shown in Table 4.1 is the circuit loading 
growth rates for these two scenarios and the DA and DB for Scenario 2. For Scenario 
1, all the circuits’ loading levels are assigned with a 1% growth rate. And for Scenario 
2, all the load in the test system is assumed to grow at 1% while all generation and 
condensers remain the same, i.e. not growing. 
It is shown that with uniform nodal growth rates (Scenario 2), it is impossible to ob­
tain uniform circuit loading growth rates for all the circuits. However, the LRIC prices 
illustrated in Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 demonstrate that, although there are small 
differences, similar pricing signals can still be obtained by assuming uniform circuit 
loading growth rate. Therefore, it is acceptable to simplify the LRIC price evaluation 
by assuming uniform circuit loading growth rate if uniform nodal growth rate is pre­
dicted. 
The highest LRIC Price falls at Bus 3 as the largest load is connected to this node, in 
addition to the security factor of the supporting circuits as discussed in Section 3.3.1. 
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Circuits Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
From Bus To Bus rℓ (%) DA (MVA) DB (MVA) rℓ (%) 
BUS 1 BUS 2 1.00 22.90 133.78 1.19 
BUS 1 BUS 5 1.00 8.67 65.49 1.17 
BUS 2 BUS 3 1.00 4.33 67.88 1.09 
BUS 2 BUS 4 1.00 3.66 51.76 1.10 
BUS 2 BUS 5 1.00 3.17 37.85 1.13 
BUS 3 BUS 4 1.00 0.41 23.54 1.02 
BUS 4 BUS 5 1.00 1.77 61.73 1.02 
BUS 6 BUS 11 1.00 1.61 5.58 1.03 
BUS 6 BUS 12 1.00 0.34 7.66 1.03 
BUS 6 BUS 13 1.00 0.92 17.60 1.02 
BUS 7 BUS 8 1.00 -0.47 18.52 0.96 
BUS 7 BUS 9 1.00 0.34 29.57 1.09 
BUS 9 BUS 10 1.00 -1.27 9.05 1.11 
BUS 9 BUS 14 1.00 -0.17 10.80 1.11 
BUS 10 BUS 11 1.00 1.91 1.37 1.57 
BUS 12 BUS 13 1.00 0.26 1.38 1.02 
BUS 13 BUS 14 1.00 0.79 4.53 0.99 
BUS 4 BUS 7 1.00 1.73 28.17 1.03 
BUS 4 BUS 9 1.00 0.21 16.25 1.04 
BUS 5 BUS 6 1.00 2.98 40.87 1.06 
Table 4.1. Circuit Loading Growth Data for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2
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Figure 4.12. LRIC Q prices for Scenarios 1 and 2 
Varying Circuit Loading Growth Rate 
Scenarios 3, 4, and 5 are scenarios where different nodal load growth rates are assigned 
to different loads. For Scenario 3, the loads at 33kV nodes are assumed to grow at a rate 
of -1% while loads connected at 132kV nodes at a rate of 1%; Scenario 4 is the opposite 
of Scenario 3 where loads at 33kV nodes are predicted to have a 1% growth rate and 
loads at 132kV have a -1% growth rate. As for Scenario 5, random nodal growth rates 
are assigned for different loads (shown in Table 4.2) to obtain different circuit loading 
growth patterns. Similarly, generation and condensers are assumed not to change. 
Using the method proposed in Section 4.2.2, the constant element, DA, the increas­
ing/decreasing element, DB, and its growth rate, rℓ, are obtained as demonstrated in 
Table 4.3. 
From Table 4.3, it is illustrated that the rℓs of Scenario 3 and Scenario 4 are almost the 
direct opposite; while DAs and DBs are almost the same. Therefore, the asset reinforce­
ment costs considered in Scenario 3 will not be considered in Scenario 4. The circuit’s 
loading data highlighted in grey in Table 4.3 are the cases where the circuit loading 
level is diminishing exponentially, where no reinforcement cost will be seen. 
The LRIC prices for Scenario 3 will hence be higher than that of the Scenario 4 as the 
most of the asset considered for reinforcement are of the 132kV network, i.e. with 
higher reinforcement costs. And most of the assets considered for reinforcement in 
Scenario 4 are at 33kV voltage level. 
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Nodal Load Growth Rate (%) 
Nodes Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 
BUS 2 1.00 -1.00 1.00 
BUS 3 1.00 -1.00 0.00 
BUS 4 1.00 -1.00 1.60 
BUS 5 1.00 -1.00 1.30 
BUS 6 -1.00 1.00 1.00 
BUS 7 -1.00 1.00 0.00 
BUS 8 -1.00 1.00 0.00 
BUS 9 -1.00 1.00 1.00 
BUS 10 -1.00 1.00 -0.50 
BUS 11 -1.00 1.00 0.80 
BUS 12 -1.00 1.00 -0.80 
BUS 13 -1.00 1.00 1.60 
BUS 14 -1.00 1.00 1.00 
Table 4.2. Nodal load growth rates of Scenarios 3, 4 and 5 
From Figure 4.13, it is shown that there is a high P price at Bus 3 and the prices from 
Bus 4 to Bus 14 are negative for Scenario 3. 
Figure 4.13. LRIC P prices for Scenario 3

The circuit with highest effective utilisation, in this scenario, is the line from Bus 3 to






DA (MVA) DB (MVA) rℓ (%)
145.42 11.26 3.79 145.45 11.22 3.80
72.91 1.24 7.98 72.92 1.24 8.01 40.57 33.58 1.63
40.52 31.70 1.55 40.50 31.72 1.55 57.29 14.93 1.60
54.45 0.96 7.81 54.46 0.96 7.83 24.97 30.44 1.57
40.98 0.05 31.28 40.98 0.05 30.93 16.86 24.17 1.58
51.81 75.76 0.62 50.67 74.62 0.63
42.31 21.19 1.73 35.20 28.30 1.54
6.05 1.15 2.23 3.63 10.82 0.18
1.09 6.90 1.08 7.37 0.63 4.11
4.04 14.48 1.13 6.09 12.43 1.61
0.31 18.37 0.97 0.33 18.38 0.97 18.07 0.01 2.80
7.24 37.15 0.96 7.18 37.08 0.96 13.58 16.33 1.44
7.20 14.98 0.83 7.20 14.98 0.83 5.75 2.03 1.73
4.74 15.37 0.90 4.71 15.34 0.90 1.66 8.97 1.42
2.73 0.54 2.16 4.18 0.90 1.07












Circuits Scenario 3 Scenario 5 
DA (MVA) DB (MVA) rℓ (%) 





- - - 39.87 -15.92 1.38 
42.28 21.22 -1.73 
- 6.04 1.15 2.23 -
- 1.10 6.90 1.08 
- 4.05 14.48 1.13 
- - - -
- - -
- - - -
- - -
2.74 0.53 -2.19 -
- 0.90 0.74 1.41 -
- 4.03 1.28 1.88 22.72 -17.41 -0.21 
- - -5.27 35.16 0.93 15.17 14.72 1.46 
- - -4.25 20.70 0.92 6.61 9.84 1.38 
12.82 31.04 -1.20 12.86 31.00 1.20 21.41 22.45 1.58 
Table 4.3. Circuit Loading Growth Data for Scenarios 3, 4 and 5 
From Bus To Bus
 DA (MVA) DB (MVA) rℓ (%) 
BUS 1 BUS 2 
BUS 1 BUS 5 
BUS 2 BUS 3 
BUS 2 BUS 4 
BUS 2 BUS 5 
BUS 3 BUS 4 
BUS 4 BUS 5 
BUS 6 BUS 11 
BUS 6 BUS 12 
BUS 6 BUS 13 
BUS 7 BUS 8 
BUS 7 BUS 9 
BUS 9 BUS 10 
BUS 9 BUS 14 
BUS 10 BUS 11 
BUS 12 BUS 13 
BUS 13 BUS 14 
BUS 4 BUS 7 
BUS 4 BUS 9 
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(Table 4.4). The high price at Bus 3 is due to the power ﬂow direction of its supporting 
circuits. As shown in Figure 4.14, all the P ﬂows of the circuits ﬂow towards Bus 3. 
Hence, all these circuits are demand-dominated seen by a load injection at Bus 3. Line 
from Bus 3 to Bus 4 will also be demand-dominated seen by a load increment at Bus 
2, and will be generation-dominated seen by load increments at the rest of the nodes 
(causing negative prices for these nodes). Similarly for the LRIC Q prices, this time the 
Q ﬂow of line from Bus 3 to Bus 4 is of the opposite direction resulting in high negative 
prices at Bus 3 and positive prices for Bus 4 to Bus 14 (shown in Figure 4.15). 
From To Annuitised Reinforcement Cost (£/yr) Effective Utilisation(%) 
BUS 1 BUS 2 1,220,674 71.71 
BUS 1 BUS 5 2,615,913 49.00 
BUS 2 BUS 3 2,238,009 50.27 
BUS 2 BUS 4 1,976,482 68.82 
BUS 3 BUS 4 2,034,670 72.99 
BUS 4 BUS 5 406,998 57.47 
BUS 10 BUS 11 18,545 43.77 
Table 4.4. Circuit reinforcement cost and eﬀective utilisation for circuits considered in Scenario 3
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Figure 4.15. LRIC Q prices for Scenario 3 
For Scenario 4, the circuit with the highest effective utilisation is the line connecting Bus 
6 to Bus 13 (Table 4.5). However, this line’s reinforcement cost is quite low compared 
to the others. The only 132kV line considered for reinforcement in Scenario 4, line from 
Bus 2 to Bus 5, has a very high reinforcement cost and has a relatively lower effective 
utilisation compared to the other circuits. Therefore, there is no strong dominant factor 
in the LRIC prices. 




Chapter 4 LRIC: Growth Rates 
The LRIC P price for Bus 2, shown in Figure 4.16, is negative as a load increment at 
Bus 2 will cause a small counter ﬂows on line from Bus 2 to Bus 5 (see Figure 4.17). 
The highest LRIC P price is at Bus 14. This is because a load increment at Bus 14 will 
result in a ﬂow increase in almost every circuit except the line from Bus 9 to Bus 10. In 
other words, almost all the circuits considered are demand-dominated seen by load at 
Bus 14. 
From To Annuitised Reinforcement Cost (£/yr) Effective Utilisation(%) 
BUS 2 BUS 5 1,801,917 56.77 
BUS 6 BUS 11 20,662 56.42 
BUS 6 BUS 12 33,881 68.67 
BUS 6 BUS 13 16,748 73.53 
BUS 7 BUS 8 0 15.83 
BUS 7 BUS 9 0 35.39 
BUS 9 BUS 10 6,770 52.60 
BUS 9 BUS 14 28,170 68.00 
BUS 12 BUS 13 53,485 44.18 
BUS 13 BUS 14 43,507 57.60 
BUS 4 BUS 7 51,539 44.38 
BUS 4 BUS 9 51,539 60.00 
BUS 5 BUS 6 51,539 58.56 
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Figure 4.17. P and Q ﬂows of Scenario 4
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Scenario 5 has widely different nodal load growth rates, ranging from -0.8% to 1.6%. 
In this scenario, all cases of positive and negative circuit loading growth patterns are 
demonstrated. Shown in Table 4.3, those data unhighlighted are those with loading 
level growth exponentially; as mentioned before the loading growth data highlighted 
in grey is with loading level decreasing exponentially (not considered for LRIC price); 
the loading level of those highlighted in yellow are decreasing faster with time; and 
the loading level of the circuit highlighted in magenta is diminishing exponentially 
(not considered for LRIC price). 
The annuitised reinforcement cost and the effective utilisation of each circuit consid­
ered is the same as shown in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. Although there is a high effec­
tive utilisation at line from Bus 3 to Bus 4, in scenario 5, the loading level this line is 
predicted to diminish. Hence, the line will be generation-dominated seen by a load 
increment at Bus 3. In this case, the highest price is at Bus 13 instead of Bus 14 because 
line from Bus 13 to Bus 14 us not considered for LRIC prices. Therefore, the impact of 
a load increment at Bus 13 becomes higher compared to that of the Bus 14. 
As it is assumed that DA and DB will retain the same proportion, the increment DB 
ﬂow on line from Bus 12 to Bus 13 has more signiﬁcant impact on the prices. This 
results in a much higher negative Q price at Bus 12. Similarly for Bus 13 and Bus 14, 
the loads at these nodes have positive Q price as the line from Bus 12 to Bus 13 is 
demand-dominated for these loads. 
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Figure 4.20. P and Q ﬂows of Scenario 5
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It is shown that LRIC pricing has strong dependency on the forecast nodal growth rate. 
With different nodal load growth rates, the LRIC prices of the same network with the 
same demand and generation will be very different, especially if there are negative and 
zero nodal load growth rates forecast. 
4.5.2 Pembroke Network 
This network consists of 56 lines, 54 transformers, and 3 generators. The lines consist 
of both overhead lines and underground cables. See Appendix B for the network’s 
diagram and load and generation data. 
Three scenarios are used to demonstrate the effect of different nodal growth rates to 
the circuit loading growth patterns and the LRIC prices. In Scenario 1, it is assumed 
that all the load is growing at 1% growth rate and all generation at 0%; Scenario 2 
changes the nodal growth rate of the load at Bus 3081 to -0.5%; and Scenario 3 changes 
the nodal growth rate of load at Bus 3009 to -0.5%, as shown in Table 4.6. 
Figure 4.22. LRIC P prices for Scenario 1, 2 and 3 
Illustrated in Figure 4.22 and Figure 4.23 are the LRIC P and Q prices for Scenarios 
1, 2 and 3. Loads from Bus 3003 to Bus 3093 have relatively higher LRIC prices than 
the loads from Bus 2025 to Bus 2048. This is because the former group of loads are 
located at a more central area and the assets supporting these loads are more utilised 
than those of the latter group of loads. 
For Scenario 2, load at Bus 3081 is predicted to diminish along time. Table 4.7 demon­
strates some of the lines and transformer supporting load 3081 and their DA, DB and 
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Nodes Scenario 1 Scenario 2







3003 1.00 1.00 
3009 1.00 1.00 
3015 1.00 1.00 
3021 1.00 1.00 
3024 1.00 1.00 
3033 1.00 1.00 
3042 1.00 1.00 1.00 
3048 1.00 1.00 
3054 1.00 1.00 
3066 1.00 1.00 
3072 1.00 1.00 
3081 1.00 -0.50 1.00 
3087 1.00 1.00 1.00 
3093 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2025 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2026 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2027 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2035 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2037 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2045 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2046 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2047 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2048 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Table 4.6. Nodal growth rate for Scenarios 1, 2 and 3





as shown in Figure 4.22 an
Scenario 2
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loading growth rates are affected and turned into a negative value. This also implies 
that these line and transformer (which are illustrated in grey in Figure 4.24) are not 
considered for network prices. The unit incremental prices for these two assets are 
not very great, but the effect of omitting them for network pricing can still be shown 
through the slight drop of the LRIC prices at Bus 3081 and the other loads near that 
Bus (Figure 4.24), i.e. Bus 3003, Bus 3015 and Bus 3048 d 
Figure 4.23. 
Circuits Effective Scenario 1 
From To Utilisation(%) DA (MVA) DB (MVA) rℓ (%) 
3102 3084 8.39 0.05 1.87 1.04 
3102 3006 32.73 0.23 7.42 1.05 
3006 3018 9.10 0.16 1.87 1.13 
3084 3081 47.65 0.02 1.89 1.01 




0.01 1.89 -0.51 
Figure 4.24. Most aﬀected network circuits for Scenario 2 
As for Scenario 3, load at Bus 3009, previously with the highest LRIC price, are pre­
dicted to have a negative growth rate. Similarly, this affects evaluated growth patterns 
of the supporting lines and transformers. load 3009 in Scenario 1 is charged highly 
because it is supported by highly-utilised assets, where 3 of them (highlighted in red 
in Table 4.8) are effectively utilised at more than 90%. 
However, if load 3009 is forecast to be decreasing, 2 of these assets will then have a 
negative rℓ and load 3009 will not be charged for using this transformers. Figure 4.25 
shows the area affected by this change and the line and transformers omitted for LRIC 
pricing. As the assets not considered have high unit incremental prices, the LRIC prices 




Utilisation(%) DA (MVA) DB (MVA) rℓ (%)
89.90 10.50 0.96 2.88
72.50 8.07 0.06 8.22
48.80 33.40 30.26 0.18
92.15 7.59 0.01 16.89
92.87 0.04 5.25 0.51
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and Figure 4.23. The most affected or decreased LRIC price is at Bus 3009, followed by 
other buses near it like Bus 3093 and Bus 3066. 
Circuits Effective Scenario 1 
From To DA (MVA) DB (MVA) rℓ (%) 
2005 3069 0.79 10.67 1.14 
3069 3105 0.30 7.83 1.08 -
3105 3012 0.07 3.07 1.08 -
2015 3012 0.48 7.12 1.09 
3012 3009 0.06 5.23 1.02 -
3012 3009 92.88 0.06 5.19 1.02 0.04 5.20 -0.51 
Table 4.8. Some Circuit Loading Growth Data for Scenario 1 and 3 
Figure 4.25. Most aﬀected network circuits for Scenario 3 
This further reinforces the ﬁndings in Section 4.5.1 that the forecast nodal growth 
will greatly affect the circuit loading growth patterns of the corresponding supporting 
circuits. And this will greatly affect the LRIC prices seen by the customers. Hence, 
forecasting the nodal load growth is not a trivial task. 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
The current practice of assuming all circuits to have the same loading growth rate, 1%, 
is not reasonable and practical as demand and generation at different locations could 
have very different growth rates. 
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This chapter establishes the link between the nodal load growth rates and the cir­
cuit loading level growth patterns, namely positive, negative and zero circuit loading 
growth patterns. LRIC pricing is sensitive to the circuit loading growth rates, therefore 
the nodal load growth rates prediction is very vital for LRIC prices evaluation. 
As illustrated in the case studies, different nodal load growth rates can result in very 
different LRIC prices for the same network and loading conditions. However, this can 
also better reﬂect the reinforcement horizon of each asset in the network, hence better 








HIS chapter discusses three different revenue reconciliation 
T methods, namely ﬁxed adder, ﬁxed multiplier and Ramsey method. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of revenue reconciliation is to meet the revenue recovered from the users 
with the targeted revenue as the revenue recovered from the LRIC prices may generate 
revenue shortfall or surplus. The LRIC prices will be translated into the ﬁnal tariffs 
after revenue reconciliation. 
The revenue reconciliation method used to produce these tariffs is very important in 
order to preserve the economical signals to the network customers, in addition to re­
covering the annual targeted revenue. If the original price signals are distorted, achiev­
ing the purposes of the network pricing (i.e. incentivise efﬁcient usage of existing as­
sets and efﬁcient siting of new customers) will be very difﬁcult. 
This chapter focuses on three different revenue reconciliation methods, namely ﬁxed 
adder, ﬁxedmultiplier and Ramsey method, and their principles and effects will be dis­
cussed. In this case, the reliability sensitive adder is not investigated as it is a method 
more suitable for spot pricing where lost of load probability (LOLP) is used as the mea­
sure of reliability [49]. The effect of these three revenue reconciliation methods onto 
the ﬁnal distribution use of system tariffs will be analysed next using a simple 3-bus 
network and IEEE 14-bus test system. 
5.2 Fixed Adder Method 
For the ﬁxed adder method, a constant amount is added to or subtracted from (i.e. 
negative adder) the marginal price seen by the users. The tariff is hence the marginal 
price plus the adder as shown in Equation 5.1, where the adder could be either positive 
or negative depending whether there is a revenue shortfall or surplus. 
Tari f f = MarginalPrice+ Adder (5.1) 
The revenue recovered through the LRICmarginal prices can be calculated using Equa­
tion 5.2, as the generation price is the opposite of the demand price (i.e. demand and 
generation are treated the same). Assuming there is no demand response to the price 
changes, the adder would be the revenue shortfall/surplus (shown in Equation 5.3) 
divided by the total MVA of the network at peak time, as shown in Equation 5.4. 
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RevenueRecovered = ∑ (MarginalPrice× (Demandi − Generationi)) (5.2) 
i 
RevenueDi f f erence = AnnualAllowedRevenue− RevenueRecovered (5.3) 
RevenueDi f f erence 
Adder = 
∑i (Demandi − Generationi) 
(5.4) 
For example, if there are two demand groups D1 and D2 and their LRIC prices are as 
shown in Figure 5.1, where D1 has a lower price than D2, for the ﬁxed adder reconcil­
iation method these two demand groups will see the same increase for their per unit 
charge (£/kW/yr) to form their ﬁnal tariffs, illustrated in magenta in Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1. LRIC prices and tariﬀs with ﬁxed adder method 
The ﬁxed adder method is currently used in the UK network pricing as it is simple 
and to some extent preserves the economical signals (if there is minimal or no demand 
response to the prices) while maintaining the price difference seen by different network 
users. 
5.3 Fixed Multiplier Method 
As for the ﬁxed multiplier method, the marginal prices are scaled by a constant scale 
factor. This scale factor, i.e. multiplier, corresponds to the ratio of the annual targeted 
revenue to the recovered revenue. The multiplier tariff is shown in Equation 5.5. 
Tari f f = MarginalPrice× (1+ Multiplier) (5.5) 
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Similarly, assuming there is no demand response to the price ﬂuctuation, the magni­
tude of the multiplier would be the ratio of the allowed revenue to the revenue recov­
ered by the marginal price (Equation 5.6). 
AnnualAllowedRevenue 
Multiplier = (5.6) 
RevenueRecovered 
With the same example, where Demand 1 has a smaller LRIC price than Demand 2 
(Figure 5.2), with the ﬁxed multiplier method Demand 2 will see a higher increase for 
its per unit use of system charge. Fixed multiplier method retains the proportion or 
ratio of the LRIC prices at all nodes in the network. 
Figure 5.2. LRIC prices and tariﬀs with ﬁxed multiplier method 
The ﬁxed multiplier method ampliﬁes the economical signals but at some point it may 
over-amplify and distort the economical signals. Some DNOs use ﬁxed multiplier 
method to reconcile the revenue surplus/shortfall for HV and LV network, where 
DRM is used to obtained the network prices [58, 59]. When FCP model was ﬁrst 
introduced, a supplier responded to their revenue reconciliation method of applying 
different adder for different voltage level (i.e. have different assigned targeted revenue 
at different voltage level), suggesting that the ﬁxed multiplier method should be used 
instead to prevent over allocation to low voltage users [60]. 
5.4 Ramsey Method 
Ramsey method is economically efﬁcient in maximising social welfare under certain 
conditions. For Ramsey method, which is also known as the inverse elasticity rule, 
the marginal price is adjusted to each users in inverse proportion to the price elasticity 
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of demand at the time of their use [49]; but it is smaller as the inverse elasticity of 
demand is multiplied by a constant lower than 1 [61, 62]. In short, the rationale behind 
this concept is that “if prices are to be increased, it is a good strategy to increase the 
markup on goods with the most inelastic demand, because consumers and users will 
buy them anyway” [63]. 
The price elasticity (Equation 5.7) is a value reﬂecting the demand change in response 
to the price change. This elasticity value is negative in all cases because demand will 
increase if there is a price drop. An elastic demand will have a higher negative value 
as its percentage change in demand is high with a small change in its network price. 
Percentage Change in Demand 
Elasticity = (5.7) 
Percentage Change in Network Price 
To set the ﬁnal tariffs so that ﬁnal revenue recovered is equal to the allowed revenue 
(so that proﬁt losses are eliminated), Lagrange multiplier technique is used. Detailed 
derivation can be found in reference [62]. The Ramsey tariffs can be derived using 
Equation 5.8 [64]. 
Elasticity× MarginalPrice 
Tari f f = (5.8) 
Elasticity− RamseyNumber 
Ramsey number is a constant lower than 1 and is the same for all demand tariff equa­
tions that can be evaluated using numerical methods to satisfy Equation 5.9 shown 
below. 
AnnualAllowedRevenue = ∑ Tari f fi × (Demandi − Generationi) (5.9) 
i 
With the same two-demand example, Demand 1 has a relatively lower price elasticity 
(lower absolute value) in Scenario S1 and has a higher price elasticity in Scenario S2, 
compared to Demand 2. The effect of their price elasticities are reﬂected in their ﬁnal 
tariffs as shown in Figure 5.3. The tariff of Demand 1 is much higher in Scenario 
S1 compared to that in Scenario S2. This is because the increase or adjustment to the 
unit incremental charge will be higher when the price elasticity is lower (Scenario S1). 
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Figure 5.3. LRIC prices and tariﬀs with Ramsey method 
Ramsey method or Ramsey pricing is highly discussed but rarely used because for nat­
ural monopolies, like distribution network operators, regulator might limit the extent 
to which the operator can adopt Ramsey method because [61, 62]: 
•	 Ramsey pricing should be limited to groups of services that are subject to similar 
degree of competition if markets are not equally monopolistic or competitive; 
•	 it may not be consistent with the governmental’s goal of providing affordable 
service to the poor; 
•	 the markup to achieve these efﬁcient Ramsey prices may be inconsistent with the 
political sustainability; 
•	 Ramsey pricing, although not necessarily bad, is a form of price discrimination; 
•	 there is other practical issues like the difﬁculty in obtaining data on different price 
elasticities for different customer groups. Inaccuracy of the customer response 
forecast will adversely distort the pricing signals. 
5.5 Case Studies 
5.5.1 3-Bus Test System 
To illustrate the effect of the three different revenue reconciliation methods, a simple 
3-bus test system is used (Figure 5.4). Both demand groups in the system, D1 and 
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Figure 5.4. 3-bus test system 
Three scenarios are used in order to illustrate the effect of the different revenue recon­
ciliation methods analysed. These scenarios include: 
1. Scenario 1 – D1 = 15MW, D2= 30MW, revenue recovered = 40.37%, 
2. Scenario 2 – D1 = 25MW, D2= 25MW, revenue recovered = 37.89%, 
3. Scenario 3 – D1 = 15MW, D2= 40MW, revenue recovered = 133.43%. 




S1 -0.045 -0.072 
S2 -0.105 -0.054 
Table 5.1. Price elasticity for Case 1 and Case 2 
Scenario 1 
In Scenario 1, D1 is half the magnitude of D2. As they are each supplied by a circuit 
and these circuits are identical, the LRIC price of D1 is smaller than that of D2, which is 
shown in blue in Figures 5.5. For ﬁxed adder method, an adder or a constant £/kW/yr 
is added to each demand’s LRIC price to form the ﬁnal tariff, as illustrated in Figure 
5.5. 
As for ﬁxed multiplier method, the price for D1will have a smaller increase compared 
to that of D2, where the increase is proportional or is a constant percentage of the LRIC 
prices. This results in a lower D1 tariff compared to the adder tariff. 
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Figure 5.5. LRIC prices and tariﬀs after reconciliation for Scenario 1 
As demonstrated, for Ramsey method, the D1 tariff for Scenario S1 is higher than that 
of the Scenario S2 because in Scenario S1 D1 has a smaller price elasticity. Similarly, 
the D2 tariff of Scenario S2 is higher due to the weaker price elasticity. Therefore, 
customers who are less responsive to the price signals will see a larger impact on their 
tariffs. 
Adder (£/kW/yr) Multiplier Ramsey Number 1 Ramsey Number 2

Scenario 1 6.03 1.344 0.038 0.032

Table 5.2. Adder, multiplier and Ramsey numbers for Scenarios 1 
Scenario 2 
For Scenario 2, D1 and D2 are the same (i.e. 25MW). In this case, the tariffs from using 
ﬁxed adder and ﬁxed multiplier revenue reconciliation methods will be the same due 
to the same magnitude of D1 and D2, i.e. there are no locational differences. 
In this scenario, the Ramsey method can be demonstrated more clearly as the LRIC 
prices of D1 and D2 before any adjustment are the same. As shown in Figure 5.6, in 
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Figure 5.6. LRIC prices and tariﬀs after reconciliation for Scenario 2

Adder (£/kW/yr) Multiplier Ramsey Number 1 Ramsey Number 2

Scenario 2 5.88 1.639 0.032 0.041

Table 5.3. Adder, multiplier and Ramsey numbers for Scenarios 2 
Scenario 3 
In Scenario 3, D2 is increased to 40MW so that the revenue recovered form the LRIC 
prices is over or more than the allowed revenue. Therefore, in this case scaling down 
is required instead. As shown in Table 5.4, the adder, multiplier and the Ramsey 
numbers for both cases are all negative. 
Demonstrated in Figure 5.7, the tariff of D1, using ﬁxed adder method, will become 
negative as the negative adder is larger than the LRIC price itself. The tariffs of the 
Ramsey method are similar to the ﬁxed multiplier method in Scenario 3. This is be­
cause in the case of over-recovery, price elasticity will have the minimal effect on the 
Ramsey tariffs and the tariffs will resemble the multiplier tariffs. The results also shows 
that ﬁxed multiplier and Ramsey method will not convert a positive price to a negative 
tariff. 
Adder (£/kW/yr) Multiplier Ramsey Number 1 Ramsey Number 2

Scenario 3 -3.07 -0.263 -0.025 -0.020
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Figure 5.7. LRIC prices and tariﬀs after reconciliation for Scenario 3 
5.5.2 IEEE 14-Bus Test System 
This section compares the discussed three revenue reconciliation methods in a more 
practical system – IEEE 14-bus test system. The network consists of 17 lines, 3 trans­
formers, 2 generators, and 3 synchronous condensers. Two scenarios, i.e. revenue 
under-recovery (the demand and generation data can be found in Appendix A.1) and 
over-recovery (data in Appendix A.2) cases, are used to illustrate the impact of these 
methods. 
Scenario 1: Scaling Up 
For Scenario 1, the revenue recovered from LRIC prices is less than the network’s an­
nual allowed revenue, 61.3% recovered, hence the LRIC prices evaluated need to be 
scaled up. 
Figure 5.8 shows the original LRIC prices and the tariff with ﬁxed adder and ﬁxed 
multiplier methods of the users, demand and generation. It is shown that the demand 
LRIC price at Bus 3 is very high compared to the other nodes. This is because the 
network largest load (94.2MW, 19MVar) is located at Bus 3, utilising its supporting 
assets highly. On the other hand, there is a negative demand LRIC price at Bus 2 
as a load injection at Bus 2 causes counter ﬂows at many supporting lines, like lines 
connecting Bus 2 and Bus 3, Bus 2 and Bus 4, and Bus 2 and Bus 5. 
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Figure 5.8. Tariﬀs for ﬁxed adder and ﬁxed multiplier 
Using the ﬁxed adder reconciliation method, the demand LRIC price at Bus 2 is con­
verted to a positive charge when the adder is included. It has maintained the econom­
ical price signals, i.e. keeping the price at Bus 3 high. 
As for the ﬁxed multiplier method, it has kept the demand charge at Bus 2 negative 
respecting that the user is giving credit to the network. However, the charge at Bus 3 
has become signiﬁcantly high compared to the other charges. This price signal ampli­
ﬁcation might not be appreciated by the customers at Bus 3. 
Figure 5.9 demonstrates the tariffs using Ramsey method for Scenario 1 and Figure 
5.10 is the corresponding forecast price elasticity of the network users. For Ramsey 
Case A, the price elasticity of the users at 132kV is -0.072 while the price elasticity of 
the users at 33kV is -0.045. In this case, the charge at Bus 3 is still the highest. The 
increments onto the LRIC prices at the 33kV nodes are considerably higher than those 
of the 132kV nodes (besides Bus 3 which has signiﬁcantly higher LRIC price) due to 
the lower price elasticities. 
As for Ramsey Case B, different price elasticities are assign to the different users in the 
network. Notably, demand at Bus 3 has the highest price elasticity, -0.105, and demand 
at Bus 14 has the lowest, -0.03. This has caused huge changes to the tariffs. For instance, 
the increase to the demand charge at Bus 14 is the highest. This resulted in the tariff at 
Bus 14 almost reaching the tariff at Bus 3. The other charges are increased accordingly 
with respect to the inverse of the corresponding demand’s price elasticity. 
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Figure 5.9. Tariﬀs for Ramsey method

Figure 5.10. Price elasticity 
Table 5.5 shows the adder, multiplier and Ramsey numbers for Scenario 1. 
The ﬁxed adder method might disregard the credit (negative LRIC prices) of some 
loads, in this case load at Bus 2, when the adder is high. Fixed multiplier reconciliation 
method might over amplify the pricing signals at nodes with higher LRIC prices. And 
the Ramsey method might change the price signals drastically with different customer 
price elasticities forecast (i.e. price discrimination). 
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Adder (£/kW) Multiplier Ramsey Number 1 Ramsey Number 2 
Scenario 1 10.01 0.632 0.024 0.022 
Table 5.5. Adder, multiplier and Ramsey numbers for Scenario 1 
Scenario 2: Scaling Down 
For Scenario 2, the demand and generation in Scenario 1 are increased by 15% and the 
revenue recovered from the LRIC prices has exceeded the annual allowed revenue, i.e. 
139.4% of the revenue is recovered. In this case, the prices have to be scaled down. 
Figure 5.11 illustrates the original LRIC prices and the tariffs of ﬁxed adder and ﬁxed 
multiplier methods. The negative adder has maintained the excessively high charge at 
Bus 3 but has caused many charges to become considerably small or close to zero. This 
means that almost all the revenue will be recovered from customers at Bus 3. 
On the other hand, the ﬁxed multiplier method has helped dampen the extremely 
sharp price signal at Bus 3 while maintaining the message to be sent to the users, i.e. 
has relatively more signiﬁcant locational signals (compared to the ﬁxed adder tariffs) 
for the rest of the nodes. Therefore, the ﬁxed multiplier method has more pros in this 
case. 
Figure 5.11. Tariﬀs for ﬁxed adder and ﬁxed multiplier

Again with the price elasticities of Ramsey Case A and B described in the previous

section, the tariffs of these cases are obtained as shown in Figure 5.12. As mentioned
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over-recovery situation. Hence, there is no huge difference in the tariffs of these two 
different cases. And the tariffs are quite similar to those of the ﬁxed multiplier method. 
Figure 5.12. Tariﬀs for Ramsey method 
These results demonstrate that if there are some excessive charges at some nodes in the 
network under over-recovery situation, the ﬁxed adder tariffs might give over empha­
sis on the users connected to these nodes (extremely high charges) and the rest of the 
customers might see very low or negative charges. Thus, most of the annual targeted 
revenue will be recovered from the users who see these excessive charges. 
On the other hand, the ﬁxed multiplier method dampens the signal of these excessive 
charges whilst keeping the other prices to minimal changes. Therefore, in this scenario, 
the load at Bus 3 still has an adequately high tariff and the other customers will still be 
provided with the locational pricing signals. 
The Ramsey tariffs in the over-recovery situation resemble those of the ﬁxed multiplier 
as the price elasticities of the customers do not have much effect on the tariffs when 
the Ramsey numbers are negative. 
Table 5.6 shows the adder, multiplier and the Ramsey numbers for Scenario 2. Again, 
for the revenue over-recovery situation, these adder, multiplier and Ramsey numbers 
are all negative. 
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Adder (£/kW) Multiplier Ramsey Number 1 Ramsey Number 2 
Scenario 2 -8.85 -0.283 -0.027 -0.036 
Table 5.6. Adder, multiplier and Ramsey numbers for Scenario 2 
5.5.3 Discussions 
Although the Ramsey method is the optimal economical way to charge customers in 
many different sectors, its application to the distribution network pricing should be 
limited as the distribution network users are mostly inelastic or have similar price 
elasticities. One of the reasons is that the network users do not have equal means 
and options to response to their network prices. 
In economics, the theory of the second best was originally used as a technical economic 
concept [65, 66]. However, the idea behind the concept is general [67]. The theory 
states that when the ﬁrst-best solution (under optimum conditions) is unavailable or 
impractical, the second-best solution should be considered. 
Therefore, as the distribution network users are not very elastic to prices, it is adequate 
to adopt the ﬁxed products, as a second-best solution, to reconcile revenue. Again, 
the tariffs obtained from Ramsey method resemble those of the ﬁxed multiplier when 
all the demand’s price elasticities are similar. In addition to that, the ﬁxed products 
may be more consistent with the political sustainability. ’In the case of services where 
traditional prices were different from Ramsey prices, there are equity issues in chang­
ing from the traditional pricing structure to a new structure, even if the new structure 
would be more efﬁcient in an aggregate sense. [62]’. 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
The main observations from this chapter are: 
1.	 Fixed adder reconciliation method 
•	 Pros: it is generally simple to implement and to some extent preserves the 
economical signals provided by the LRIC prices. 
•	 Cons: it may distort or undesirably sharpen some excessive price signals 
and dampen the rest if the locational signals when the revenue recovered is 
more than the annual allowed revenue. 
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•	 Summary: it is more suitable when the revenue recovered from the LRIC 
prices is less than the allowed revenue. 
2.	 Fixed multiplier reconciliation method 
•	 Pros: it is simple to implement and to some extent preserves the economical 
signals provided by the LRIC prices. 
•	 Cons: it may distort or undesirably sharpen some excessive price signals 
and dampen the rest if the locational signals when the revenue recovered is 
less than the annual allowed revenue. 
•	 Summary: it is more suitable when the revenue recovered from the LRIC 
prices are is more than the allowed revenue. 
3.	 Ramsey reconciliation method 
•	 Pros: it is economically efﬁcient to integrate customer responses into net­
work pricing and Ramsey method is the way to achieve this purpose. In 
addition to that, Ramsey method can maximise social welfare under the op­
timum conditions. 
•	 Cons: If optimum conditions are not met, Ramsey method might distort the 
economical signals. Also, it is more sophisticated, price elasticity prediction 
is very vital in this method and not all customers have means or options to 
response to the price signals. 
•	 Summary: it is more suitable if distribution network users are more respon­
sive or elastic to the price signals, in addition to having the ability andmeans 




Pricing Signals of LRIC and 
FCP Models 
HAPTER six discusses about the different pricing signals, the 
C strength and weaknesses of LRIC and FCP methodologies. The assumptions made for these methodologies are also investi­
gated intensively in this chapter. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Ofgem, the GB electricity market regulator, has decided to require each DNO to either 
apply a common LRIC model or a common FCP approach for their EHV use of system 
charging, by 1 April 2011. The seven DNOs are currently working together to achieve 
commonality on their EHV charging methodologies and tariff structures [68, 69]. 
When the FCP approach was ﬁrst introduced, Frontier Economics [70], commissioned 
by Scottish Power, Reckon [71], and DLT Consulting in conjunction with University of 
Bath [72], have done some comparisons on these two charging methodologies. 
Reference [70] stated that LRIC is a ’pure’ incremental cost pricing approach while 
FCP is more in favour of a total cost pricing approach. The FCP approach has the 
potential of sacriﬁcing economic efﬁciency and cost reﬂectivity, as a result of departing 
the pure incremental cost pricing. However, Reference [70] argued that FCP might 
generate charges similar to the ’pure’ incremental cost pricing. Moreover, customers 
might not be too sensitive to the charge rates, i.e. have a low price elasticity. Frontier 
Economics also claimed that the LRIC approach might lead to charges too excessive in 
some cases and will break down under certain parameter speciﬁcations, for instance, 
when the nodal load growth rate is close to zero and reaching its capacity. 
Reckon believes that both methodologies ’provides locational incentives in the right 
direction, but both face serious challenges in providing the customer incentives that 
Ofgem appears to seek [71]’. Both methodologies also fails to provide satisfactory 
incentives covering all forms of customer behaviours. Reckon also mentioned that the 
LRIC approach faces the risk of overstating the locational differences, while in contrary 
the FCP approach might understate the locational differences. 
On the other hand, DLT Consulting and University of Bath argued that it is essential 
to obtain symmetry between charges or credits for generation and load. As the FCP 
approach applies different models for generation and load, it is weak in this respect. 
LRIC relies relatively less on assumptions in calculating the charges and will only have 
signiﬁcant price changes when the system conﬁguration changes, like large generation 
and point loads connection. FCP provides ’less stable charges since it has a threshold 
that are temporal (in its 10 year horizon) and in circuit utilisation (since it ignores the 
reinforcement of circuits where the utilisation is less than 87%) [72]’. They also argued 
that the excessive charge under extreme conditions is an appropriate message as the 
system reinforcementmight be over due or circuits overloaded. They believed it would 
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be inappropriate to visit the pricing consequence of this to the users, and this can be 
possibly solved by capping the reinforcement horizon. In contrary, the FCP model 
gives weaker locational signals as the network is arbitrarily zoned before prices are 
derived. 
This chapter discusses the pricing signals of the LRIC and FCP models on the IEEE 
14-bus test system and on Pembroke network. Next, sensitivity analyses are carried 
out to identify the factors that these pricing pricing methodologies are sensitive to. 
6.2 Case Studies on IEEE 14-Bus Test System 
The IEEE 14-bus test system, with three scenarios, low, high and very-high utilisation 
cases, are used to ﬁnd the most inﬂuencing factors of these two charging methodolo­
gies. For FCP approach studies, two network groups, the 132kV and 33kV network 
groups, are identiﬁed. 1% annual load growth is used; Forecast new generation is as­
sumed to be 30% of the current demand and the test-size generators used are 55MW 
and 20MW for 132kV and 33kV network groups respectively; The generation contri­
bution factor is assumed to be 0.5. The demand and generation data for these three 
scenarios can be found in Appendix A. In this test system, there are four generators. 
6.2.1 Low Utilisation Case 
Appendix A.3 shows the real and reactive power of the demand and generation for the 
low utilisation case. The average utilisation of the circuits and transformers is 57.6% 
while the highest utilisation is 77.4%. 
LRIC and FCP Prices 
Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 illustrate the LRIC and FCP demand and generation charges 
for the low utilisation case respectively. From Figure 6.1, for FCP approach it is shown 
that there are no demand (marginal) charges for the 132kV network group and a small 
charge, £1.9/kVA/yr, for the 33kV network group. This is because there is no reinforce­
ment requirement identiﬁed within the ten-year period. As for the FCP generation, 
there is also no generation (marginal) charge for both the 132kV and 33kV network 
group (shown in Figure 6.2). In addtion to no reinforcement requirement (due to test-
size generation increment) within the ten-year period, there is no generation beneﬁt 
because there is no demand charge for the 132kV network group. 
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Figure 6.1. Demand charges for low utilisation case 
While for the LRIC approach, the highest demand LRIC charge is at Bus 3 as the highest 
load (96.1 MVA) is connected at Bus 3. As shown in Figure 6.2, the LRIC generation 
prices are the mirror effect of the demand prices. LRIC treats demand and generation 
the same. 
Figure 6.2. Generation charges for low utilisation case 
LRIC and FCP Tariﬀs 
The revenue recovered for both LRIC and FCP approaches are 18.11% and 2.17% re­
spectively. Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 are the demand and generation tariffs after the 
Page 103

Chapter 6 Pricing Signals of LRIC and FCP Models 
revenue recovered is reconciled using ﬁxed adder reconciliation method. The adder 
for LRIC approach is 17.56[£/kVA/yr] whilst the adder for FCP approaches is 20.98 
[£/kVA/yr]. 
Figure 6.3. Demand tariﬀs for low utilisation case

Figure 6.4. Generation tariﬀs for low utilisation case 
The relatively high LRIC demand tariff (ﬁnal price) at Bus 3 will discourage existing 
demand growth, as well as new demand. Furthermore, the negative LRIC generation 
tariff at Bus 3 will encourage new generation to connect at that location. These pricing 
signals will guide customer behaviours to the direction of decreasing network usage 
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at the area near Bus 3. The demand and generation tariffs at other nodes, however, are 
dominated by the adder. 
On the other hand, the FCP approach provides weaker locational signals and , in this 
case, all the demand and generation tariffs are similar as they are dominated by the 
adder of the FCP approach. This does not give enough pricing signals for the cus­
tomers to act upon, hence new generation and demand might anyhow connect to the 
network due to the weak locational charge differences. 
6.2.2 High Utilisation Case 
The demand real power is increased by about 20% while demand reactive power and 
the generation is kept to the previous sizes (as shown in Appendix A.4) for the high 
utilisation case. In this case, the average utilisation of the circuits and transformers is 
63.2% while the highest utilisation is 95.2%. 
LRIC and FCP Prices 
Figure 6.5 shows the demandmarginal charges for FCP and LRIC approaches. For FCP 
approach, reinforcement projects are identiﬁed for the 33kV network group. There are 
no demand charges for the 132kV network group even though the effective utilisation 
of the 132kV assets are high. This is because with the FCP demand approach, there 
will only be demand charges when the supporting assets are loaded at more than 90%. 
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The results also illustrates that the LRIC prices have gone up signiﬁcantly especially at 
Bus 3. Although the circuit with the highest effective utilisation is in the 33kV network, 
the LRIC prices for the nodes in 33kV network are relatively small compared to the 
price at Bus 3. This is because the 132kV assets have much higher investment cost. 
Table 6.1 demonstrates the effective utilisation of the assets of the 132kV network 
group. In this case, the line from Bus 3 to Bus 4 has the highest effective utilisation, 
supplying the highest load in the network at Bus 3. Hence, the highest LRIC price 
falls at Bus 3 where its supporting line has the highest effective utilisation amongst the 
132kV assets. 
From Bus To Bus Effective Utilisation(%)

Bus 1 Bus 2 79.73 
Bus 1 Bus 5 
Bus 2 Bus 3 
Bus 2 Bus 4 
Bus 2 Bus 5 
Bus 3 Bus 4 81.15 
Bus 4 Bus 5 63.68 
Table 6.1. Eﬀective utilisation of 132kV assets for the high utilisation case 
Again, the generation LRIC prices are the opposite of the demand LRIC prices (Figure 
6.6), with the highest reward at Bus 3. As for the FCP generation, there is no reinforce­
ment project identiﬁed within the 10-year window and as there is no demand charges 
for the 132kV network group, there is no generation beneﬁt for the generation at 33kV 
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Figure 6.6. Generation charges for high utilisation case 
LRIC and FCP Tariﬀs 
In the high utilisation case, the LRIC approach recovers 95.73% of its annual allowed 
revenue whilst the FCP approach recovers 12.98%. Hence, the adder for the LRIC 
model is small (0.82[£/kVA/yr]) and for the FCP approach the adder (16.67[£/kVA/yr]), 
which has relatively small differences from the adder of the low utilisation case. 
These revenue recovery ﬁgures demonstrate that the LRIC approach recovers most of 
the revenue through customers at Bus 3, where the tariff at Bus 3 is extremely high 
compared to the others (more than 5 times higher). On the other hand, the FCP ap­
proach only provides marginal charges for demand at 33kV network group, resulting 
the low revenue recovered (through marginal prices) and a high adder for a highly­
utilised network. 
Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8 are the demand and generation tariffs for both LRIC and 
FCP approaches. For the LRIC approach, as the revenue recovered is very close to 
the annual targeted revenue the LRIC tariffs are almost the same as the LRIC prices. 
The pricing signals attract new generation and discourage demand to connect at Bus 
3, similar to the low utilisation case. 
As for the FCP approach, the adder is again dominant in the FCP demand and gener­
ation tariffs, resulting in weak locational signals. Although there are slight differences 
in the FCP demand tariffs, the FCP generation tariffs are the same. New generation 
is not adequately directed to the locations that bring the most beneﬁt to the network 
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Figure 6.7. Demand tariﬀs for high utilisation case 
itself. Worse, new generation might locate at an area that might cause more investment 
projects in the network. 
Figure 6.8. Generation tariﬀs for high utilisation case 
6.2.3 Very-High Utilisation Case 
In the very-high utilisation case, demand real and reactive power is further increased 
while maintaining the sizes of the generation, as demonstrated in Appendix A.5. The 
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average effective utilisation of the assets in the network is 64.6% and the highest efec­
tive utilisation is 98.5%. 
LRIC and FCP Prices 
In this case, the line with the highest effec V line connected from 
Bus 1 to Bus 2, as illustrated in Table 6.2. or the GSP point of the 
network, and line from Bus 1 to Bus 2 is s ds in the test system. 
From Bus To Bus 
Bus 1 Bus 2 
Bus 1 Bus 5 
Bus 2 Bus 3 
Bus 2 Bus 4 
Bus 2 Bus 5 







Bus 4 Bus 5 66.51

Table 6.2. Eﬀective utilisation of 132kV assets for the very-high utilisation case 
Hence, the LRIC prices for all the nodes have drastically increased. Shown in Figure 
6.9 and Figure 6.10 are the demand and generation prices for the LRIC and FCP ap­
proaches. The LRIC prices at 33kV nodes are slightly higher than those of the 132kV 
nodes. This is because 33kV loads are also supported by the 33kV assets in addition to 
the line from Bus 1 to Bus 2. 
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As for the FCP demand approach, in this case both 132kV and 33kV network groups 
have reinforcement projects identiﬁed, i.e. there are assets with utilisation higher than 
90%. The FCP demand charges for both network groups are coincidently similar. 
Figure 6.10. Generation charges for very-high utilisation case 
There is no FCP generation (marginal) charge for both network groups. However, 
as there is demand charge for the 132kV network group in this case, there will be 
generation beneﬁt for the generation of the 33kV network group. As a contribution 
factor of 0.5 is assumed, the generation beneﬁt of the 33kV network group will be half 
the demand charge of the 132kV network group. 
LRIC and FCP Tariﬀs 
In this very-high utilisation case, the revenue recovered using the LRIC approach has 
exceeded the annual allowed revenue at 162.38%. Therefore, scaling down in required 
and the adder for the LRIC approach will be negative, i.e. -11.01[£/kVA/yr]. On the 
other hand, the FCP approach recovers 38.44% and its adder is 10.87[£/kVA/yr]. 
From the results, it is demonstrated that the LRIC prices are very high causing revenue 
over-recovery, whilst the FCP prices are relatively small, where the adder is still higher 
than the FCP prices under this heavily-utilised condition. 
Shown in Figure 6.11 and Figure 6.12 are the demand and generation tariffs for the 
LRIC and FCP approaches. Due to the negative adder for the LRIC approach, the 
generation tariffs decrease. This high rewards provide strong signals that the network 
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is very highly utilised and that new generation is very welcomed; while demand is 
discouraged to further increase by imposing high demand ﬁanl charges. 
Figure 6.11. Demand tariﬀs for very-high utilisation case

Figure 6.12. Generation tariﬀs for very-high utilisation case 
As for the FCP approach, because of the high adder, generation is charged for both 
network groups. These pricing signals are not effective in attracting new generation 
connection to the network. And even at this very highly utilised situation, the adder 
is still quite dominant in the tariffs. As a result, FCP demand and generation tariffs do 
not signiﬁcantly change in these three case studies. 
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6.3 Case Study on Pembroke Network 
Appendix B shows the network diagram and the demand and generation data of Pem­
broke network. It consists of 56 lines, 54 transformers, and 3 generators. For FCP ap­
proach studies, the network groups are identiﬁed as illustrated in Figure 6.13, where 
the blue area is the 132kV network group, the yellow area 33kV network group and 
the pink areas are the 11kV network groups. 1% annual load growth is used; Forecast 
new generation is assumed to be 30% of the current demand and the test-size gener­
ators used are 144MW, 36MW and 12MW for 132kV, 33kV and 11kV network groups 
respectively; The generation contribution factor is assumed to be 0.5. 
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LRIC and FCP Prices 
Figure 6.14 and Figure 6.15 are the LRIC and FCP demand and generation prices 
for Pembroke network. Only the prices for 11kV nodes with demand or generation 
connected are shown in these ﬁgures. 
Figure 6.14. Demand charges for Pembroke Network

Figure 6.15. Generation charges for Pembroke Network 
For the LRIC approach, it provides locational signals where the prices from Bus 3003 
to Bus 3093 (Zone 2) are higher compared to the others (Zone 1), as they are located 
to a more central area with more heavily used supporting assets. The LRIC generation 
charge is the opposite of the demand charge. 
For the FCP approach, in this case, only two of the 11kV network groups have FCP 
demand charges. However, there is a 22.36[£/kVA/yr] demand charge for the 33kV 
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network group. Thus, the 11kV network groups will see generation beneﬁts, equiva­
lent to half of the 33kV demand charge. 
LRIC and FCP Tariﬀs 
LRIC approach recovers 50.87% of the annual allowed revenue and has an adder equals 
to 9.09[£/kVA/yr]. As only two of the demand are charged, in the FCP case, and 
generation is relatively highly rewarded, the revenue recovered is negative – -7.58%. 
The FCP adder is 19.91[£/kVA/yr]. 
Figure 6.16. Demand tariﬀs for Pembroke Network

Figure 6.17. Generation tariﬀs for Pembroke Network
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The LRIC locational price differences provide signals for existing and new customers 
to act or connect, facilitating more efﬁcient network usage. For instance, new gener­
ation will be more willing to connect at the central area, like Bus 3009 and Bus 3048 
as shown in Figure 6.17, where generation will be given higher credits for locating at 
these nodes. 
On the other hand, the FCP approach provides weaker locational signals. The demand 
charges are generally dominated by the FCP adder and the generation charges become 
positive as a result of the high adder. Hence, the FCP approach does not provide 
adequate economical signals for the network customers, especially new generation. 
6.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
The FCP approach has merits of modelling generation as a lump sum rather than small 
increments. However, this is accomplished through many assumptions, like the size of 
the test-size generator and the forecast new generation. As for the LRIC approach, it is 
more sensitive to the circuit loading growth rates. Analyses are performed to see how 
these factors affect the prices of the FCP and LRIC approaches. 
6.4.1 FCP Generation: Varying Test-Size Generator 
The assumption of the size of the test-size generator inﬂuences the FCP generation 
prices a lot. Therefore, a study is carried out to see how varying test-size generator 
would impact the generation prices. The forecast new generation is set to be 30% of 
the current demand. 
To perform this sensitivity analysis, an example is used: 
Total Demand 22 MW 
Total Forecast New Generation 6.6 MW 
Forecast New Generation (11kV) 5.66 MW 
Effective Spare Capacity 4 MW 
Asset Investment Cost £516939.40 
Table 6.3. Example network group data 
As shown in Figure 6.18, the probability of the connection drops as the size of the test-
size generator increases. There are cases where the probability goes beyond 1 when 
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the test-size generator chosen is very small, in this example, test-size generator lower 
than 5MW would produce a probability greater than 1. 
Figure 6.18. Probability of connection versus test-size generator 
Illustrated in Figure 6.19, as the size of the test-size generator increases the investment 
horizon is brought forward. This is due to the test-size generator are equally divided 
into 10 sections and incremented onto the network (in a linear function) each year, 
hence these generation increments will increase if the size of the test-size generator 
increases. Therefore, the investment horizon will be closer. 
Figure 6.19. Reinforcement year of the reinforcement identiﬁed versus test-size generator 
The investment cost accounted for the FCP generation price calculation is the proba­
bility multiplied by the present value of the reinforcement cost. For the cases where 
probability is higher than 1 the investment cost would be more than the total rein­
forcement cost. And the investment cost is decreasing with increasing size of test-size 
generator, due to the decreasing probability, as shown in Figure 6.20. 
Shown in Figure 6.21 is the FCP generation charge before considering the generation 
beneﬁt. It demonstrates that if the size of the test-size generator is small, resulting 
in a higher probability of connection, the generation charge becomes relatively more 
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Figure 6.20. Annuitised investment cost considering the probability of connection versus test-size 
generator 
signiﬁcant. The size of the test-size generator affects the FCP generation, therefore, it 
has to be carefully chosen. 
Figure 6.21. FCP generation versus test-size generator 
Figure 6.22 demonstrates the FCP generation charges for two different test-size gen­
erators – 10MW and 6MW, with increasing asset utilisation. For the 10MW test-size 
generator, there will only be a generation charge when the asset is utilised from about 
30%. This is because before that utilisation, this reinforcement project will not be iden­
tiﬁed within the 10-year study period. Similarly, the customers will only see a charge 
is the asset is utilised at more than about 60% if the 6MW test-size generator is used. 
The 6MW test-size generator case will have a higher generation charge as the probabil­
ity of connection is higher compared to the 10MW test-size generator case. The results 
also show that at some utilisation, in this case between 30% to 60%, the generation 
might see no charges if a smaller test-size generator is chosen. 
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Figure 6.22. FCP generation charges for diﬀerent test-size generator 
Pembroke Network 
A sensitivity analysis is carried out on Pembroke network, varying the test-size gener­
ator of the 11kV network. In this study, test-size generators of 9MW, 12MW and 15MW 
are used. Figure 6.23 shows the FCP generation charges for the 11kV network of the 
Pembroke Zone 2 area. These generation charges are due to investments identiﬁed 
with the test-size generators increments. 
Similarly, the results show that as the test-size generator increase, FCP generation in­
vestment charges decrease. This is because the probabilities of connection drop, while 
the same investment is identiﬁed. Besides that, the results also show that a larger test-
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Figure 6.23. FCP Generation prices for 11kV network of Pembroke Network with diﬀerent test-size 
generators 
Figure 6.24 is the FCP generation capacity charges, i.e. the FCP generation prices plus 
the generation beneﬁt, for the 11kV network of Pembroke. The generation beneﬁt for 
the 11kV network is a negative constant, in this case much higher in value compared 
to the FCP generation prices. Hence, all the generation capacity charges are negative. 
For those nodes without generation investment prices, the FCP generation capacity 
charges will be the generation beneﬁt. 
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The FCP generation tariffs for llkV network (Zone 2) of Pembroke network in illus­
trated in Figure 6.25. As the FCP generation prices are negative and demand prices 
are generally low, the ﬁxed adder used to reconcile the revenue recovered is relatively 
high. This further reinforce that smaller test-size generators might result in higher 
tariffs, with the same investments identiﬁed. 
Figure 6.25. FCP Generation tariﬀs for 11kV network of Pembroke Network with diﬀerent test-size 
generators 
6.4.2 FCP Generation: Varying Forecast New Generation 
Another inﬂuencing factor for FCP generation price is the forecast new generation. 
Using the same example in Section 6.4.1, to demonstrate the impact of the forecast 
new generation, the size of the test-size generator is ﬁxed at 10MW. 
As shown in Figure 6.26, the probability of the test-size generator connection increases 
as the forecast new generation increases. The probability can also be above 1 if the 
forecast new generation is too high. 
As the test-size generator is ﬁxed, the time the reinforcement project is required is the 
same, hence the present value of the reinforcement cost is the same. Therefore, the 
investment cost (i.e. present value of the reinforcement cost times the probability) is 
highly dependent on the probability of connection. This causes the investment cost to 
increase with increasing forecast new generation, which is also shown in Figure 6.27 
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Figure 6.26. Probability of the test-size generator connection versus forecast generation

Figure 6.27. Annuitised investment cost considering the probability of the test-size generator con­
nection versus forecast generation 
The FCP generation charges, before considering the generation beneﬁt, will also grow 
with the forecast new generation (Figure 6.28). The generation charges are also directly 
dependent on the probability of connection. 
Figure 6.29 shows the FCP generation charges for two different forecast new genera­
tion, i.e. 30% and 20% of total demand. There will be no generation charges until the 
asset reaches certain utilisation. Moreover, the FCP generation charge is higher if the 
forecast new generation is higher. 
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Figure 6.28. FCP generation versus forecast generation 
However, this contradicts with the Ofgem target of encouraging more generation con­
nection, in addition to giving inappropriate price signals. If higher/more new gener­
ation is predicted, the FCP generation price will increase. This will discourage new 
generation connection, hence delaying the aim to achieve the targeted or predicted 
new generation in the future ten years. 
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Pembroke Network 
Similarly, this analysis is carried out on Pembroke network (Zone 2 11kV network), 
varying the new generation forecasts. Here, total generation in 10 years time is forecast 
to be 20%, 30% and 40% of demand. For the nodes with reinforcements identiﬁed, the 
FCP generation prices increase while the forecast generation increase (shown in Figure 
6.30). 
Figure 6.30. FCP Generation prices for Pembroke Network with diﬀerent new generation forecasts 
Demonstrated in Figure 6.31 is the FCP generation capacity charges, with the genera­
tion beneﬁt considered. 
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Again, the FCP prices are either negative or low, hence the adder for revenue recon­
ciliation is high. Figure 6.32 shows the FCP generation tariffs for the case study. The 
results further reinforce that FCP generation tariffs contradict with the Ofgem target 
of encouraging more generation connections, as the tariffs increase when generation is 
predicted to increase. 
Figure 6.32. FCP Generation tariﬀs for Pembroke Network with diﬀerent new generation forecasts 
6.4.3 LRIC: Varying Load Growth Rates 
As for the LRIC approach, it has a high dependence on the load growth rates. Different 
load growth rates will lead to different LRIC prices, as shown in Figure 6.33. For lower 
load growth rate at higher circuit utilisation, the LRIC price is always higher than that 
of the higher load growth rate. This is because for the lower load growth rate case, 
if there is no new customers the circuit can be used for a longer time compared to 
the higher load growth rate case. Therefore, new customers are more encouraged to 
connect at a node with higher load growth rate as the circuit is going to be reinforced 
sooner anyway. Although LRIC gives pure economical signals, the LRIC prices tend to 
go very high if some of the supporting circuits is almost fully utilised. Hence, revenue 
over-recovery can occur. 
Pembroke Network 
Uniform nodal load growth rates of 1.0%, 1.5% and 2.0% are used on the Pembroke 
network to demonstrate a sensitivy analysis of the LRIC pricing model on the growth 
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Figure 6.33. LRIC price for diﬀerent load growth rates 
rates. Figure 6.34 and Figure 6.35 are the LRIC demand prices and demand tariffs, 
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The results illustrate that the LRIC tariffs might increase or decrease with different 
nodal load growth rates, under the same loading conditions. For the assets with lower 
utilisations, as the circuit loading growth rate increases, the LRIC unit price increases; 
and for the assets with higher utilisations, as the circuit loading growth rate increases 
the LRIC unit price decreases. This observation further reinforce the ﬁndings from 
Figure 6.33. 
Figure 6.35. LRIC demand tariﬀs for Pembroke Network with diﬀerent nodal load growth rates 
6.5 Chapter Summary 
From the case studies, it is found that: 
1.	 FCP approach 
•	 Price signals: FCP approach gives weak locational signals in that it groups 
nodes to a network group, within the nodes, the charges are the same. Fur­
thermore, for a lightly utilised network, they may not have any need for 
network reinforcement in the speciﬁed time horizon (10 years) hence, zero 
capacity/marginal charges. Therefore, the FCP demand and generation tar­
iffs would be dominated by its adder. Also shown in the case studies, the 
FCP demand and generation capacity charges are quite low (hence, lower 
signiﬁcance in the ﬁnal tariffs) even for a heavily utilised network. 
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•	 Sensitivity: FCP charges relies on a considerable amount of assumptions, 
they are dependent on the size of the test-size generator and also the fore­
cast new generation to be connected within the 10 year horizon. From these 
assumptions, the probability of the connection of the test-size generator will 
directly scale the reinforcement cost, leading to high charges to high proba­
bility of connection (which are tend to be small test-size generator). If higher 
new generation is forecast, the probability of connection will increase, lead­
ing to higher charges. This pricing signals contradict with the aim of encour­
aging more new generation. 
2.	 LRIC approach 
•	 Price signals: LRIC approach gives nodal locational signals, in that they 
provide locational differential charges and treats demand and generation 
equal. However, it may produce excessively high charges if the network is 
highly utilised. Therefore, A price cap might need to be placed onto the ﬁnal 
tariffs 
•	 Sensitivity: LRIC approach relies on few assumptions and is simple to un­
derstand and implement. The LRIC prices are sensitive to the assets under­
lying loading growth rates. It tends to provide high charges when an asset, 
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HAPTER 7 discusses the long-term impact or the economic ef-
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Chapter 7 Long-Term Investment Cost Assessment Between ICRP, LRIC and FCP 
7.1 Introduction 
Electricity generation and demand are expected to signiﬁcantly change over the next 
20 years in the UK. “All but one of the nuclear power stations (7GW) will retire be­
tween now and 2020, as will many coal and oil ﬁred power stations in order to meet 
EU Environmental Directives. [73]” To meet increasing demand and replace the clos­
ing generation capacity, a huge capacity of new generation is needed, estimated to be 
roughly 20-25 GW by 2020. 
Therefore, to accommodate this new generation, network companies need to plan their 
network accordingly. But this is an increasingly difﬁcult task, given somany uncertain­
ties in the connections of the new generation. If network companies devise their plans 
according to a set of perceived future scenarios, the process could be complicated and 
expensive. Moreover, reality might be very different from these projected scenarios 
and inessential new investment decisions could have been made. Whereas if network 
companies only upgrade or expand their network in response to ﬁrm applications for 
generating capacity, the long lead time for these investments could discourage the con­
nection of new generation [73]. 
Hence, it is better to guide these new customers, generation or demand, to locations 
that require the least network investments commensurate with their requirements, i.e. 
fully utilising the existing spare network capacity. This can be achieved through ﬁnan­
cial incentives, for instance, in the form of charges for use of the network. 
Therefore, it is vital to assess the economic efﬁciency of the network pricingmethodolo­
gies over a long time horizon. This will provide some guidance to network operators 
in valuing, choosing and applying a pricing methodology onto the network. 
Previously, the efﬁciency of different pricing models are assessed qualitatively, where 
their merits are ascertained from comparisons of different pricing principles, the re­
sulting prices and stability or sensitivity of the prices for changes in network power 
ﬂows and user behaviours [10]. Limited research is carried out to compare the impact 
of different pricing models on long-term network development. 
The proposed framework evaluates the economic efﬁciency of different pricing models 
quantitatively, i.e. quantifying the magnitude of the cost savings that can be achieved 
over a ﬁxed period of time. The framework takes into account how network users re­
sponses to the resulting prices, and how this will next change both the network plan­
ning and the consequential pricing. The cost of the investments needed, to meet the 
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requirements of new generation and load, within the examined time horizon will then 
be calculated as an efﬁciency measure of different pricing models. 
This chapter discusses the framework for assessing the economic efﬁciencies of differ­
ent long-run network pricing models, in this case, ICRP, LRIC and FCP models. These 
pricing models are then applied to two test networks, namely the IEEE 14-bus test 
system and the WPD Pembroke network. Their consequential prices and the users re­
sponses are then further analysed to see the strengths and weaknesses of these pricing 
models toward long-term network development. 
7.2 Assessment Tool 
The assessment tool aims to comprehend and assess the dynamic interactions between 
network pricing methodologies, network users and network operators. This involves 
building the generation and demand response models to ﬁnd the reactions or deci­
sions to connect of network users to the prices generated from various pricing models, 
namely AC load ﬂow ICRP, LRIC and FCP models. Network operators will then need 
to reinforce their network if the maximum allowed capacities (N-1 contingent) of the 
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Figure 7.1 shows the ﬂowchart of the assessment tool. In short, the proposed assess­
ment framework comprises four stages. The ﬁrst stage is to devise a reference EHV 
network. The second stage is to consider a number of different pricing models that 
will produce various different prices for the customers. The third stage is to devise a 
customer behaviour model that mimics the response of generation and demand cus­
tomers to these prices. Finally the fourth stage is to devise an investment model that 
identiﬁes and places reinforcements necessary tomeet the different patterns of demand 
and distributed generation. 
7.2.1 Generation Response Model 
The generation response model seeks to imitate the siting decision of the new dis­
tributed generation on the reference network. Generators are assumed to site at the 
location that gives the highest rate of return at the time of connection. This model 
generally consists of three steps. 
Step 1: Derive Target Renewable Energy Level and Required Additional Capacity 
Assuming that 20% of renewable electricity, in this case wind and CHP generation , 
will be installed by 2020 and that the percentage of the targeted renewable electricity 
(electrical energy) level for the reference network is increasing linearly (i.e. increas­
ing/plus 1% each year), the targeted renewable electricity level can be evaluated. 
To meet this renewable energy level, new generation is connected to the reference net­
work where this distributed generation is assumed to comprise 20% of combined heat 
and power (CHP) and 80% of wind farms. The CHP generation is taken to have a load 
factor of 80%, whilst wind generation 30%. Hence, the required additional/new CHP 
and wind generation capacities are determined. 
Step 2: Determine Expenditure and Income at Each Node 
In deciding the location that the new distributed generation will site on the reference 
network, the cash ﬂow of each generation project is estimated. The cash ﬂow incorpo­
rates the capital cost, operation and maintenance costs, connection costs, EHV use of 
network charges and, in the case of CHP, the anticipated fuel cost. 
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Step 3: Determine Rate of Return and Locate Generation Projects 
Knowing the expenditure and income of each generation project at each node, the rate 
of return can be determined (Equation 7.1). As mentioned, generation is deemed to 
connect at the location with the most encouraging return of investment as viewed at 
the time of connection. 
Income− Expenditure 
Return o f Investment = (7.1) 
Expenditure 
7.2.2 Demand Response Model 
The demand response model seeks to estimate the change in the growth of load, which 
is assumed to react to the change in price according to generic customer class price 
elasticities. The demand response model comprises four steps. 
Step 1: Import and Identify Types of Demand at Each Node 
The load at each location is subdivided and classiﬁed into three different types, namely 









Table 7.1. Assumption of the distribution of residential , industrial and commercial customers 
Step 2: Determine the Unit Price 
The pricing models that are going to be analysed are AC models. Both ICRP and LRIC 
models, in this study, will provide P and Q locational network prices, whilst the FCP 
model will provide S locational prices. Fixed adder method is used to scale the rev­
enue recovered and the adder is in £/kVA/year. As the price elasticities used are of 
the elasticity towards P prices. Hence, the equivalent unit P prices for residential, in­
dustrial and commercial customers need to be evaluated (Equation 7.2). For ICRP and 
LRIC models, the Unit PriceS is their adder, whilst for the FCP model there will be no 
Unit PriceP and Unit PriceQ, and the Unit PriceS will be the sum of the locational price 
and its adder. 
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Q S 
Unit P Price = Unit PriceP + × Unit PriceQ + × Unit PriceS (7.2) P P 
Different power factors and load factors are assigned to these three types of customers, 
as shown in Table 7.2. Finally, the unit prices in p/kWh, which include the energy and 
supply charges, transmission network charges and distribution network charges, are 
evaluated. The energy and supply charges, and the transmission network charges for 
each customer generic class are assumed. 
Demand Power Factor Load Factor 
Residential 0.95 0.57 
Industrial 0.85 0.63 
Commercial 0.90 0.51 
Table 7.2. Power factor and load factor for residential, industrial and commercial customers 
Step 3: Determine the New Change in Demand at Each Node due to Price Change 
The consequent change in the demand upon a change in the price (end users’ unit 
price in p/kwh consisting energy and supply, transmission and distribution network 
charges) can be established by assigning appropriate price elasticities, Ep, to customers 
of different generic classes. Ep can be calculated using Equation 7.3. 
% change in Quantity 
Ep = (7.3) 
% change in Price 
As an assumption for this framework, the price elasticities recommended by the Aus­
tralian National Institute of Economic Research (NIESR) in 2004 [74] are adopted (Ta­
ble 7.3). 




Table 7.3. NIESRs recommended long run price elasticities for each of the customer sectors 
Hence, knowing the percentage change in price and the price elasticity, the percentage 
change in demand for all generic classes can be determined. 
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Step 4: Determine the Final Demand and New Growth Rate 
The percentage change in demand obtained will then perturb the new demand pre­
dicted from the initial load growth rate, which is estimated to be 1%. Hence the rate 
of demand growth will become the sum of the long-term load growth rate prediction 
(1%) and the percentage change in demand, for each generic class of residential, in­
dustrial and commercial customers. The new demand evaluated will then be used to 
calculate the prices for the consequent year. 
7.2.3 Investment Model 
Aftermodifying the reference network’s generation and demand, an investmentmodel 
is devised to examine and install any network reinforcement necessary to maintain the 
required security and quality standards. The model installs static voltage compen­
sators (SVCs) to correct any situation of voltage violation that may emerge. And in the 
event of over-utilisation, i.e. existing circuits and transformers exceeding their ther­
mal rating (under N-1 contingency), the model will install an identical overhead lines, 
cables or transformers. 
With the necessary network reinforcements installed, the process of the assessment 
tool (evaluating network prices, customer responses and reinforcements needed) will 
start over again for the 20-year study period. 
7.3 Case Studies 
Two reference networks, IEEE 14-bus test system and Pembroke network, are used to 
perform the efﬁciency assessment of ICRP, LRIC and FCP models. See Appendices A 
(Section A.1) and B for the network diagrams and network input data. 
7.3.1 IEEE 14-Bus Test System 
The IEEE 14-bus test system is used to demonstrate the price signals due to customer 
responses and predictability over a long time horizon. For FCP approach studies, two 
network groups, the 132kV and 33kV network groups, are identiﬁed. 1% annual load 
growth is used; forecast new generation is assumed to be 30% of the current demand 
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and the test-size generators used are 55MW and 20MW for 132kV and 33kV network 
groups respectively; the generation contribution factor is assumed to be 0.5. 
ICRP 
The ICRP prices reﬂect the distance the power travels to meet demand. The ICRP 
prices are locational but its P prices merely change over the 20 years, as shown in 
Figure 7.2, though the demand and generation changes along the years. The new 
generation is attracted to Bus 3 due to the high credits generated by the ICRP model 
(the generation prices of the ICRP model is the mirror effect of its demand prices). 
The new huge injection of generation at Bus 3 does not cause much ﬂuctuation to the 
P prices. However, this generation, in addition to the investment of an SVC at Bus 9, 
can help in reducing or changing the ﬂow of the reactive power in the network. This 
is reﬂected on the Q prices of the ICRP model as shown in Figure 7.3. The Q prices 
decrease gradually until the later years of the study period. This can give signal that a 
new SVC might be needed on the network in the near future. 
Figure 7.2. ICRP P prices (at 5-yearly intervals) of the 20-year study period for IEEE 14-bus test 
system 
During the 20-year study period, 1 SVC and 4 33kV lines are added into the network, 
resulting in total investment costs of about £1.35 million. The results demonstrate that 
the ICRP charges hardly change along years, it will be less cost-reﬂective as the assets’ 
extend of use and the change in demand and generation are not reﬂected in the charges 
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Figure 7.3. ICRP Q prices (at 5-yearly intervals) of the 20-year study period for IEEE 14-bus test 
system 
and hence the ﬁnancial incentives to guide the siting of new generation and demand 
will be less efﬁcient. 
The tariffs, in this assessment, seen by the end users, residential, industrial and com­
mercial, are illustrated in Appendix E.1.1. The patterns of these tariffs, in p/kWh, are 
similar to those of the ICRP P prices, in £/kW/yr. These tariffs are the prices to which 
the demand of different generic classes responses to according to their price elasticities. 
Also shown in Appendix E is the table of the assumed unit energy and supply prices 
and the unit transmission prices for the end users. The residential, industrial and com­
mercial customers that are connected to the same node see similar ﬁnal tariffs; this is so 
because the difference in the distribution charges (due to different power factors and 
load factors) is very small at the same location for different customer types. 
LRIC 
As for the LRIC model, the prices reﬂect the level of use of the network assets in addi­
tion to the distance of the customers from the GSP. Similar to ICRP model, the genera­
tion and demand are treated the samewhere their prices are almost the direct opposite. 
Also similar to the ICRP model, new distributed generation is attracted to Bus 3. This 
generation injection relieves the congestion of the assets supporting demand at Bus 3 
Page 136

Chapter 7 Long-Term Investment Cost Assessment Between ICRP, LRIC and FCP 
and with LRIC model this is reﬂected on the prices. Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5 are the 
P and Q prices of the LRIC model. 
As illustrated in Figure 7.4, the P price at Bus 3 gradually decreases due to the con­
nection of new distributed generation at the node. Whilst the prices at the other nodes 
increase over the 20 years as demand is steadily increasing in the whole network but 
no new generation is connected to these nodes. Eventually, the P price at Bus 14 will 
exceed the price at Bus 3 and attracts generation to Bus 14. This reduces the locational 
price differences in the network, leading to efﬁcient utilisation of the existing network 
assets. 
Figure 7.4. LRIC P prices (at 5-yearly intervals) for the 20-year study period for IEEE 14-bus test 
system 
During the 20-year study period, 1 SVC and 3 33kV lines are added into the network, 
resulting a total investment costs of about £0.96 million. With consideration of the 
utilisation of the network assets, the LRIC prices provide better signals in guiding a 
more efﬁcient siting of new generation and demand. 
The LRIC tariffs for the residential, industrial and commercial customers, again, have 
similar patterns with the LRIC P prices (demonstrated in Appendix E.1.2). 
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Figure 7.5. LRIC Q prices (at 5-yearly intervals) for the 20-year study period for IEEE 14-bus test 
system 
FCP 
The FCP model, on the other hand, treats demand and generation differently where its 
prices are evaluated through simulating the projected demand and generation increase 
over a 10-year window. The prices reﬂect the utilisations of the network assets but the 
economical and locational signals are weaker than that of the LRIC model. 
Figure 7.6 shows the FCP demand prices of the 132kV network group (from Bus 2 
to Bus 5) and the 33kV network group (from Bus 6 to Bus 14). For the 33kV network 
group, the demand price decreases at year 5, 10 and 15 as the reinforcement required 
has been installed into the network over the years and no new reinforcement projects 
are identiﬁed within or ’slide’ into the new 10-year window. As for the 132kV network 
group, at year 15 an expensive reinforcement project appears in the 10-year time hori­
zon and the reinforcement is installed before year 20. Hence, there is a high charge for 
the network group at year 15 but not the other 5-yearly intervals. 
The FCP generation price consists of the translated per unit reinforcement costs (due 
to projected generation injection) and the generation beneﬁt, which is, in this case, 
half the FCP demand price for the voltage levels above the voltage level of the exam­
ined network group. There is almost no generation charge for both network groups 
throughout the 20 years. But the high demand charge for the 132kV network group at 
year 15 leads to the high credits for the generation at 33kV network group. 
Page 138

Chapter 7 Long-Term Investment Cost Assessment Between ICRP, LRIC and FCP

Figure 7.6. FCP demand prices (at 5-yearly intervals) of the 20-year study period for IEEE 14-bus 
test system 
New distributed generation is attracted to the 132kV network group for the ﬁrst 15 
years as there is a small positive generation charge at the 33kV network group. In this 
case, Bus 4 in the 132kV network group is randomly picked as the location of the new 
generation penetration as there is no locational difference between the nodes on the 
same network group. In year 15, generation is attracted to the 33kV network group, 
which has high credits, instead. In this network group, Bus 10 is selected randomly, in 
this study, for new generation connections. 
The demand and generation charges ﬂuctuate drastically. Further analysis is done to 
demonstrate the detailed interaction between the customers and the network prices. 
Illustrated in Figure 7.8 is the MW demand of different nodes in the network for the 
20 years and Figure 7.9 is the consequent FCP demand and generation charges for 
both network groups. As shown, in year 14 the demand charges of the 132kV network 
group dramatically increase as an expensive reinforcement (132kV line from Bus 3 to 
Bus 4) ’slide’ into the focused 10-year window. This effectively causes the demand of 
that network group to drop in year 15. 
The demand charges for 132kV network group remain high until year 19 when that 
particular 132kV line is installed. Therefore, the demand price for 132kV network 
group and the generation price for the 33kV network group become zero in year 20. 
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Figure 7.7. FCP generation prices (at 5-yearly intervals) of the 20-year study period for IEEE 14-bus 
test system 
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Figure 7.9. FCP demand and generation yearly prices for the 20-year period 
During the 20-year study period, 1 SVC, 4 33kV lines and 1 132kV line are added into 
the network, resulting a total investment costs of about £29.2 million. This results show 
that the consequent FCP charges might change drastically and this will jeopardise the 
predictability of the network prices. And worse, the weak locational signals might 
result in a huge generation penetration at the weakest link of the network group with 
the highest credits for generation. 
Appendix E.1.3 shows the ﬁnal tariffs for the residential, industrial and commercial 
customers. In this study, the patterns of these ﬁnal tariffs are similar to those of the 
FCP demand prices. 
Investment Summary 
Table 7.4 summarises the reinforcement projects and the total reinforcement costs for 
the ICRP, LRIC and FCP approaches in this assessment. It is shown that the LRIC 
approach has the least reinforcement costs in the 20-year study period. This is followed 
by the ICRP approach, where there is an extra 33kV line reinforced compared to the 
LRIC approach. The ICRP invested about £0.39 million more than the LRIC approach. 
As for the FCP approach, it has triggered the reinforcement of one of the 132kV lines, 
which are much more expensive than the 33kV lines. Compared to the LRIC approach, 
FCP invested an extra £28.24 million. 
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Pricing Model Investments Total Investment Costs (£million) 
ICRP 1 SVC 1.35 
4 33kV lines 
LRIC 1 SVC 0.96 
3 33kV lines 
FCP 1 SVC 29.20 
4 33kV lines 
1 132kV line 
Table 7.4. Summary for the investments for ICRP, LRIC and FCP approaches 
7.3.2 Pembroke Network 
The efﬁciency assessment is demonstrated on Pembroke network (Appendix B). This 
network consists of 56 lines, 54 transformers, and 3 generators. The lines consist of 
both overhead lines and underground cables. And the underground cables have much 
higher cost per km compared to the overhead lines. For the FCP model, 22 network 
groups are identiﬁed (as shown in Figure 6.13) – 1 132kV network group, 1 33kV 
network group, and 19 11kV network groups. Similarly, 1% annual load growth is 
used; forecast new generation is assumed to be 30% of the current demand and the 
generation contribution factor is assumed to be 0.5. 
ICRP 
Again, the ICRP P and Q prices (as shown in Figure 7.10 and Figure 7.11) hardly 
change for the 20 years except for the P prices of a few nodes – Bus 3054, Bus 3066 and 
Bus 3072. The Q prices for the second half, roughly, of the nodes are much smaller 
(mostly negative) than the ﬁrst half, as illustrated in Figure 7.11. This is because the 
ﬁrst half of the nodes are located at the urban area while the rest are quite distant and 
their supporting network assets are less utilised, in addition to havingmore distributed 
generation. However, this is not clearly shown in the P prices as the utilisation of the 
asset is not considered but the distant of the node to the GSP. 
New generation is again attracted to nodes with higher credits. Bus 3054, Bus 3066 and 
Bus 3072, are the nodes initially providing high credits to generation. Generation will 
be located at Bus 3054 for the ﬁrst 3 years until the price ’ﬂipped’, as shown in Figure 
7.12. This is because after year 3, sufﬁcient generation has located at this node, eventu­
ally causing the power ﬂows to reverse with the generation exporting from the node. 
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Figure 7.10. ICRP P prices (at 5-yearly intervals) of the 20-year study period for Pembroke network
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Then, the prices seen by the generation become positive and demand is rewarded for 
offsetting the export. 
Figure 7.12. ICRP consequential demand P prices for the 20-year period of three selected nodes 
In turn, new generation is attracted to Bus 3066 until the power ﬂow eventually re­
verses again in year 7, and next to Bus 3072 until year 9. From then new generation 
is located at other nodes whilst the demand at these 3 buses grows steadily along the 
years. At year 17, demand at Bus 3066 and Bus 3072 matches and slightly exceeds 
the generation at the nodes and hence causes reverse power ﬂows, ’ﬂipping’ the prices 
again. The changes in the demand prices causes the demand at these two nodes to drop 
slightly (Figure 7.13) but no new generation is projected to connect at these nodes. 
Hence, demand drops below generation and the prices are ’ﬂipped’ again in year 18. 
Similar happening occurs at Bus 3054. This might continue until some new generation 
is connected or the demand stops growing at these nodes. This effect is dramatical and 
gives rise to a pricing instability at nodes where there is relatively little load connected. 
During the 20-year study period, 2 SVCs, 3 33/11kV transformers, 1 132/11kV trans­
former and 1 33kV line are added into the network, resulting in total investment costs 
of about £1.65 million. Shown in Appendix E.2.1 are the ﬁnal tariffs for the residential, 
industrial and commercial customers with ICRP methodology. 
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Figure 7.13. Consequential demand (MW) for the 20-year period of three selected nodes
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LRIC 
For the LRIC model, the P and Q prices (illustrated in Figure 7.14 and Figure 7.15) 
for the urban and distant nodes have more signiﬁcant differences as the prices are 
driven by both the distance and the utilisation of the network assets. Similarly, new dis­
tributed generation is drawn to the nodes with high credits (or high demand charges). 
Hence, the higher demand charges gradually reduce from year to year as shown in 
the results. This is because with LRIC model, generation is attracted to area or nodes 
where it can provide most support for the existing network. 
Figure 7.15. LRIC Q prices (at 5-yearly intervals) for the 20-year study period for Pembroke network 
During the 20-year study period, 2 SVCs, 1 33/11kV transformer, 1 132/11kV trans­
former and 1 33kV line are added into the network, resulting in a total investment 
costs of about £1.11 million. Appendix E.2.2 illustrates the ﬁnal tariffs for the end 
users with LRIC pricing methodology. 
FCP 
Figure 7.16 is the FCP demand prices evaluated for the 20-year study period. As 
shown, there are only demand charges at two of the 11kV network groups in year 
5 and one of the 11kV network groups in year 10. Furthermore, there is almost no 
generation charge or beneﬁt for the ﬁrst 10 years of the study period. This effectively 
results in the dominance of the ’ﬁxed adder’ in the ﬁnal distribution network tariff. 
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In year 15, some reinforcement projects are identiﬁed at the 33kV network group, re­
sulting in the FCP demand charges (around 5.20 £/kVA/yr) at that network group. 
This consequently causes the 19 11kV network groups to see a sudden rise in the gen­
eration beneﬁts, as demonstrated in Figure 7.17. For FCP, new generation is randomly 
allocated at one of the nodes with the highest generation credits. 
Figure 7.16. FCP demand prices (at 5-yearly intervals) for the 20-year study period for Pembroke 
network 
The identiﬁed reinforcement projects are closer to the study year in year 20 and the 
FCP demand charges at 33kV network group increases, hence the generation beneﬁts 
of the 11kV network groups. In year 15 and year 20, the revenue recovered from the 
network prices is negative. This is because in this network the existing demand is only 
connected at the 11kV network groups and there are no demand charges for the 11kV 
network groups in year 15 and year 20. Moreover, there are some generation beneﬁts 
for 11kV network generation hence causing the negative revenue recovery. 
The FCP demand charges of the 33kV network group and the generation beneﬁts of 
the 11kV network groups for the consequent years are illustrated in Figure 7.18. In 
year 15, the 33kV demand price has a rapid increase and the price will gradually rise 
(as reinforcement project is closer) from then until this particular reinforcement is in 
place. 
The sudden change in prices is further demonstrated for four of the 11kV network 
groups in Figure 7.19. Bus 3054 and Bus 3009 see gradually increasing demand charges 
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Figure 7.17. FCP generation prices (at 5-yearly intervals) for the 20-year study period for Pembroke 
network 
Figure 7.18. FCP consequential demand prices(33kV network group) and generation beneﬁts (net­
work groups below 33kV) for the 20-year study period 
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Figure 7.19. FCP consequential demand prices of the 20-year study period for four selected network 
groups 
from the start of the study period, until in year 4 and year 8 their respective reinforce­
ment projects are installed. The reinforcements are 33/11kV transformers from Bus 
3057 to Bus 3054 (year 4) and from Bus 3012 to Bus 3009 (year 8). Similarly for Bus 
3060 reinforcement of a transformer (from Bus 3063 to Bus 3060) is identiﬁed from FCP 
model in year 4 and is reinforced in year 15. As for Bus 3003, reinforcement is identiﬁed 
in year 19. 
During the 20-year study period, 2 SVCs, 3 33/11kV transformers, 2 132/11kV trans­
formers, 1 132/33kV transformer and 5 33kV lines are added into the network, result­
ing a total investment costs of about £5.07 million. Appendix E.2.3 are the ﬁnal FCP 
tariffs for the residential, industrial and commercial customers. 
Investment Summary 
Table 7.5 summarises the investment and the total investment costs for the ICRP, LRIC 
and FCP approaches in this assessment on Pembroke network. It is demonstrated that 
the LRIC approach has triggered the least reinforcement projects in the 20-year study 
period, causing a total investment cost of £1.11 million. This is followed by the ICRP 
approach, where there is two extra 33/11kV transformers reinforced compared to the 
LRIC approach. The ICRP invested about £0.54 million more than the LRIC approach. 
As for the FCP approach, it has the most reinforcement costs, where there is a total of 
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13 assets invested – additional 4 transformers and 4 33kV lines compared to the LRIC 
approach. Compared to the LRIC approach, FCP invested an extra £3.96 million. 
Pricing Model Investments Total Investment Costs (£million) 
ICRP 2 SVCs 1.65 
3 33/11kV transformers 
1 132/11kV transformer 
1 33kV line 
LRIC 2 SVCs 1.11 
1 33/11kV transformer 
1 132/11kV transformer 
1 33kV line 
FCP 2 SVCs 5.07 
3 33/11kV transformers 
2 132/11kV transformers 
1 132/33kV transformer 
5 33kV lines 
Table 7.5. Summary for the investments for ICRP, LRIC and FCP approaches 
7.4 Chapter Summary 
From the results of the two case studies, it is illustrated that the ICRP model pro­
vides network prices reﬂecting the distance of the customers from the GSP and hence 
the prices merely change along the years. This will not encourage new generation to 
spread over the network to other needy nodes. New generation will locate at the same 
place until a reverse power ﬂow occurs. 
As for the LRIC model, because it reﬂects the extend of use of the assets in the network 
through its prices, new generation can be guided to the locations where the supporting 
assets are more utilised and hence can better release the congestion in the network, as 
well as trigger less reinforcement projects. 
On the other hand, the FCP model tends to provide dramatical change (in the long 
term) in its prices when reinforcement projects ’slide’ into the studied 10-year win­
dow (prices increase) or when the identiﬁed reinforcement projects are installed (prices 
drop). This very much sacriﬁces the predictability and stability of the prices in the long 
Page 150

Chapter 7 Long-Term Investment Cost Assessment Between ICRP, LRIC and FCP 
run. As the FCP model provides weaker locational signals, new generation might not 
be efﬁciently guided to the node actually giving more beneﬁts to the network. 
ICRP LRIC FCP 
Volatility Charges merely change High charges decreases Sudden charge changes 
Cost- Inadequate as only Reﬂects extend of use Reﬂects extend of use and distance, 
reﬂectivity reﬂect distance and distance limited as group signals are given 
Predictability Predictable Predictable if new generation Not easy to predict as investments 
connects to the nodes with might slide in or out the 10-year 
highest return window 
Impact of Causes reverse Reduces high charges if generation Weaker signals might lead to large 
Generation power ﬂow, ﬂipping connects according generation connection at a node, 
Connection the prices to the model resulting unnecessary investments 
Table 7.6. Summary of the characteristics for ICRP, LRIC and FCP approaches 
Thus, the LRIC model is a more economic pricing model and it represents the best 
available long-run pricing model to date. Table 7.6 is an overview of the characteristics 






HIS chapter draws the conclusions to the thesis based on the ap­
T plication of the presented methodology to the test data. 
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Many countries have committed to or are currently working towards introducing more 
competition into their electricity power industry. Electricity markets were formed and 
developed, moving from previous monopoly structure to a more competitive environ­
ment. This is achieved through open, non-discriminatory access to the transmission 
and distribution networks for all network customers. 
Network pricing is increasingly crucial in providing efﬁcient economic signals, in con­
junction of the signiﬁcance of DG. In the UK, penetration of DG is increasing due to 
the pressure to: 
• increase plant-operating efﬁciency, 
• reduce the electricity costs for customers, and 
• reduce carbon dioxide emissions. 
This DG penetration leads to the changing in distribution network development and 
hence raises questions on the appropriateness of the existing distribution pricing ar­
rangement. Without efﬁcient price signals DG could potentially locate at areas requir­
ing great network investments. Therefore, to accommodate these future customers the 
use of network prices set by network companies play an increasingly vital role in pro­
viding efﬁcient economic signals to: 
• guide the siting of future customers – generation and demand, and 
• incentivise efﬁcient use of existing facilities of the networks. 
Drawbacks of DRM 
Efﬁcient network pricing should closely reﬂect the degree of utilisation of the assets 
in the system. With adequate price signals, the siting of the future customers can be 
guided to release constraints and congestion in the network, as well as facilitating efﬁ­
cient network expansion and reinforcement. However, the distribution reinforcement 
model (DRM) adopted by majority of the distribution network operators is not capable 
of providing these economical signals as its prices are not locational. In addition, the 
future reinforcement costs of accommodating new customers are calculated based on 
historical data. Hence, the DRM prices will not reﬂect the ’true’ forward-looking costs 
for the network users. Therefore, a new distribution network pricing methodology 
needs to be developed in replacement of the DRM. 
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Drawbacks of basic LRIC 
This thesis develops an enhanced LRIC pricing methodology by investigating the ma­
jor issues preventing the basic LRIC pricing model from its practical deployment onto 
actual systems. The basic LRIC pricing model establishes the link between nodal cus­
tomer (demand or generation) increment and changes in the investment costs. It pro­
duces pure economic signals by considering the reinforcement horizon based on the 
time taken for the current loading level, with a 1% circuit loading growth rate, to reach 
its maximum capacity. 
However, the basic LRIC pricing methodology is not practical to use as: 
•	 the assets in the network should not be allowed to load to their full capacity. This 
is because network operators have to assure availability of network capacity and 
to withstand credible contingencies to maintain the integrity of the system. 
•	 the loading level of all the network assets will not be the same. This is because 
the growth of the existing demand in the network is expected to vary. Moreover, 
it is not practical to model generation growth the same way as demand because 
existing generation will not gradually and constantly grow in a small percentage. 
LRIC: Security Factor 
Therefore, to have network security consideration integrated into the LRIC pricing 
methodology, a full N-1 contingency analysis is performed. Through the analysis, a se­
curity factor, which deﬁnes the maximum allowed loading level (MALL), for each line 
or transformer in the network is evaluated, where the most critical outage is consid­
ered. This security factor term reﬂects the additional power ﬂow a branch has to carry 
when its most critical contingency takes place. The results of the case studies shows 
that with network security consideration, the improved LRIC methodology can better 
reﬂect the extent of use of the network assets without neglecting the network integrity. 
LRIC: Circuit Loading Growth Rate 
As for the different nodal load growth rate problem, two main issues need to be ad­
dressed: 
•	 the circuit loading growth rates estimation, and 
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• the LRIC pricing for positive, negative and zero loading growth patterns 
Two methods are investigated in this thesis to link the nodal load/generation growth 
rate with the circuit loading growth rate. The ﬁrst method assumes that the loading 
level of a circuit will grow at the initial ’combined’ nodal growth rate seen at the cir­
cuit. However, it is observed that the loading level gradually diverges from the actual 
loading level with time. Therefore, a second method is investigated where a constant 
element is included into the equation. This constant element acts as a tool to control 
or adjust the initial ’combined’ nodal growth rate so that the estimated loading level 
can conform better to the actual loading level. Results show that the latter method 
performs better than the former. 
The evaluated circuit loading growth rates, together with the constant and varying 
elements, is next classiﬁed into three categories – positive, negative and zero circuit 
loading growth patterns. As the loading level is now split into two elements, a positive 
circuit loading growth rate does not necessary mean that the circuit loading level has a 
positive growth pattern. In terms of pricing for future reinforcement costs, the situation 
where negative circuit loading growth rate, r is evaluated will not be considered, i.e. 
has zero reinforcement cost. This is because with a negative growth rate, the loading 
level will never reach the MALL of a circuit. 
For positive circuit loading growth, the LRIC price is higher when the loading level 
of the circuit is closer to its MALL, as reinforcement requirement is closer. Whilst for 
the negative circuit loading growth pattern, the reinforcement horizon considered is 
the time taken for this loading level to drop to zero, ’ﬂip’ the direction of the power 
ﬂow and continuously grow and ﬁnally reach its MALL. As the reinforcement horizon 
is longer, the LRIC prices for the negative circuit loading growth pattern case will be 
relatively smaller. It is demonstrated that the LRIC price is higher if the circuit has 
lower utilisation for the negative case as reinforcement requirement is closer. 
LRIC: Revenue reconciliation 
After these two key issues are attended, the scaling of the LRIC prices is next to be 
considered. The revenue generated through the LRIC prices may not meet the annual 
allowed revenue of the network operators. Hence, revenue reconciliation is required to 
make up the differences. Three revenue reconciliation methods, ﬁxed adder method, 
ﬁxed multiplier method and the Ramsey method, are investigated and applied on var­
ious case studies. It is observed that these revenue reconciliation method are suitable 
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for different situations. The ﬁxed adder method is simple to implement and can per­
form better, i.e. minimise unnecessary price disturbance, when the revenue recovered 
from the LRIC prices are less than the allowed revenue. As for the ﬁxed adder method, 
its implementation is also simple and is more suitable to be used for situation when the 
revenue recovered is more than the allowed. On the other hand, the Ramsey reconcili­
ation method is only suitable if the customers concerned have the ability and means to 
respond to the network price signals. 
LRIC and FCP Comparison 
In the UK, distribution network operators are required to adapt either the LRIC pricing 
model or the FCP model on their EHV network by April 2011. In this thesis, the pricing 
signals of these two pricing methodologies are investigated and a sensitivity analysis 
is performed. One of the major ﬁndings from this studies is that the FCP approach 
provides weak locational signals as it groups nodes to a network group and charges 
them the same. Furthermore, FCP approach is not at all suitable for lightly utilised 
network as FCP might not produce any locational signals to the customers. This is 
because there might not be any reinforcement requirements within the 10-year study 
period. Even for heavily utilised network, the FCP ﬁnal prices could also be dominated 
by its adder, shown in the case studies. The FCP generation charges are quite sensitive 
to: 
•	 the size of the test-size generator, which is an assumption made according to 
historical data (85th percentile of the existing generation in the network), and 
•	 the forecast new generation to be connected to the network within the 10-year 
horizon. This new generation is forecast in conjunction with the governmental 
target. 
The sensitivity analysis illustrates that for a higher test-size generator, reinforcement 
cost will be seen (i.e. reinforcement project is identiﬁed) from lower circuit utilisation 
but with a lower FCP generation price, and for a smaller test-size generator reinforce­
ment cost only appears at higher utilisation with a relatively higher FCP generation 
charge. This shows that with a smaller test-size generator, customers will be charged 
later but with a higher generation charge. Furthermore, if higher new generation is 
forecast, the probability of connection will increase leading to higher FCP generation 
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charges. These signals contradict with the governmental target of encouraging more 
new generation to the network. 
On the other hand, the LRIC pricing methodology provides stronger locational sig­
nals and relies on fewer assumptions. It is demonstrated that the LRIC approach is 
providing efﬁcient guidance for the new customers to locate at nodes requiring the 
least reinforcement or expansion, through the pricing signals. However, it may pro­
duce some excessively high charges if the network is heavily utilised. LRIC prices 
are sensitive to the circuit loading growth rates. The sensitivity analysis demonstrates 
that for lower circuit loading growth rate and at higher circuit utilisation, the LRIC 
approach produces higher charges. This is the case because a small load increment 
will cause drastic change in the investment horizon for the low circuit loading growth 
rate scenario. Therefore, customers are encouraged to connect at location with higher 
load growth rate (if the network is highly utilised) as reinforcement is required soon 
anyway. 
Investment Cost Assessment 
A long term (20 years) investment cost assessment is also performed in this thesis, 
this time between ICRP, LRIC and FCP approaches, to demonstrates the economic ef­
ﬁciency of these pricing models. This assessment is done with the consideration of 
network investments and customer responses to the tariffs. 
Results shows that the ICRP model provides network prices reﬂecting the ’distance’ 
travelled by electricity from the GSP to the customers and hence the ICRP pricesmerely 
change in the 20 years, unless a ’ﬂip-ﬂop’ effect occurs. This will guide DG to connect 
at the same node, for this assessment, until the generation eventually exceed the de­
mand in that area. This proves that the ICRP approach does not adequately address 
the key issues of the distribution network, thus, is not an efﬁcient pricing model for 
distribution networks. 
As for the FCP model, it tends to introduce dramatical change in its prices when re­
inforcement projects ’slides’ into the 10-year study period or when the identiﬁed re­
inforcement project is in place. This eventually sacriﬁces the predictability and the 
stability of the prices in the long run. Moreover, the FCP model provides weak loca­
tional signals that new generation might not be efﬁciently guided to the best location 
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On the other hand, the LRIC prices reﬂect the extend of use of the assets in the network, 
as well as the ’distance’. New generation is given more incentives at locations that 
are highly utilised, and this new generation connection can release the constraint and 
congestion in that area, resulting in less reinforcement requirements in the 20 years. 
Therefore, it is proven that the LRIC model is the most efﬁcient pricing model to date 
that can provide economically efﬁcient signals for network users to facilitate a more 






HIS chapter presents some further works to improve the LRIC 
T pricing methodology and the efﬁciency assessment tool. 
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Enhancing LRIC: Time of Use pricing 
Providing time-differentiated signals of network users’usage is important in better re­
ducing the reinforcement costs as well as the operational costs. The highest demand 
usually occurs on in winter with minimal generation contribution whilst the lowest de­
mand usually in summer with the maximum generation contribution in the network. 
This therefore results in very different power ﬂow in winter and summer. Hence, a 
time of use (ToU) charging methodology can be developed on the basis of the LRIC 
model. 
This can be achieved by identifying and differentiating winter or summer dominated 
assets. The winter and summer loading level on a circuit can be very different. If a 
power ﬂow of a line is higher during summer, the asset is deﬁned as ’summer domi­
nated’ asset, and vice versa. After differentiating winter and summer assets, the LRIC 
prices for winter period with only winter assets’ reinforcement costs considered can 
be evaluated. This also applies to the summer studies that only summer assets are 
considered. 
for the ToU LRIC pricing, the network assets would also have different security factors 
and circuit loading growth rates for summer and winter. 
Enhancing LRIC: Distributed Generation 
Although the output is clean most of the incentivised DG is also intermittent. This na­
ture of the DG has caused DG not being properly or fairly treated in terms of network 
pricing. This intermittency characteristic hence needs to be modelled into network 
pricing to better reﬂect DG’s credits to the network. 
Besides, the renewable energy sources contribute to reducing the emission of carbon 
dioxide. This contribution could also be factored into the LRIC pricing model, whilst 
penalising other generation that are not providing clean energy. 
Enhancing LRIC: Circuit Loading Growth 
The LRIC pricing methodology is sensitive to the circuit loading growth rate. If the 
circuit loading growth rate is very small, at high utilisation a circuit could have ex­
cessively high unit incremental cost, resulting in a customer paying more than the 
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reinforcement cost itself. WPD proposed capping the customer payment to the rein­
forcement cost to solve the problem. Besides capping, other means to address this 
excessive high charge could be investigated. 
Expanding the Eﬃciency Assessment 
The assessment tool used to measure the impact and efﬁciency of network pricing 
methodologies needs to be further developed in order to effectively and practically 
model the possible customer responses and investment installations. 
The customer responses should include: 
•	 existing demand growth patterns, considering all sorts of different load growth 
rate, 
•	 new industrial demand connections, 
•	 new generation connections, considering the resources available in addition to 
the tariffs at a location, and 
•	 existing generation – closing plants. 
Furthermore, the investment model needs to be expanded as the current model is very 
simple, assuming reinforcement of an identical asset when the thermal limit is violated. 
The investment model could be developed to make more complex reinforcement de­
cisions, like investing an asset that would bring most beneﬁt to the network at a low 
price. 
By modelling the network users’ behaviour and network reinforcement and expansion 





The IEEE 14-Bus Test 
System 
PPENDIX A shows the IEEE 14-bus test system. Existing 
A demand and generation are shown together with the lines and transformers thermal limits and other parameters. 
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A.1 Base Scenario 
Bus Voltage Demand Generation 
Name Level (kV) P Q P Q 
Bus 2 132 21.70 12.70 40.00 44.14 
Bus 3 132 94.20 19.00 0 25.34 
Bus 4 132 47.80 -3.90 0 0 
Bus 5 132 7.60 1.60 0 0 
Bus 6 33 11.20 7.50 0 13.83 
Bus 7 33 0 0 0 0 
Bus 8 33 0 0 0 18.53 
Bus 9 33 29.50 16.60 0 0 
Bus 10 33 9.00 5.80 0 0 
Bus 11 33 3.50 1.80 0 0 
Bus 12 33 6.10 1.60 0 0 
Bus 13 33 13.50 5.80 0 0 
Bus 14 33 14.90 5.00 0 0 
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A.2 Over-Recovery Scenario 
Bus Voltage Demand Generation 
Name Level (kV) P Q P Q 
Bus 2 132 24.96 14.61 46.00 50.77 
Bus 3 132 108.33 21.85 0 29.14 
Bus 4 132 54.97 -4.49 0 0 
Bus 5 132 8.74 1.84 0 0 
Bus 6 33 12.88 8.63 0 15.90 
Bus 7 33 0 0 0 0 
Bus 8 33 0 0 0 21.08 
Bus 9 33 33.93 19.09 0 0 
Bus 10 33 10.35 6.67 0 0 
Bus 11 33 4.03 2.07 0 0 
Bus 12 33 7.02 1.84 0 0 
Bus 13 33 15.53 6.67 0 0 
Bus 14 33 17.14 5.75 0 0 
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A.3 Low Utilisation Scenario 
Bus Voltage Demand Generation 
Name Level (kV) P Q P Q 
Bus 2 132 21.70 12.70 40.00 44.14 
Bus 3 132 94.20 19.00 10.00 25.34 
Bus 4 132 47.80 -3.90 0 0 
Bus 5 132 7.60 1.60 0 0 
Bus 6 33 11.20 7.50 15.00 13.83 
Bus 7 33 0 0 0 0 
Bus 8 33 0 0 10.00 18.53 
Bus 9 33 29.50 16.60 0 0 
Bus 10 33 9.00 5.80 0 0 
Bus 11 33 3.50 1.80 0 0 
Bus 12 33 6.10 1.60 0 0 
Bus 13 33 13.50 5.80 0 0 
Bus 14 33 14.90 5.00 0 0 
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A.4 High Utilisation Scenario 
Bus Voltage Demand Generation 
Name Level (kV) P Q P Q 
Bus 2 132 26.04 12.70 40.00 44.14 
Bus 3 132 112.04 19.00 10.00 25.34 
Bus 4 132 57.36 -3.90 0 0 
Bus 5 132 9.12 1.60 0 0 
Bus 6 33 13.44 7.50 15.00 13.83 
Bus 7 33 0 0 0 0 
Bus 8 33 0 0 10.00 18.53 
Bus 9 33 35.40 16.60 0 0 
Bus 10 33 10.80 5.80 0 0 
Bus 11 33 4.20 1.80 0 0 
Bus 12 33 7.32 1.60 0 0 
Bus 13 33 16.20 5.80 0 0 
Bus 14 33 17.88 5.00 0 0 
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A.5 Very-High Utilisation Scenario 
Bus Voltage Demand Generation 
Name Level (kV) P Q P Q 
Bus 2 132 30.38 17.78 40.00 44.14 
Bus 3 132 131.88 26.60 10.00 25.34 
Bus 4 132 66.92 -5.46 0 0 
Bus 5 132 10.44 2.24 0 0 
Bus 6 33 12.99 8.70 15.00 13.83 
Bus 7 33 0 0 0 0 
Bus 8 33 0 0 10.00 18.53 
Bus 9 33 34.22 19.26 0 0 
Bus 10 33 10.44 6.73 0 0 
Bus 11 33 4.06 2.09 0 0 
Bus 12 33 7.08 1.86 0 0 
Bus 13 33 15.66 6.73 0 0 
Bus 14 33 17.28 5.80 0 0 





Western Power Distribution 
Pembroke Network 
PPENDIX B provides a geographical view of the Pembroke 
A network, with the electrical power network, and tables show­ing demand and generation data, as well as the lines and 
transformers thermal limits and other parameters. 
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Appendix B Western Power Distribution Pembroke Network

Bus Voltage Demand Generation 
Number Level (kV) P Q P Q 
3003 11 5.60 0 0 0 
3009 11 10.50 0 0 0 
3015 11 8.00 0 0 0 
3021 11 14.10 0 0 0 
3024 11 9.10 0 0 0 
3033 11 11.90 0 0 0 
3042 11 4.10 0 0 0 
3048 11 3.10 0 0 0 
3054 11 4.30 0 0 0 
3060 11 8.60 0 0 0 
3066 11 3.10 0 0 0 
3072 11 2.20 0 0 0 
3081 11 1.90 0 0 0 
3087 11 9.00 0 0 0 
3093 11 4.90 0 0 0 
2025 11 13.63 3.27 0 0 
2026 11 13.72 3.44 0 0 
2027 11 0 0 3.33 1.09 
2035 11 16.45 5.97 0 0 
2037 11 16.45 5.97 0 0 
2045 11 1.22 0.46 0 0 
2046 11 0 0 12.61 4.15 
2047 11 1.22 0.44 0 0 
2048 11 0 0 12.61 4.15 





Security Factor of Lines 
and Transformers for 
Pembroke Network 
PPENDIX C shows the maximum allowed loading level and 
A the security factor of the lines and transformers for Pembroke Network, with and without security consideration. 
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Base Loading Maximum Allowed 
Line From To Level (MVA) Loading Level (MVA) S.F. 
1 2015 3090 17.15 11.18 1.53 
2 3090 3045 14.29 14.29 1.00 
3 3090 3057 17.15 6.05 2.83 
4 2005 3069 21.72 12.75 1.70 
5 2005 3078 14.29 6.47 2.21 
6 2005 3075 14.29 7.81 1.83 
7 3057 2005 22.86 11.55 1.98 
8 3069 3105 21.72 11.21 1.94 
9 3105 3012 21.72 6.43 3.38 
10 3105 3096 22.86 22.85 1.00 
11 2015 3012 21.72 8.25 2.63 
12 2015 3018 17.15 13.97 1.23 
13 2015 3027 12.52 5.81 2.15 
14 2015 3063 17.15 16.95 1.01 
15 2015 3036 22.86 11.19 2.04 
16 2015 3099 17.15 10.96 1.56 
17 2015 3102 17.15 17.12 1.00 
18 3102 3084 22.86 22.86 1.00 
19 3102 3006 23.43 23.38 1.00 
20 3006 3018 22.58 22.29 1.01 
21 3018 3051 22.58 22.58 1.00 
22 3099 3030 12.52 6.01 2.08 
23 3099 3039 22.86 11.39 2.01 
24 5150 2000 134.89 66.81 2.02 
25 5148 2631 176.05 97.02 1.81 
26 2000 2620 125.06 27.69 4.52 
27 2001 5149 149.98 89.02 1.68 
28 2001 2620 125.06 52.80 2.37 
29 2621 2010 125.06 68.59 1.82 
30 2620 2631 125.06 76.31 1.64 
31 2620 2011 125.06 66.99 1.87 
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Base Loading Maximum Allowed 
Transformer From To Level (MVA) Loading Level (MVA) S.F. 
1 3045 3042 17.00 17.00 1.00 
2 3090 3087 13.10 6.52 2.01 
3 3090 3087 13.10 6.54 2.00 
4 3057 3054 4.50 4.50 1.00 
5 2005 3021 19.57 9.68 2.02 
6 2005 3021 19.60 9.80 2.00 
7 3075 3072 4.89 2.67 1.83 
8 3078 3072 3.00 1.36 2.21 
9 3069 3066 4.70 4.70 1.00 
10 3096 3093 18.50 18.50 1.00 
11 3012 3009 11.40 5.70 2.00 
12 3012 3009 11.40 5.65 2.02 
13 3063 3060 10.00 4.97 2.01 
14 3063 3060 10.00 4.98 2.01 
15 3084 3081 4.00 4.00 1.00 
16 3006 3003 4.00 2.11 1.90 
17 3006 3003 14.00 10.07 1.39 
18 3006 3003 4.00 2.11 1.90 
19 3018 3015 17.90 8.97 2.00 
20 3018 3015 17.90 8.88 2.02 
21 3051 3048 4.70 4.70 1.00 
22 3027 2024 18.47 8.62 2.14 
23 3030 2024 18.52 8.93 2.07 
24 3036 3033 17.70 8.73 2.03 
25 3039 3033 17.70 8.88 1.99 
26 5140 5153 210.00 107.23 1.96 
27 5140 5154 240.00 118.07 2.03 
28 2000 2005 30.00 24.48 1.23 
29 2001 2005 45.00 29.92 1.50 
30 2010 2015 90.00 49.59 1.81 
31 2011 2015 90.00 48.47 1.86 





Circuit Loading Growth 
Rate Derivation for 
Method 2 
PPENDIX D provides the detailed derivation of the circuit 
A loading level’s static element, dynamic element and its growth rate using Method 2 in Chapter 4. 
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As in is assumed that the circuit loading level consists of a static element and a dynamic 
element, the loading level equation is as follow: 
Dn = DA + DB(1+ rB)
n (D.1) 
WhereDn is the circuit loading level at year n, DA and DB are the constant and growing 
elements respectively and rB is the rate DB is growing at. 
To obtain DA, DB and rB, the circuit loading level for the ﬁrst three years need to be 
simulated. Substituting D0, D1 and D2 into Equation D.1, gives: 
D0 = DA + DB (D.2) 
D1 = DA + DB(1+ rB) (D.3) 
D2 = DA + DB(1+ rB)
2 (D.4) 
Rearranging Equation D.2, gives: 
DA = D0 − DB (D.5) 
Therefore: 
D1 = D0 − DB + DB(1+ rB) 
D1 − D0 = DB(−1+ 1+ rB) 
= DBrB (D.6) 
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And 
D2 = D0 − DB + DB(1+ rB)
2 
D2 − D0 = DB(−1+ 1+ 2rB + rB 
2) 
= DBrB(2+ rB) 
= (D1 − D0)(2+ rB) 
D2 − D0 = 2+ rB
D1 − D0 
D2 − D0 
rB = − 2 (D.7) 
D1 − D0 
Knowing rB and rearranging Equation D.6: 
D1 − D0DB = (D.8) 
rB 






PPENDIX E shows the residential, industrial and commer-




Appendix E End Users’ Tariﬀs 
The distribution network charges only contributes to less than 20% of the electricity 
tariffs seen by the end users. For both networks, IEEE 14 bus-test system and Pem­
broke network the unit energy and supply prices and the unit transmission prices are 
assumed as follow: 
Demand Unit Energy, Supply Unit Transmission 
Residential 4.00 0.40 
Industrial 3.00 0.30 
Commercial 3.50 0.50 
Table E.1. Unit energy and supply prices and unit transmission prices for residential, industrial and 
commercial customers 
E.1 IEEE 14-bus Test System 
E.1.1 ICRP 
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Figure E.2. ICRP tariﬀs for industrial customers of IEEE 14-bus test system
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Figure E.4. LRIC tariﬀs for residential customers of IEEE 14-bus test system 
E.1.2 LRIC 
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Figure E.6. LRIC tariﬀs for commercial customers of IEEE 14-bus test system 
E.1.3 FCP 
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Figure E.8. FCP tariﬀs for industrial customers of IEEE 14-bus test system










Figure E.10. ICRP tariﬀs for residential customers of Pembroke network
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Figure E.12. ICRP tariﬀs for commercial customers of Pembroke network 
E.2.2 LRIC 




Appendix E End Users’ Tariﬀs

Figure E.14. LRIC tariﬀs for industrial customers of Pembroke network
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E.2.3 FCP 
Figure E.16. FCP tariﬀs for residential customers of Pembroke network
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